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This thesis examines the rôle and perception of the budget and budget
related issues in thirteen medium or large UK companies. The specific
issues examined include: the importance given to different roles of the
budget, the existence, sources and consequences of budget pressure, and
the degree of participation in the budget setting process.
Chapter 2 is a review of the traditional literature on budgeting. From
this review various general propositions have been developed in chapters
4 and 5. Data for this study were primarily obtained by a questionnaire
completed by a sample in each company and by interviews with company
officials.
Chapter 4 concludes that the budget is primarily seen as a forecast of
future performance although there is a sizeable minority who view the
budget as a target. The budget is used as a control device but this has
not produced unwelcome pressure, in fact a large majority consider that
increased pressure would be beneficial. Participation in the budget
setting process was not a general feature and there was desire for
increased participation.
In chapter 5 three user-groups are distinguished; namely, accountants.
senior non-financial managers, and first line managers. The perceptions
and attitudes of these user-groups to the issues discussed in chapter 4
were examined in this chapter. There was general agreement that the
budget was a forecast and that it was used as a control device. A
minority of senior managers indicated that there were budget related
incentives, particularly via promotion prospects. Accountants gave less
importance to the business oriented objectives. The managers felt that
pressure does arise from the use of the budget as a control device, but
the greatest source of this pressure is self-generated and thus not
likely to cause dysfunctional consequences. All groups sought increased
participation, but this was most strongly felt by accountants.
Chapter 6 contains a brief review of four organisational paradigms;
namely, contingency theory, organisational power, markets and
hierarchies and agency theory. The implications for budgeting from
these paradigms were examined and conclusions drawn in chapters 6 and 7.
The role of uncertainty was particularly important in drawing
comparisons between these organisational paradigms and the results of
the empirical study.
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Within the literature of management accounting, budgets and the
budgeting process has long been a subject for research and comment.
There is a considerable body of theory which relates to this area arid a
smaller body of empirical research. The empirical evidence which
relates to the use of the budget and other budget related issues within
U.K. companies is relatively small. The primary objectives of this
thesis are as follows.
To seek a better understanding of the role of the budget in medium
and large sized U.K. companies.
To learn more about certain important budget related issues within
these companies, particularly the extent of participation in the
budget setting process, and the sources and consequences of budget
pressure.
To investigate the perceptions and attitudes of different users of
the budget to the issues described above.
To relate the findings of the empirical study to the accounting
literature and to some important areas of the wider literature on
organi sat ions.
The basic structure of the thesis will now be outlined. Chapter 2
contains a review of the 'traditional' accounting literature on the role
of budgets and budget related Issues. From this review various general
propositions are drawn in chapters 4 and 5 which form the basis of the
empirical study. There are further smaller reviews of relevant
literature in chapters 4 and 5 in the places where this is needed.
Chapter 3 describes the methodology that has been adopted in the
empirical study. Data for this study were gathered by a questionnaire
completed by a sample from each company arid by means of an interview
with a senior company official. These visits occurred in late 1981 and
during 1982. The statistical techniques and methods of presentation of
data are also described.
The first part of the empirical study is presented in chapter 4.
This deals with the rOle of the budget in the thirteen medium and large
sized U.K. companies which form the sample. The objective at this stage
is to investigate the issues at the company level and where appropriate
to examine the differences that occur between the companies. An
investigation into whether there were systematic differences between the
companies was attempted, adopting a contingency theory approach.
In chapter 5 the focus changes and the same budget related issues
are examined with attention on the perceptions and attitudes of three
important user-groups. To enable conclusions to be drawn it was
necessary to develop testable hypotheses as to whether there would be
differences between the user-groups. This was done for four of the
general propositions that had been investigated in chapter 4.
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Chapter 6 contains the second main literature review in which a
wider perspective on the roles of budgets is taken. A few
representative items from four areas of the literature on organisations
are reviewed with the specific objective of ascertaining the
implications for company budgets and budgeting practices. The
conclusions from this review are compared with the results from the
empirical study. This process is continued in chapter 7 where the
conclusions of the previous chapters are summarised. At this point
certain general conclusions are drawn and implications for further
research are noted.
Finally in this introduction two points should be made. First,
masculine pronouns have been used throughout this thesis. This policy
has been adopted to avoid inelegant English and has no further
implication. Second, various acronyms and abbreviations have been used




REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON BU1XETS
In this chapter the literature that has a direct bearing on the
role, purpose and use of budgets is reviewed. The literature on this
subject is vast and, thus, this review is not fully comprehensive. How-
ever, the major aspects of budgeting that have figured prominently in
the literature in the last 25 years or so will be covered.
Later in the thesis, there are sections which include reviews of
other aspects related to the rOle and perception of budgets. These
reviews are presented at points where consideration of those aspects of
the literature will be most helpful to the arguments and evidence being
discussed. The final chapter is also predominantly literature-based and
considers important contributions from the wider literature on organisa-
tions.
2.1 Introduction
The 'conventional wisdom' contained within typical text books on
management accounting suggests that the budget has a multi-purpose rOle
in business organisations. A brief review of a sample of eight popular
texts 1
 reveals that the rOles usually include: forecasting, planning
co-ordination, communication, control and motivation. These rOles are
diverse and, in some instances, apparently incongruent, for example
planning as opposed to a motivational target. The text books give
little or no consideration to potential conflicts in the rOles they
describe. More advanced UK texts do consider these matters in more
detail (e.g. Amey & Eggintori (1973), Emmanuel & Otley (1985), Ezzamel &
Hart (1987)) but such texts are unlikely to be read by practitioners.
There are two other important aspects of budgeting which figure
very lightly, if at all, in many texts; that is actual practice in
business organisations and the large academic literature on budgets and
the budgetary process. The lack of this material results in such texts
being unable to discuss the differences that exist between practice and
the academic literature.
Few texts mention more of the large academic literature on budget-
ing than a few references to classic articles from twenty years ago.
Thus many of the most common texts present a view of the budget and
budget-related issues which is highly over-simplified and does not
attempt to deal with many of the more complex problems as seen by either
academics or practitioners. The divergence between theory and practice
is an issue which will be raised later in the thesis, but its origins
may lie partly in the preceding paragraphs.
Allied to this is the problem that there is a paucity of available
material which describes actual budgeting practices. 	 There is an
increasing number of studies which shed light on this matter but the
words of Scapens still apply:
"Unfortunately the available evidence is very limited; there
is no coherent body of literature which describes management
accounting in practice . . ." (Scapens (1984), p.36).
The remainder of this chapter will review the literature on budget-
ing and enable six basic propositions to be advanced in Chapter Four. To
impose some order on this review, a schema will be used which has been
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adapted from Otley (1977), viz:
1. Budgets as targets
2. Budgets as forecasts
3. Managerial use of budgets
4. Budgets as standards for performance evaluation
5. Participation in budget-setting.
This will be followed by a brief review of the empirical work on the use
of budgets in UK companies.
2.2 Bpgets as Targets
An issue that has been of interest to researchers for many years is
whether setting a budget which is difficult to achieve will result in
eventual higher performance and, if this is the case, under what condi-
tions will the effect be greatest. In the early decades of this century,
F.W. Taylor examined this matter and developed his theories of
Scientific Management in which motivation and increased performance are
central. In Taylor (1947) (first published in 1911) he describes how
the best performance will be obtained by determining the "best way" to
do a task and then using this optimal 'budget' as a target against which
rewards will be paid for achieving the target. Many criticisms have been
levelled against the work of Taylor and his followers (some of whom
developed the basic manual labour problems, about which Taylor wrote, to
include office work), particularly his simplistic attitude towards
motivation and human nature which viewed humans as being almost totally
motivated by financial rewards.
Stedry (1960) produced a similar conclusion though by very differ-
ent means. His laboratory experiment, using college students, examined
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different levels of budget difficulty (including no explicit budget) and
the links with aspiration levels and performance. The best results were
achieved by the group who had been given the hardest budget and allowed
to set the aspiration level after having received the budget. Stedry
concludes from this that there is evidence in his experiment that
business organisations will be able to improve performance by having
management set and impose difficult budgets on their staff. The appli-
cation of these results to business organisations has attracted a great
deal of criticism. Part of this concerns the specific conduct of the
experiment (e.g. a key question which was ambiguous and the lack of an
adequate feedback mechanism) but perhaps more important is the diff i-
culty of transferring results from a laboratory experiment, which made
no pretence at being 'the real world', to the environment of a business
organisation. However, it is the implication that imposed budgets may
be better than participative ones which has drawn much more criticism
than the implication that difficult budgets can improve performance.
Stedry followed up this laboratory experiment with a field study
which examined similar issues. Stedry & Kay (1964) report that dif f-
icult goals led to performance which was either very good or very poor.
They explain this by means of aspiration levels. As long as the budgetee
believes he can attain the budget target it will continue to motivate,
but if this target is seen as impossible, the aspiration level will
dramatically fall and there will be no motivating effect from the
budget.
Certain other writers have advanced a similar direct relationship
between targets and performance. E.A. Locke, who conducted a series of
experiments on this issue, concluded:
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"The results are unequivocal. The harder the goal the higher
the performance" (Locke (1968) p.162).
Similarly, Turcotte (1974), who investigated control systems in two
public sector organisations, concluded that it was precise, demanding
and widely understood objectives which were instrumental in producing
high performing agencies.
Bryan & Locke (1967) summarise some of their earlier work in three
statements:
(a) Specific hard goals produce a higher performance than a more
general goal of "do your best".
(b) Hard goals produce less overall task liking than easy goals.
(c) Specific hard goals produce more interest in the task than a
general goal of "do your best".
They then present the findings of another experiment which indicated




(c) increased favourable attitudes.
Ivancevich (1976) tested the hypothesis that multiple hard goads
would produce more effective performance from a sample of the sales
force of a large US company. The hypothesis was confirmed. It is of
particular interest that the sample was of sales force personnel who
frequently are faced with control through targets yet have rarely formed
part of any field experiment reported in the accounting and related
literature.
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There are a number of other reports that confirm this basic view of the
effects of a difficult-to-achieve target, but which add some form of
qualification. Hofstede investigated the issue of the budget as a target
in a number of Dutch companies. He concluded:
"[Budgets and standards] will have a more positive effect on
motivation when they are tighter and less easily attained.
This works up to a certain limit: beyond this limit tighten-
ing of standards reduces motivation". (llofstede (1968)
p.160).
This result has been seen or predicted by other writers (e.g. Stedry &
Kay (1964) and Ronen & Livingstone (1975)) and has been explained by
different theories. It is generally accepted that there will be a cut-
off point beyond which a difficult budget will no longer produce better
performance; in fact, performance will deteriorate rapidly.
Carol & Tosi (1970) in their study of a 'management by objectives'
scheme found that multiple goals did not produce negative results and
that different personality characteristics of the inagers were import-
ant. This is summarised in a subsequent book:
"However, difficult goals were associated with increased
effort among managers with high self-assurance, managers who
associated their performance with the reward system arid
mature managers". (Carol &Tosi (1973)).
Cherrington & Cherrington (1973) investigated the relevance of
Skinner's Reinforcement Theory to budget targets by conducting a labora-
tory experiment using college students. The conclusion of their experi-
merit was that an imposed, difficult budget did produce significantly
higher performance especially when appropriate reinforcements were
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given. Cherrington & Cherrington conclude that the reinforcement contin-
gencies are critical to the success of the budget as a motivational
device:
"Careful thought and attention need to be given to the
various forms of reinforcement and reward contingencies both
stated and implied in the budgeting process". (Cherrington &
Cherrington (1973) p.252).
Cherririgton et al. (1971) consider the nature of possible reinforcement
contingencies and stress the need for rewards to be positively contin-
gent on the desired perfornce (e.g. attaining the budget target).
Finally in this section, Ronen & Livingstone (1975) have presented
an Expectancy Theory model developed from House (1971), and they
discussed its implications for a budget-setting situation. The basic
formulation of the model is
M = IVb + P 1 (IV +	 P2EV)
where
M	 = motivation to work
IV = intrinsic valence associated with successful completion of
task
IV,, = intrinsic valance associated with goal directed behaviour
EV = extrinsic valence associated with
	
extrinsic reward
= expectancy that goal directed behaviour will accomplish the
work goal
P21 = expectancy that accomplishment will lead to the 	 extrin-
sic reward.
This theory suggests that high budget targets can produce high perform-
ance if correctly linked to a reward structure. However, this relation-
ship will hold subject to:
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(a) P 1 remaining high, i.e. there is still a reasonable expectancy that
the target can be met.
(b) P21 has a high value. This links with the previous study by
Cherrington & Cherrington (1975) where there must be a strong
relationship between achieving the target and gaining the reward.
2.2.1 Summar There is a considerable body of literature which mdi-
cates that the company budget could be used as a target with the
aim of increasing the motivation and performance of the
budgetees. The evidence suggests there are limitations to this
general rule and that there are some situations where the motiva-
ting effect will be greater than others. There are potential
problems in reconciling the budget as a target with the use of a
budget as a forecast (the aggregate target budgets will exceed
the budget forecast). This problem has only rarely been consid-
ered in the literature, for example Stedry (1960) and Hofstede
(1968).
2.3 Budgets as Forecasts
There is a little contention over the statement that budgets are
designed to be forecasts in many instances. The forecasting of future
performance arid the incorporation of these forecasts in management plan-
ning is one of the undisputed roles for the budget. However, for what
may appear as a straightforward aspect of the budget, many issues and
problems have arisen.
2.8
The first issue concerns the basic problem of obtaining a forecast
(in the absence of any organisation or behavioural problems). Otley has
examined this issue in two articles. Otley (1985) examined the implica-
tions of the budgetee adopting "most likely outcomes" when the under-
lying distribution is skewed. There are good reasons why the distri-
bution of earnings could be negatively skewed, primarily because
companies usually attempt to operate near their capacity constraint, and
Otley's study confirmed this in a sample of 41 managers from 2
organisations. If the budgetee adopts as his budget estimate the most
likely outcome, i.e. the mode rather than the average or long-run
expected outcome (the mean), the budget estimates, when aggregated, will
exceed the expected outcome for the organisation. Thus, where there is
a negatively skewed distribution, there is good reason to expect that
the aggregate budget, and the individual budgets in the long-run, will
contain an upward bias for purely technical or statistical reasons. To
mitigate this effect to some degree, Otley also tested, and confirmed,
the hypothesis that aggregation was likely to reduce the skewness of the
underlying distribution. 	 However, Otley & Berry (1979) have
demonstrated that one of the results of asymmetric distributions was to
magnify distortions to the budget as aggregation takes place. In their
example, a manager had nine subordinate managers who each bad a 3O
probability of meeting their budget, but the probability of the manager
meeting his aggregate budget was reduced to 6%.
One of the few studies of how forecasting is conducted in practice
was undertaken by Lowe & Shaw. In their study of a medium sized retail-
ing organisation they examined how the sales forecasts were prepared and
agreed over two years. Lowe & Shaw (1968) report three main sources of
bias that were incorporated into the sales forecasts, utz
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(a) because the reward system was based on meeting the budget there was
a tendency for downward bias, i.e. budgetary slack (see 2.3.1
below);
(b) an upward bias was caused by the company's new policy whereby a
growth element was to be incorporated in all budgets; and
(c) managers who had previously performed badly incorporated an upward
bias in their forecasts whereby their operations would appear
satisfactory - at least at the budget stage.
A second paper based on this study (Lowe & Shaw (1970)) examined
the more technical forecasting aspects of the process. They found a
strong tendency to over-estimate the sales in declining shops and also a
less strong tendency to under-estimate the sales in growing shops. This
confirmed a more general feature from the literature that the magnitude
of changes were frequently under-estimated. Also of considerable
interest is their finding that current knowledge about sales changes,
based on recent experience, was frequently ignored in the sales f ore-
casts. They conclude that this was the result of strong organisational
pressures (to have "acceptable" growth) which outweighed the empirical
evidence.
The conclusion from this section is that for both technical and
organisational reasons, forecasting will not be a straightforward pro-
cess and the comment, frequently heard in the interviews of this study,




Closely linked to the concept of the budget as a forecast is the
notion of Budget Slack (BS). A sizeable literature on this subject has
developed and some of the more important contributions 'will be reviewed
below.
The concept of BS has probably developed from the more general con-
cept of organisational slack in Cyert & March (1963). Merchant (1985a)
further considers this and suggests both beneficial and negative effects
from the existence of organisational slack, whereas BS is usually con-
sidered to have predominantly negative effects.
BS can be defined as the deliberate biasing of the budget forecast
by a subordinate manager with the objective of making the budget less
difficult to attain. Or, as "the excess of the amount budgeted in an
area over that which is necessary" (Merchant (1985b)). BS is differen-
tiated from forecasting errors by being premeditated, in fact there are
many references to the "managing" of PS.
Slack arises primarily as a result of the difference between
personal goals and organisational goals (Onsi (1973), Williamson (1964))
but there are many specific reasons why subordinate managers attempt to
incorporate BS, including.
(a) Obtaining a higher level of rewards in situations where rewards are
given on the basis of performance which is better than budget.
(b) Manipulation of long-run profits (and thus rewards in some
instances) by creating slack in good years and reconverting this in
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bad years (Schiff & Lewin (1970)). This process is often referred
to as "managing ES".
(c) Reducing the pressure to meet the budget being exerted by superior
managers. Argyris (1952) was among the first to note the efforts
of budget pressure and the tactic that could be employed to ameli-
orate the situation.
(d) Reducing uncertainty by 'de-coupling' various parts of the produc-
tion process. Slack resources are then used when some unexpected
event disrupts the production flow and thus slack isolates the
effect in one area, allowing other parts of the process to continue
normally for a while. Calbraith (1973) describes and gives examples
of this process. This procedure may be an organisational policy,
in which the term budget slack is probably inappropriate.
Alternatively, it could be the covert action of subordinate
managers.
Two basic conditions are required for BS to exist within an organ-
isation. First, that personal and organisational goals are not fully
congruent. Second, that the subordinate manager has some relevant know-
ledge (usually concerning effort or potential performance) not available
to senior management. Under such conditions, Schiff & Lewin, among many,
maintain that ES is unavoidable and will be greater as the degree of
authoritarianism in the organisation increases.
A number of studies have reported examples of the creation of ES.
In Williamson (1964), the three companies investigated displayed that
budgets had previously incorporated BS and in one company, where senior
management took action to 'squeeze' BS, there was a 20% fall in costs
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whilst output remained constant. In the study by Caibraith (1973) he
describes a number of ways in which slack was being built into the
budgets of large manufacturing organisations.
Onsi (1973) interviewed 32 middle-managers in 5 large US companies
and 80% freely admitted that they bargained for BS. This study also
revealed that it was usual for Divisional Controllers at least to know
of the existence of BS, but they did not attempt to help Top Management
in its efforts to remove slack. Schiff & Lewin (1970) estimated that PS
"may account for as much as 20 - 25% of a division's budgeted operating
expenses".
This section on BS will conclude with a brief review of four more
recent studies. Young (1985) used a laboratory experiment involving 40
MBA students to examine the effects of risk-attitudes and asymmetric
information. The study found that risk averse individuals attempted to
build in more BS than other types; that this tendency could be reduced
by social pressure; but, surprisingly, the hypothesis that increased
private information would cause the subordinate manager to build in
increased BS could not be confirmed. However, Merchant (1985a) found
that the propensity to create BS was strongly related to the superior's
ability to detect slack.
Waller (1988) also examined risk attitudes. His study confirmed
that both risk-neutral and risk-averse subjects will build in PS if the
reward system provides an incentive so to do. However, the study further
indicated that when a "truth-inducing pay scheme" was introduced the PS
was reduced by 80% for the risk-neutral subjects but by only 23% by the
risk-averse subjects. Thus the truth inducing scheme had only a very
limited effect on the risk-averse group and could not be relied upon to
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substantially reduced BS.
A number of writers (Argyris (1952), Onsi (1973), Schiff & Lewin
(1970)) have suggested that there are good reasons why increased part-
icipation in the budget-setting process should result in a reduction in
BS. Merchant (1985a), in his study using 170 responses from middle
managers in manufacturing companies, found strong support for his
hypothesis that participation would lead to a reduced propensity to
create BS. Govindarajan (1986) examined this proposition by adopting a
contingency approach in which environmental uncertainty was the key
situational variable. His hypothesis that increased participation will
bring about decreased BS only where high environmental uncertainty
exists was confirmed.
Finally, a more elaborate model was constructed by Lukka (1988) who
then used it to improve his understanding of what was observed in a
particular business organisation. The model dealt with the factors that
may determine budgetary biasing at the level of the individual and the
organisation. The model of the budgetary process at this organisational
level is shown in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1
The Budgetary Process from the Biasing Viewpoint



































2.3.2 pninartJ In most business organisations the budget will have a
role as a forecast, though this will not necessarily be its sole
rOle. However, the technical problems of determining an accurate
forecast and the organisational problems, such as budgetary
slack, result in this forecasting rOle being complex and proble-
matic.
2.4 The Managerial Use of Budgets
The fundamental point which is made in this section is that the
budget cannot be viewed in isolation or solely as a technical device
forming part of the accounting system. Some of the traditional writing
on budgets, and an increasing amount of the recent literature, stress
that the budget is primarily designed as an instrument to help manage-
ment in its task of controlling the organisation. The budget is viewed
in its organisational context. The literature suggests (for example,
Hopwood (1972), Otley (1978)) that where meeting the budget is a major
objective in itself, the organisation will perform less effectively than
an organisation where the budget is viewed in a wider context.
This managerial or organisational view of the budget is apparent in
much of the literature. For example, Hofstede (1968) emphasises the
managerial rOle of budgets throughout his book. Merchant describes a
budgeting system as:
a combination of information flows and administrative
processes and procedures that is usually an integral part of
the short-range planning and control system of an organisa-
tion". (Merchant (1981), p.813).
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and the budget itself as:
"... the primary financially-oriented organisational control
mechanism ...". (Merchant (1984), p.291).
Otley (1980) considers the budget as part of an "organisational control
package", the components of which "form a package which can only be
evaluated as a whole".
This management and organisational emphasis can be seen in writers
who have developed less common roles for the budget. Parker (1978)
considers the budget as a communication device capable of being an
important instrument for upward and dowiiward communication within the
firm. Covaleski &Dirsmith (1986)
"... [assess] these political theories of organisations
which suggest that budgeting serves to establish, distribute
and maintain power within organisations".
This is not a new emphasis as Cyert & March (1963) saw budgets as the
result of a political bargaining process and that their role may be to
legitimise decisions, power and control within an organisation. This
organisational aspect of the budget will be further developed in Chapter
Six.
The final subject to be considered in this section concerns
managerial choice of the rOle and use of budgets. As Merchant (1984)
expressed this: "Budgeting ... is now generally recognised to be used
differently in different organisations". This feature was noted before
it could be explained, but it is clear from many writers that management
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choose to use their budgets In very different ways. Bruns & Waterhouse
(1975) were among the first to examine budgetary control systems specif -
ically in this light and to adopt a contingency approach to explain the
differences in company budgeting practices. A more detailed review of
Contingency Theory is held over to Chapter Six but at this stage the
general feature of this approach is noted, i.e. that in different
environmental situations and organisational structures, different
budgetary control systems will be adopted. Bruns & Waterhouse found
that larger, more diversified organisations, which were generally more
decentralised, developed more formal and complex budgeting systems.
Sunnnanj. The budget does not exist in isolation from the organisation
in which it is found. Rather, the organisation's context will to some
extent shape managerial choice of the role and use of budgets and there
are certain rOles for the budget which only become apparent when seen in
the wider organisational setting.
2.5 Budgets as Standards for Performance Evaluations
This is the familiar use of the bu3get as a means of control
through the process of comparing actual performance with budgeted per-
formance, calculating variances, investigating their causes where
appropriate and taking any necessary remedial action. All textbooks
examine this aspect, usually in considerable detail, and with varying
degrees of sophistication. This rOle for the budget has received support
from some writers whose interest lies in more general appraisal issues.
Thompson and Dalton (1970) examined the quite common "peer comparison"
appraisal techniques and demonstrated some of the problems of these
"zero-sum" approaches. They advocated "objective-focussed" appraisal
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techniques of which budget centred evaluation or "management by excep-
tion" are examples.
Meyer, Kay & French (1965) conducted a series of studies on
appraisal related issues in the General Electric Company. Among their
findings was that appraising more than one aspect at once, using the
same means, was likely to cause major problems. This has importance in
the budgeting context as there is often some ambiguity about what is
being evaluated. In particular, typically, there is evaluation of a
department or cost centre and the evaluation of the head of the depart-
ment or cost centre. There are important differences in the evaluation
of these although they may in practice be appraised at the same time,
using the same data.
There is also a well-established theme in the literature (e.g.
Locke & Bryan (1966) & (1967), Meyer, Kay & French (1965)) which states
that specific goals will produce better performance than the more
general goal of "do your best". Steers (1976) found that specific goals
were strongly positive related to job satisfaction and job involvement.
The use of the budget in the performance evaluation process is a clear
means of setting clear and specific goals, irrespective of whether the
budget is seen as a difficult target at which to aim.
The academic literature (as opposed to text books) has spent little
time on the basic aspect of how the budget can be used as a standard for
performance evaluation. There has been some interest in the advantages
or otherwise of different variance calculations; one of the more
controversial issues being that of ex ante versus ex post analysis
advanced by Demski (1967). The cx post concept was criticised by Aniey
(1973), most strongly because it did not exist as a choice facing the
2.18
decision maker and thus has no control significance.
However, there has beei a long-standing interest in the
consequences of using the budget for performance evaluation. As for
back as Argyris (1952) there was recognition that the mariner in which
performance evaluation, in relation to the budget, was conducted could
have serious consequences for the organisation as a whole. This has
resulted in considerable interest in the effects of pressure to meet the
budget and a substantial literature.
2.5.1 Budget and Pressure
Argyris (1952), in a fascinating study by interviews and observa-
tion, described how pressure to meet the budget resulted in a range of
dysfunctional behaviour. This included: concentration on sub-units
rather than the organisation as a whole, much time and effort expended
on proving that someone else was responsible for a budget variance, the
creation of groups and group loyalties, and implicitly in the building
of budget slack.
Hofstede (1968) describes how high reliance on accounting perform-
ance measures leads to high feelings of pressure and nervousness. Onsi
(1973) found that when the budget was being used for performance evalua-
tion in such a way that pressure to meet the budget was experienced by
the budgetee, then the creation of budget slack, with dysfunctional
consequences, would result. Similarly, Merchant (1985a) found that when
there was pressure on the manager because meeting the budget was an
important factor in resource allocation, the motivation to build in
slack increased.
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hayes (1977) trade a more general point when he wrote,
"The research results ... indicate that the traditional
managerial accounting tools were relatively poor explanators
of effectiveness".
The use of the budget as a standard for performance evaluation is thus
fraught with problems as it is effectiveness which ideally should be
measured and encouraged. A similar point is made in Hopwood (1972),
pp. 157 - 158. This general problem can be exacerbated by the manner in
which the budget is used, as is demonstrated in the following.
In a paper in 1972, Hopwood considered this issue and others have
conducted further research on the matter. Hopwood's empirical test took
place in a large US manufacturing company using questionnaires and
interviews. Four styles of evaluation were defined, namely:
i. Budget Constrained style (BC) : meeting the budget, but not concern
with costs ranked in the top three.
ii. Budget-Profit style (BP) : both meeting the budget and concern with
costs were ranked in the top three. (This style was azrlgamated
with BC above for some purposes).
iii. Profit-Conscious style (PC) : concern with cost, but not meeting
the budget ranked in the top three.
iv. Non-Accounting style (NA) : neither meeting the budget nor concern
with costs were ranked in the top three.
The study concluded that managers who feel they are being evaluated
under a BC style reported:
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(a) significantly higher levels of job-related tension than in the
other two groups;
(b) that relations with their superiors deteriorated;
(c) less favourable relations with peers;
(d) that they were more likely to engage in manipulative behaviour.
Perhaps surprisingly, the style of evaluation did not seem to
affect whether the budget was met or not. Hopwood also concluded that
it is not the use of the budget as a standard of performance evaluation
per Se, but the manner in which the evaluation is conducted and then
used which is important. Only when meeting the budget becomes an end in
itself, irrespective of any dysfunctional consequences, does it become
the source of considerable pressure and the consequences noted above
occur. The study was unable to directly test the impact of these styles
of evaluation on overall organisational performance, but it was
Hopwood's conclusion "that a PC style is likely to result in a higher
level of efficiency than a BC style'.
These important findings about the use of the budget in performance
evaluation have not remained unchallenged. Otley (1978) replicated part
of Hopwood's study using 57 managers from a UK manufacturing company.
His findings indicated that an evaluation style which involved particu -
lar stress on meeting the budget (BC) resulted in:
(a) a decrease in job ambiguity and better performance;
(b) no significant increase in job-related tension;
(c) budgets being met more frequently;
(d) evidence of manipulation and the incorporation of budget slack;
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(e) better general financial performance.
These results, with the exception of (d), were contrary to those presen-
ted by Hopwood. Otley (1977 & 1978) suggests some reasons for this,
including : differences in responsibilities in units (profit centres v.
cost centres), size, and differences in the operating environment. These
differences may also reflect differences between US and UK and this
possibility is discussed later in the thesis.
Hirst (1981) took up the basic ideas of Hopwood and suggested that
accounting performance measures will be perceived as being incomplete
and that where this occurs, dysfunctional behayiour of various types
will occur. Hirst particularly stressed the roles of task uncertainty
and reliance on accounting performance measures (RAPM). He hypothesised
that internal measures of performance will be perceived as more complete
when task uncertainty is low, rather than when it is high. He examined
the difference combinations of degree of RAPM and degree of uncertainty
and made a number of propositions which include many where considerable
dysfunctional consequences follow.
In Hirst (1983) this model was used to investigate the differences
between the results of Hopwood (1972) and Otley (1978). He concluded
that RAPM is associated with job-related tension but that this associa-
tion is dependent on task uncertainty, e.g. where there was high task
uncertainty, job-related tension increased as 1APM increased. Hirst
concludes that the use of intervening variables gives a possible recon-
ciliation of the differences between Hopwood and Otley.
Brownell (1982) is another attempt to examine the differences
between Hopwood and Otley. This study examined the rOle of budget part-
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icipation as a moderating variable between evaluatory style and perform-
ance, although in this study job satisfaction was used as a surrogate
for performance. Brownell found support for his hypothesis that partici-
pation is a moderating variable and he states:
"[there is] strongest support for Hopwood's contention that a
Budget Constrained style can directly result in adverse
consequences." p. 23.
Brownell suggests that participation works as a moderating variable
because it ensures that only organisationally functional information is
included in the budget, which then becomes a more complete measure of
performance and, thus, if a BC style is adopted it will result in
organisationally better performance being encouraged.
Brownell & first followed up the studies outlined above and an
earlier study by Kennis. Kennis (1979) had tested a range of budget-
related variables, and one conclusion in particular that, where budget
goals were "too tight" they would result in increasing job-related
tension. Browriell & first (1986) tested two hypotheses; first, the
relation between performance and the three variables: budget participa-
tion, budget emphasis (similar to evaluatory style) and task uncer-
tainty; and, second, the relationship between job-related tension and
the same variables. Unfortunately, the hypothesised relationship for
performance was not supported, and thus this did not confirm the results
of Brownell (1982). For job-related tension it was found that compat-
ible combinations of participation and budget emphasis (high : high and
low : low) are more effective in reducing job-related tension in low as
opposed to high task uncertainty situations.
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2.5.2 Summary. The large number of studies indicate that the style of
budget used as a standard for performance evaluation is critical
to the success of the evaluation. When the budget is used in an
inappropriate manner, there is a strong likelihood that dysfimc-
tional consequences will result. The more recent studies have
attempted to look more deeply at this relationship and examine
the role of other budget-related characteristics. This examina-
tion is not complete, but a contingency approach appears to be
the most promising way ahead in which the interrelationships
between various variables are examined and some conclusions drawn
to enable good design of performance evaluation systems.
2.6 Participation in Budget-Setting
This subject has already been mentioned in passing, particularly
with reference to budget slack and budget pressure. There is a large
literature which merits a separate review and discussion. Within this
literature on participation different issues have been raised and
approaches taken, and this will be taken into account in the framework
adopted for the review as shown below:
1. Studies which report general results.
2. Generally accepted conclusions.
3. Studies which use contingent or intervening variables.
4. Other issues.
2.6.1 Studies which report general results
Among the first to comment on this matter was Argyris (1952). After
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describing many of the dysfunctional consequences of authoritarian
budgeting systems which produced pressure and stress on employees, he
strongly advocated a change to a more participative style as the remedy
to cure the undesirable behaviour he had observed. Other writers
endorsed this position that participation would bring benefits to the
organisation, including improved performance.
Milani (1975) found that increased participation was related to
increased performance; the association was not strong being, significant
at the 10% level. Searfoss (1976), in a large study of 342 foremen in
five industrial companies, found that increased perceived participation
was related to increased motivation to achieve the budget and concluded:
"[there was] the possibility of increasing effort expended by
increasing the perception of participation". p.384.
Searfoss also observed that the effects of participation will filter
down through an organisation so those managers who are allowed to part-
icipate are more likely to allow their subordinates to participate in
decision-making.
Kennis (1979), in a study which examined many different variables,
found that participation produced an increase in budget performance, but
did not find a significant overall relationship with job performance.
In a study using professional engineers in their usual work situation,
Ivancevich (1979) found that those managers who were deprived of the
participation which they desired performed significantly worse than
other non-deprived managers.
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There are also research reports which have concluded that partici-
pation is not, in general, likely to improve performance. Stedry (1960)
concluded from his laboratory experiment on students that imposed goals
(budgets) produced better results than goals formed in other ways. In a
study of the attitudes to and success of a "nnagement by objectives"
scheme, Carol & Tosi (1970) concluded that participation in the setting
of goals (budgets) did not seem important in the perceived success of
the scheme. Neither did participation result in better relations with
superiors of better goal achievement. These were unusually negative
results, as the study found virtually no positive benefits from partic-
ipation.
Foran & DeCoster (1974) used the concept of "cognitive dissonance"
as a means of explaining the effects of participation. Cognitive disson-
ance occurs when a subject holds two cognitions which are psychologic-
ally inconsistent, i.e. when there is confusion as to which beliefs and
actions result from a particular situation. It is usually supposed that
individuals will avoid this situation if possible. Foran & DeCoster
hypothesised that authoritarian and participative styles would produce
significantly different levels of cognitive dissonance. However, their
tests did not support this hypothesis and little value for participation
was evidenced. Ivancevich (1976) also failed to find empirical support
for his hypothesis that the participative group in his study would
produce a better performance than an authoritarian group.
Thus there is clearly a difference in the literature between those
finding evidence for a general benefit from participation and those un-
able to find such evidence. This difficulty will be further examined in
Section 2.6.3.
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2.6.2 Generally Accepted Conclusions
Before examining further the problems raised by the contradictory
results regarding the effects of participation on performance, there are
some issues where the literature has a more consistent voice.
2.6.2a Job Sattsfactton. In 1964, having reviewed the available litera-
ture, Vroom (1964) stated:
"There is considerable evidence that the satisfaction of sub-
ordinates is positively associated with the degree to which
they are permitted an opportunity to participate in making
decisions". p.115
Further evidence, subsequently, has supported Yroom's conclusion that
increased participation will result in increased job satisfaction. A
study by Steers (1976) found a strong positive relationship between
participation and job satisfaction. This sample was unusual in being
female without higher education, whereas most other samples were of
college students or managers. Chenhall & Brownell (1988) also found
support for this relationship, as did Swieringa & Moncur (1972) in their
sample of 26 bank branch managers. Ivancevich (1976) is one of the very
few tests not to support this conclusion (and there were problems in
this test concerning the transition to a participative style which may
explain the lack of positive results).
2.6.2b Reduced Job Tension. There is little evidence to the contrary
and much to support the proposition that participation will reduce job
tension. The basis for the comments by Argyris (1952) is that partici-
pation will reduce the tension caused by the authoritarian system he had
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observed. Brownell & Hirst (1986) found in their three-way test involv-
ing budget evaluation, task uncertainty and budget participation, that
participation significantly reduced. job-related tension.
The above discussion assumes that job tension is undesirable for
some reason and thus it would be beneficial to reduce it. However, the
results of Swieringa & Moncur (1972) suggest that this may not be so.
The bank managers in their sample who experienced increased partic-
ipation also experienced considerably greater job-tension. This may
have been as a result of their "boundary position" between head office
and the branch or it may have been an inevitable consequence of
participation. This was considered acceptable by the managers because
(a) participation brings other benefits which outweigh increased
tension, and (b) the increased job tension is still within tolerable
limits. This study is an exception to the general conclusion, given
above, and may reflect the unusual position of branch bank managers in
the study.
2.6.2c More favourable job attitudes. There are a number of different
attitudes which are encompassed in this heading. French, Kay & Meyer
(1966) found that participation improved the attitude of employees to
the appraisal system in which they were allowed to help set goals.
Hofstede (1968) found participation was an important feature in improv-
ing attitudes towards the budget system (see Figure 2.2. in Section
2.6.3). Milani (1975) shows that participation was positively related
to attitudes towards the firm as a whole.
In studies by Mia (1987) and Govindarajan (1986) a composite van-
able for managerial attitudes was used comprising attitudes towards:
superiors, the budget, the firm, undesirable activity, etc. 	 In both
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these studies there was a positive relationship between participation
and improvement in attitudes.
Thus it is apparent from the literature that while the relationship
between participation and performance is problematic, the relationships
with job satisfaction, job tension and job attitudes are far less
equivocal.
2.6.3 Studies which use contingent or intervening variable
It was clear in Section 2.6.1 that there was no consensus on the
effects of participation on performance. The studies reviewed there
examined general or universal propositions regarding the participation!
performance relationship. Hofstede (1968) put this universal relation-
ship in this diagram of the "traditional view of the effect of partici
-
pation on standard-setting" shown in Figure 2.2 below.
Figure 2.2
The Universal Proposition Regarding Participation and Performance
as per Hofstede (1968) p.178
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universal to a more contingent view in which there are many variables to
be considered and where an increase in participation may or may not lead
to better performance. The Hofstede model is shown in Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3
An Improved Model of the Effect of Participation on Standard
Setting, as per Hofstede (1968). p.178
This section contains a review of some of the variables which have
been examined as possible contingent or intervening variables to account
for the relationship between participation and performance. It is
suggested that the different results described in Section 2.6.1 arose
because these contingent variables were ignored. They were in fact in
operation and in some of the tests they were unintentionally compatible,
and thus a positive relationship between participation and performance
was found.	 Whereas, in others they were incompatible and thus no
relationship was found. These variables will now be examined.
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2.6.3a Persoriattt Times. This was the first variable to be noticed
and tested. Vroom (1959) found that participation produced improved
performance when those involved were "low authoritarian persons with
high independence needs". These two variables were high correlated and
thus both characteristics were frequently found in the same people. He
also found that there was no improvement in performance f or persons with
the opposite characteristics. Searfoss & Monczha (1973) produced a very
similar result.
Seiler & Bartlett (1982) attempted to look at this question from a
different perspective and tested whether it was possible to predict
budget system characteristics from personality variables. Their tests
concluded that authoritarian inflexible persons with high independence
needs would be found in non-participative budgetary systems and vice
versa. It is worthy of note here that Vroom found participation and
high independence needs were compatible whereas Seiler & Bartlett found
participation and low independence needs produced better performance.
There appears to be no obvious reconciliation of this contradiction. On
the basis of their results, Seiler & Bartlett recommend that all changes
in budget systems should be evolutionary as the current state is likely
to reflect the personality characteristics of the current staff and such
characteristics cannot be changed rapidly.
Two studies are reviewed that have examined the personality vari-
able "locus of control". This variable "measures the extent to which
individuals exercise control over the reinforcements which occur rela-








'Internals", who feel their rewards and punishments are determined
by their own actions, and
"Externals', 'who feel that the force which yields rewards or
punishment is beyond their control.
Brownell (1981) summarised the preceding literature as in Figure 2.4.
Figure 2.4
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Brownell examined the hypothesis that performance would be higher
when locus of control and participation were congruent. The laboratory-
based test was carried out on samples of students and managers and in
both cases the predicted relationship was found.
Licata et at (1986) examined the effects of the locus of control
variable in the superior manager, whereas Brownell and others had looked
at the effects in subordinate managers. The hypothesis that internals
would allow a greater degree of participation than externals was tested
by a laboratory experiment. The hypothesis was supported by the test at
the 1% level of significance and forms an interesting counterpart to the
Brownell (1981) results.
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The results of these tests suggest that for personality types,
particularly in respect of locus of control and degree of authoritari-
anism, there are considerable differences in the relationship with
participation. Participation has been associated with increased perf or-
mance in certain predictable personality types.
2.6.3b.	 Orcianisattonat attttudes.	 This title includes a range of
attitudes also described as "cohesiveness", "morale" or "attitudes
towards the firm". The hypothesis that has been examined is that unless
these attitudes are positive, then participation will not have a bene-
ficial effect on performance, and it may be detrimental. Becker & Creen
(1962) examined this issue in a theoretical manner and proposed that
only where the attitudes within the organisation (to other members and
to the objectives) were positive, would participation produce benefits
in performance. Mia (1988) tested a similar hypothesis, i.e. "Managers
whose budget participation is congruent with their attitude will demon-
strate improved performance, while managers whose budget participation
is incongruent with their attitude will demonstrate hampered
performance". This hypothesis was tested on a sample of 83 managers
from a large manufacturing company and could not be rejected at 2%
significance level.
Thus the evidence suggests that organisational attitudes are impor-
tant features in the relationship between participation and improved
performance. Without positive attitudes, performance will not be
improved by participation. However, there is a possible problem of
circularity here. In section 2.6.2c, it was seen that participation
will result in improved organisational attitudes, and in this section
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participation may be dependent upon good organisational attitudes. This
circularity has not been noted in the literature and thus its importance
has not been evaluated. It is the opinion of the researcher that
organisational attitudes are probably not important causal variables,
but are better considered as constraints on participation producing
improved performance. In an environment which is conducive to effective
participation there will be good organisational attitudes and such
attitudes will also be strengthened by participation.
2.6.3c Uncertatnt. Different forms of uncertainty have been examined.
Caibraith (1973) wrote:
"It is hypothesised that in order to be effective, organisa-
tions will utilize these forms [i.e. participative lateral
relations] in proportion to the amount of task uncertainty".
p .47
He found evidence for this hypothesis in a number of large organisa-
tions.
Brownell & Hirst (1986) tested the interaction of three variables,
one of which was task uncertainty, with participation and performance.
Their evidence did not support the hypothesis made by Galbraith above,
although they had expected to be able to confirm it.
Covindarajan (1986) proposed a formal contingency approach to the
explanation of participation and tested environmental uncertainty as one
of two key contingent variables. His straightforward hypothesis that
"the greater the environmental uncertainty, the greater the positive
impact of participation in the budgetary process on managerial perform-
ance" was tested using a sample of 77 managers from a large business
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organisation. The results gave "clear and strong support" for this
hypothesis.
The general impression from the papers considered is that uncer-
tainty, either task or environmental, is a potential intervening or
contingent variable which will help to explain the participation
performance relationship.
2.6.3d Motivation. Two studies involving Peter Brownell attempted to
show that the primary cause of the link between participation and
improved performance was by means of improved motivation. This view had
been advocated by many from Argyris (1952) and Becker & Green (1962)
onwards. Both of the Brownell studies (Brownell (1983) and Brownell &
Mclnnes (1986)) adopted an expectancy theory approach to the measurement
of motivation and tested the hypothesis using questionnaires on middle-
level managers. These studies failed to find support for the interven-
ing effect of motivation and Brownell & Mclnnes found one of the key
relationships to be opposite to that predicted by the hypothesis. It is
interesting to note that a strong positive relationship between partici-
pation and performance was found, but "only a small proportion of this
was accounted for by the path through motivation" (Brownell & Mclnnes
(1986), p.59'T).
Mia (1988) has also examined this proposition. His hypothesis was
that where participation and motivation are congruent then improved
managerial performance will result. Mia examined the potential of
motivation as a construct moderating the relationship between budget
participation and performance. Here the term moderating is used in the
sense that motivation is related to neither participation nor perform-
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ance but to the relationship between these latter variables as shown in
the figure 2.5 below. (Mia (1988), p.467).
Figure 2.5




Mia found that the results of his study strongly supported the moderat-
ing effect of motivation and that congruence between participation and
motivation was strongly associated with improved performance.
Thus, whereas the interaction between motivation and the participa-
tion-performance relationship has been discussed for many years, it
appears to be more complex than originally thought. Some earlier tests
failed to confirm simpler hypotheses but a more complex hypothesis by
Mia was supported.
2.6.3e Role wnbtquit. Chenhall & Brownell (1988) stated that simple
relationships between participation and performance are not supported by
the literature and so they continued the exploration for intervening
variables which explain the relationship. Their study examined role
ambiguity which occurs when the expectations for managers are such that
they caimot clearly be translated into behaviour or expected performance
levels. The results of Chenhall & Browriell (1988) do not support a
positive relationship between participation and performance directly.
However, their hypothesis that rOle ambiguity is an intervening variable
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which explain the relationship, is strongly supported.
2.6.3f Information AstjmntetrTj is the final variable to be considered.
Young (1985), in a laboratory experiment using 40 MBA students, investi-
gated the hypothesis that information asymmetry, particularly in favour
of the subordinate manager, would result in dysfunctional behaviour and
poorer performance. This hypothesis could not be supported in general
because the subjects engaged in very diverse behaviour when they had
private information. Some of this behaviour was as predicted, but much
was not.
2.6.4 Other Comments on Participation
Two other articles have made important contributions to this liter-
ature. First, Daroca (1984) examined the specific group effects in a
participative budget setting. Many of the other studies have included
these effects implicitly because they have questioned managers about
their practices which include some group loyalties and other group
effects. Daroca conducted a laboratory experiment to examine these
effects specifically. He found that participation in a group setting
produced some interesting results, including:
(a) The group may encourage the sharing of information and thus
increasing the total information available. This is one of the
advantages that is frequently put forward in support of partici-
pat ion.
(b) Certain types of information may be inhibited by the group process,
particularly information which is contrary to the initial or gener-
ally held position.
2.37
(c) A budget developed by a group may not be internalised by the
individuals as the result is seen as "only an artifice of the
group". This is contrary to the typical advantages of participa-
tion advocated in textbooks.
A second important paper is that of Parker (1979) where he examined
the institutional aspects of participation and surveyed the prospects
for increased participation. The differences between countries and the
effects of institutions, such as the legal system and the trade unions,
put the results outlined above in a wider perspective.
2.7 UK Empirical Evidence on the Role of Company Budgets
The actual rOle played by the budget in UK companies has not
figured prominently in the literature. Such evidence as there is comes
from three sources 	 literature which directly addresses this issue;
published case-studies, and UK textbooks.
2.7.1 Ltterature ithich dtrecth. exanttrtes the rOte of the budget.
Probably the earliest work on this that still has any relevance today is
Perrin (1958). This PhD thesis examined budgetary planning and control
in 30 UK companies. 22 of these companies used operating budgets.
Perrin asked questions directly about the objectives and purposes of the
budget and the overwhelming response gave forecasting, planning and cost
control as the primary objectives. There was no mention of budgets being
used as targets or any other directly motivational purpose. All but one
of the companies stated that their budgets were expectations, i.e. fore-
casts of what they expected would occur.
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Dew & Gee (1972) investigated management control in UK companies
and the budget was an important aspect of this in many of them. In a
study quoted by Dew & Cee, 45% of the managers interviewed made no use
of the budget and a further 29% made only limited use of it for manage-
ment control purposes. Dew & Cees own study found a greater use being
made of the budget and the overall picture is of a budget designed as a
forecast and being used in planning and control. Again, there is no
discussion of motivational purposes for the budget.
The final item considered is Murray (1970) in which the management
controls of four business organisations from Eire were examined. The
budget is only a part of this investigation but there is no evidence of
any motivational target in the roles which the budget plays. The
emphasis is again on planning and control, and efficiency gains are
sought through better planning and control rather than by direct
motivation to higher effort levels.
2.7.2 Case-Studtes. Where case-studies describe the budgetary system
in a particular company, they give useful insight from which it is quite
often possible to conclude what rOle the budget has in that company. As
an example, a very useful series of case-studies has been edited by
Sizer & Coulthurst (1985). In volume 1, seven of the case-studies
describe the budgetary process in sufficient detail to enable some con-
clusions as to the budget rOle to be drawn. Six of the companies have a
budget which is a forecast of expected performance and only one has a
direct motivational target.
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2.7.3 IlK text-boo1s. Although text-books do not directly describe
practice, there is a high probability that text-books and practice are
closely related. Text-book writers pay some attention to "the real
world" whereas practitioners are influenced by the texts from which they
learned. If this is so, then an examination of the UK text-books popu-
larly used to teach practicing management accountants will give an
indication of the role of the company budget. Many of the texts make
virtually no mention of anything other than forecasting, planning and
control (e.g. Baggott (1973), Batty (l978a), Edey (1959) and Wald
(1984)). Others, such as Arnold & Hope (1983) and Drury (1985) give
much more emphasis to the traditional forecasting and control whilst
giving some time to the motivational aspects.
2.7. I Suinmarij. From this brief review of the empirical literature on
the use of the budget in UK companies, it appears that the budget is
primarily seen as a forecast of likely actual performance which can be
used for planning and control purposes.
NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO
1. The eight texts reviewed were:
Arnold & Hope (1983), Drury (1985), Emmanuel & Otley (1985),
Heitger & Matulich (1982), Horngren (1982), Killough & Leininger
(1984), Moriarty & Allen (1984), and Shillinglaw (1982).
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(IIAPTER ThREE
MF11ODOLOCY AN]) STATISTICAL TESTS
3.1 THE SAMPLE
The central objective of this study was to investigate the
perceptions of the role of the budget and attitudes towards certain
budget related issues within a sample of U.K. companies.If it could be
assumed that uniform perceptions and attitudes towards the budget
prevail within each company, it would have been feasible to send a
postal questionnaire to a large number of companies. This would have
had the advantage of a large sample size enabling parametric statistical
techniques to be used.
However, although an official company view may exist, it is
doubtful whether this would be held by all members of the organisation.
Indeed, a crucial issue to be explored in this study is the extent to
which different budget users hold similar perceptions and attitudes.
Moreover, the restriction on the companies participating to a relatively
small number, allowed individual characteristics of companies to be
investigated by personal interviews with company personnel.
Consequently this study adopts the following strategy.
(a) A questionnaire on the rOle of budgets and related issues was
distributed to employees within a small number of companies, the
selection of which is discussed in section 3.1.2.
(b) Each company participating was visited and a senior financial
official was interviewed. More details of this are given in
section 3.3. The chief aim of the interview was to obtain
information about the company's structure, organisation and
environment which would enable the results of the
questionnaire to be interpreted at a later stage.
3.1.1 The Three User Croups
It would have been possible to select a random sample of company
employees to complete the questionnaire. However, another possibility
was adopted as having considerable advantages over a random sample. The
budget is used by various members of a company, many of whom come from
recognisable, definable groupings. These are termed user-groups within
this study. Three user-groups were selected and from each user-group a
sample, the selection of which is discussed below, was asked to complete
the questionnaire. The three user-groups are stated and described below.
The abbreviation given after each user-group is used frequently in the
remainder of the thesis.
(a) Accountants (ACCT) This group is distinct and there were no
problems in definition or selection. The group is not wholly
comprised of qualified accountants, but all the members are above
the level of accounts clerks (many are part-qualified). In all the
companies the members of this user-group are part of the accounting
function and have their sole or primary responsibility within this
function.
(b) Senior Non-Financial Managers (SNFM). This user-group came from a
range of functions within the company. Typical members of the
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company who were included in this user-group were : managing
director/general manager; heads of production, maintenance,
research and development and occasionally marketing. The finance
director was not part of the user-group.
(c) First Line Managers (FLM). This group was the most difficult to
define and the definition used for the purposes of this study was
"the lowest level of management where there is direct involvement
with budget data in the course of normal work". Typically this
user-group comprised heads of departments or cost-centres.
It was the a prtort belief of the researcher that members of these
user-groups, which occupy very different positions and have different
functions within the orgarlisation, may well have different perceptions
and attitudes towards the budget. Thus, in sampling from each of the
user-groups, another dimension could be added to the study and this is
developed in Chapter 5 where differences between the user-groups are
investigated. There is further discussion of the three user-groups in
section 5.1.
It was decided to select six individuals from each user-group (the
selection process is described in section 3.3.1). Thus in each company
eighteen questionnaires were issued. This particular sample size
resulted from a compromise between various conflicting factors,
including the following.
(a) To gain admission to the required number of companies, the total
amount of time expended by employees participating in the study
must not seem unreasonable. It was assumed that the greater the
number of individuals required, the lower would be the probability
of a company agreeing to participate.
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(b) The sample size must be above a certain minimum size to allow the
statistical tests to operate at the company level.
(c) There must be some allowance for questionnaires either not being
returned or being unusable. The Kruskal-Wallis test, described in
section 3.4.2b, has special tables for three small samples. Samples
of four can be validly used with this test.
The compromise decided upon was six per user-group. Another
advantage of this size became apparent when the questionnaire was
administered as there were only six accountants in some of the smaller
companies. 1-lad the sample sizes been greater, this could only have been
accomplished by using accounts clerks. It was important not to do this
as the accountants user-group all have some professional training and
this may be influential in creating attitudes to the budget and budget-
related issues. In one company there were only five accountants and so
the sample size was altered accordingly.
3.1.2 The Companies in the Study
The original intention was to obtain fifteen companies who would
participate in the study. It was believed that such a number would be
obtainable and would be sufficiently large to enable some statistical
tests to be used and conclusions drawn. Whilst a larger sample would
have had some advantages, these were outweighed by the difficulty in
gaining entry to companies and the time and cost of further visits. The
companies in the sample had to meet the following criteria which were
set in order to impose a degree of comparability necessary for later
analysis.
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(a) Turnover greater than l0m.
(b) More than 500 employees.
(c) Engaged primarily in nnufacturing or processing.
These criteria apply to the participating unit, not to the company as a
whole, where these were different.
The following procedures were used to obtain companies who would
participate in the study.
(a) The Chartered Institute of Management Accountants, who had financi-
ally sponsored the study, asked its local branch to arrange
introductions where possible. This was invaluable. A number of
companies participated as a result of this; a pilot study in one
company was arranged and helpful comments were received from a
small group of the local branch committee.
(b) Personal contacts were used and introductions were made to a small
number of companies by this means.
(c) Contacts with two local firms of Chartered Accountants were made
and they provided a few introductions with companies which they
thought would be willing to consider participating in this study.
(d) Finally, all the companies who met the above criteria that were
listed in the trade directory for the six counties around Bristol
were contacted by letter (unless they had been contracted by other
means). The letter explained the purpose of the study and the
requirements for a participating company.
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Ninety companies were contacted by one of the above methods from
which fifteen agreed to participate. The great majority of those
participating caine through personal links of some kind. Two of these
were unable to produce the required number of completed questionnaires
and thus the final sample of companies was thirteen, i.e. l4 of those
approached. In both companies where there was an unsatisfactory return
of the questionnaires, the cause lay in the lack of influence that
accountants had in the operational areas of the company.
One of the intentions in any study of company practices is to be
able to draw conclusions or make comments about the whole population of
similar companies. In this study there is a sample of thirteen medium
or large sized UK manufacturing companies but before conclusions or
comments can be made, the sample must be examined for any observable
bias. There are many aspects which can produce bias and some of the
most common are discussed below.
(a) Industrij. The companies come from a wide range of industries as
can be seen from an examination of Appendix 2, where the major
characteristics of each company are presented. The only unusual
feature is that four companies have some connection with the aero-
space industry.
(b) Markets. There is considerable diversity between UK and overseas
markets and between government and private customers.
(c) Orpanisatiort Structure. All but three of the companies visited were
subsidiaries but none had overseas parent companies.
3.6
(d) Reasons for parttctpattng in the stuthj. All the companies were
asked why they had agreed to participate. A wide-range of replies
was given ranging from one finance director who stated "our budget-
ing is poor and we might learn something" to the chief accountant
of another company who commented "we're really quite proud of our
budgeting".
(e) Preutous links with researchers. None of the companies in this
sample had participated in any research study involving the manage-
ment control function in the preceding few years. There was no
history of connection with researchers in the areas of the company
that were involved in this study.
It has been concluded by the researcher that there is no observable
bias in the companies participating in the study. The only known feature
which limits the drawing of conclusions which have general applicability
to medium and large sized UK companies is the sample size.
3.2 THE QUESTIONNAIRE
3.2.1 The Form of the Questionnaire
It was decided to draw up a questionnaire specifically for this
study. There are existing questionnaires for certain aspects of the
study, e.g. budget pressure and participation in the budget-setting
process. However, these are often quite lengthy and they would have
increased the time taken to complete the questionnaire beyond the point
which the researcher believed would have been acceptable to the compan-
ies who showed an interest in participating. In the design of the
questionnaire there were similar conflicting features to those discussed
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in relation to the sample size. There was a desire for as much data as
possible but there was the constraint of what would be deemed acceptable
by the company. It was decided to construct a simple questionnaire which
covered the main issues of the study and which could be completed within
half an hour.
The questionnaire, which may be seen in full in Appendix 1, con-
tamed a few opening questions about the individual, length of time in
the job and the company, job title, etc., and seven main sections as
described below.
A - The importance of certain objectives to the company.
B - The influence of different groups in setting the objectives.
C - The importance of various purposes f or the budget.
D - The influence of different groups in drawing up the budget.
E - The relationship between the budget and various incentives.
F - Personal importance attached to the budget.
C - Pressure to meet the budget.
The main questions in sections B, C and D were asked in two forms:
first what the individual thought was the actual state •of affairs in
their company and, second, what they thought the position ought to be.
This allowed some interesting analysis later of the difference between
the two sets of answers.
The main questions in sections A-D were answered on a Likert-type
scale. For example, in section C, question Cl asked how important
various budget purposes were and the answers were given on a scale as
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shown below.
Not important	 extremely important
This form of answer was preferred to a ranking of the same list of pur-
poses as it allows for additional information to be indicated. For
example, certain items may be given similar but not identical
importance, and this 'bunching t
 effect is lost in a simple ranking of
the list.
The majority of the other answers require either a yes/no answer or
one possibility among a number to be selected.
3.3.2. The Administration of the Questionnaire
The questionnaires were not sent to Individuals within the company
until the company had been visited and various aspects of the question-
naire had been checked with company procedure, structure and terminol-
ogy. In one case the questionnaire had to be amended to take account of
a particular organisation structure. The questionnaires were delivered
to the selected individuals by internal company means. A letter from
the company usually accompanied the questionnaire, giving their full
support for the individual's participation, or the equivalent message
was communicated personally. There was a covering letter from the
researcher thanking the individual in advance for their help and
explaining the purpose of the questionnaire.
The completed questionnaire was returned directly to the researcher
using the stamped addressed envelope provided. The respondent was
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assured of confidentiality and their name did not appear on the
questionnaire. The letter with the questionnaire stated that informa-
tion would be given to the company in aggregate form only and In such a
manner that no individual's response could be identified.
The senior financial official of the company kept records of the
questionnaire numbers and took action to follow up those individuals who
did not return the questionnaires. The individuals had not agreed to
participate before they were selected (that was done solely on their
suitability for the sample) and thus it was expected that some chasing-
up would be required and that there would be some questionnaires that
would not be returned.	 -
There were two companies where this procedure was not fully
followed. In one, the questionnaires were filled in by the individuals
at the time of the company visit. These were then collected directly by
the researcher and not returned by post. In another, the senior finan-
cial official decided to organise the whole procedure himself before the
researcher arrived and thus those questionnaires did not come directly
to the researcher. This could have resulted in bias in the responses
because anonymity was not guaranteed. There is no evidence of this and
the senior financial official had not examined the completed question-
naires before the visit of the researcher.
The responses on the questionnaires were transferred to a coding
sheet prior to entry into a computer file. The Likert-type answers were
translated into an integer score between 0 and 20 while the yes/no type
answers were coded 0 or 1. The two-stage process between questionnaire
and computer file was checked fully at each stage. An edit programme
was run on each company file on the computer which included range checks
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and other simple verification procedures.
The response rate of the thirteen companies in the study was as
follows:
Number of Questionnaires 	 Number of

















When the basic results were available for each company and the com-
bined sample, a version of the results was sent to each company. This
was a copy of the questionnaire with the mean score for each user-group
marked for each question. Significant results from the Kruskal-Wallis
test arid the Wilcoxon matched pairs test were also indicated. The
official in each company who received these results was invited to
comment upon this; however, no comments were received.
3.3 (DMIPANY VISIT AND INTERVIEW
As has already been mentioned, each company was visited before the
questionnaires were issued. The major part of the visit was a meeting
with a senior financial official. It was usually through this individual
that the participation of the company had been arranged. This official
was either the finance director or the chief accountant of the company.
In some companies other officials were also met, either in formal meet-
ings or at lunch. Discussions with the senior financial official lasted
for approximately two hours.
3.11
There were two main purposes for this interview. The first was to
ensure comparability in the user-group samples. The second was to gain
information about the company which would be used later to interpret the
results from the study.
3.3.1 Selection of the Sample
To enable comparisons to be made between companies it was necessary
to ensure as much comparability between the user-group samples as was
practical. The definitions of each user-group were explained and
discussed with the senior financial official in each company. In many
cases individuals were chosen by the researcher in consultation with the
compai-iy official during this meeting, often with the aid of organisation
charts or similar information. In some companies only categories of
employees were selected and the choice of individuals could only be made
by a senior manager responsible for that area. In the instance of the
company in which the whole process was completed before the researcher
arrived, the sample was reviewed and found to be compatible with the
criteria used in other companies. The researcher did not have full
control of the selection procedure as some individuals were suggested or
selected by company officials. However, the criteria laid down by the
researcher were followed and no bias was detected.
Due to differences in organisation structure and company size, it
was not possible to achieve identical samples from the user-groups from
each company. There were few problems in selecting the accountant group
as this user-group was the most tightly defined. In some companies there
was no choice to be made as there were only five or six individuals who
met the definition. For the SNFM there were only marginally more
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problems and In all cases there were at least six individuals who were
clearly seen as part of the senior management of the company.
The greatest problems arose in the selection of the FlY and in
ensuring satisfactory comparability. These problems arose because the
budget permeates to different levels in each organisation and thus the
level of management where "there is a direct involvement with budget
data in the course of normal work" may be different. Further, the level
of this involvement and the significance of the budget to the manager
may also be different. Notwithstanding these problems, it was the
researcher's view that the level of similarity between the thirteen
samples of each user-group is such that the results can be compared and
the companies can be aggregated to form a combined sample of each user-
group.
3.3.2 Background Information about the Companies
The greater part of the time spent with the senior financial
official was occupied by a semi-structured interview designed to
discover background information about the company. The official was
also asked if there was an "official company view" on the various issues
being investigated in the study. The semi-structured interview covered
the following areas:
Company size;
Organi sat ion structure;
Degree of autonomy, e.g. capital expenditure limits;
Budget setting process;
Use and purpose of budget;
Existence of bonus or incentive schemes;
Type of product and production process;
Markets for finished goods;
Effects of recession on company.
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Frequently the discussion was wide-ranging and the official was encour-
aged to talk about any issue that he thought might be of interest or
importance to the study.
The main use of these data was as the basis for constructing
explanatory variables which might reconcile the differences found
between and within the companies. Sections A and B of the questionnaire
were also intended to be used in a similar manner. The aims or object-
ives of the company were not a subject under direct investigation in
this study, but it was thought that they might be part of the explana-
tion for results, for example, of the role of the budget in the company.
3.4 P1ESENTATIO OF THE RESULTS AND STATISTICAL TESTS
Various means of presentation and statistical tests that have been
used are discussed below. The presentation of results for Chapters 4
and 5 are dealt with in the succeeding two sections.
3.4.1 Presentation of Results in Chapter 4
For the questions Cl, C2, Dl, 132, F2, G2 and C3 where a Likert-type
scale is used, the results are presented in three forms.
3.4.la Charts of means. Within each company and for each part of each
question (e.g. for each of the seven listed purposes of the budget in
questions Cl and (2), a mean score and standard deviation have been cal-
culated. The results for all thirteen companies have been aii.lgamated
(the 'combined sample') and the mean and standard deviation for this has
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been calculated. The combined sample has been used in two ways.
(a) As a much larger sample of budget practices in UK medium and large
sized companies. For this to have any meaning, there must be some
similarity between the companies. It is one of the features of this
study that differences between companies have been investigated and
explanations sought, so considerable care has been taken in the
conclusions drawn from the combined sample. It is the opinion of
the researcher, in the light of the subsequent analysis, that there
are some areas of interest where the combined sample does
contribute valuable insight into the issues under investigation.
(b) To give a benchirk against which unusual results can be seen, i.e.
companies whose results are different from the general pattern.
The means and standard deviations are presented in the form of
charts of means of which Figure 4.2 is an example. A part of this figure
is reproduced below in Figure 3.1.
FIGtJRE 3.1
Detail from Fi gure 4.2
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The chart of means has a horizontal scale which is the integer
score representing the Likert-type scale in the questionnaire. Differ-
ent parts of the question are shown on the vertical axis. The mean of
the combined sample is shown by the x' and the horizontal line
represents the standard deviation of the combined sample. The standard
deviations have been plotted centrally about the mean. Any company whose
mean score does not lie within the standard deviation of the combined
sample is shown by the '1' which has the number of the company above.
The companies shown with the J. are described as 'outliers' as they are
outside the standard deviation of the combined sample, which is being
used as a benchmark for normality. Whilst this is an arbitrary distinc-
tion, in practice it worked well as the vast majority of company means
were within the normal range while some companies were systematically
outside the range. This is discussed in Chapter 4.
The objective of the chart of means is to show simply the general
picture that the results produced, in particular the overall means, with
the degree of agreement being indicated by the size of the standard
deviation, and also those companies who produced clearly different
results.
3 . 1 . 1b Rank Data. The second form in which the results are presented
is by the conversion of the mean scores in each company into a ranking
for the separate parts of each question. Thus, for question Cl, the
mean scores for each of the seven budget purposes are used to rank the
seven purposes. In this process the budget purpose with the highest
mean score is given the highest ranking; so in question Cl the most
important budget purpose is ranked as 7. From these data an average
ranking for each purpose can be obtained by summing the rankings for
each company and dividing by the number of companies. These average
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rankings can be ranked to give an overall ranking based on the thirteen
companies. One of the major uses of this information is as a guide to
the agreement among the companies, i.e. whether the average ranks are
bunched or well spread out. It is also useful in overcoming any possible
scale problems between the companies, although this problem is more
likely at the individual level which is discussed below.
3. l .1c IndtutcluaL ranktngs. The third method of presenting the data is
by analysing the rankings given by tndtuidual. respondents in each
company. It is not uncommon to find equal rankings and so some care
must be taken with the results. For example, in one question there are
ten companies where ^ half the respondents rank item 1 first, but also
ten companies where ^ half the respondents rank item 2 first. The advan-
tage of this means of presentation is that it deals with the individual
respondents and avoids the problem of means in which one or two very
unusual responses can alter the means considerably.
In sections C and D the questions Cl and Dl ask that does occur
while questions C2 and D2 ask that ought to happen. The Wilcoxon
matched-pairs test is used to determine if the responses to the two
questions are significantly different, and a simplified chart of means
shows the means and standard deviation of the combined sample for
question Cl and C2 together and similarly for Dl and D2.
3 . t . 1d Wttcoxort matched-pairs test. The full name for this test is the
Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed rank test which compares two related
samples which can be ranked. The null hypothesis for this test is that
the median of the population differences is zero, for a two-sided test.
Significance levels can be calculated and in this case results which are
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significant at 10%, 5% and 1% are shown in the table of results; Figure
4.6 is an example. The aim of the test is to indicate when there is a
significant difference between the responses of the individuals for the
'actual' and 'ought to' questions. This is interpreted as evidence that
the respondents are not happy with the actual situation in the company,
for this particular item, and would prefer a different practice or pro-
cedure.
3. I .1e Kendall's Coefficient of Concordance. For all the rankings of
means presented in Chapter 4, Kendall's Coefficient of Concordance has
been calculated. In all cases the hypothesis that there is no associa-
tion can be rejected at a significance level of 0.01 and thus it is
concluded that there is adequate consensus among the individuals for
comient to be made regarding each company as a whole. Without this
result there would be no basis for drawing conclusions in terms of a
company view.
The Kendall's Coefficient of Concordance tests and the Wilcoxon
matched-pairs tests were run using the SPSS software operated by the
South West University Regional Computer Centre (SWURC) at Bath.
3. I#.lf Classification of coTnjxxnies. In sections E, F and C many of the
the questions require a Yes/No answer or a choice of one alternative
from two. For these questions the aggregated results are usually given
and the individual companies are classified by their collective
response. For example, in a Yes/No question, if two-thirds or more
individuals give a 'Yes' answer, the company is classified a 'Yes'
company. Similarly for 'No' companies. If the 'two-thirds' rule is not
met, then the company remains unclassified,
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3.4.2 Presentation of Results in Chapter 5
The prinry objective in Chapter 5 was to investigate the responses
of the three user-groups and in particular to determine whether or not
the user-groups were giving similar responses. Unfortunately, there was
no single method of presentation or analysis which adequately reflected
the diversity of the data and the desired analysis. Thus various methods
have been used. For one aspect in particular there were no established
statistical tests and this is dealt with in detail below.
3.I.2a Star Plots. This is a graphical means of presenting the data
from the Likert-style questions, in which the responses of the three
user-groups can be seen clearly. The plots are produced using the sof t-
ware package "S" under the command "starsymb" (further details are given
in Becker and Chambers (1984) p. 449). The median score for each user-
group is calculated F or each argument (in the case of question Cl, for
example, this would be for the seven budget purposes) and this is
represented by the distance from the origin to the point of the radius.
This is done for each argument, the radius is numbered and the outer
points of each radius are joined. The plot for each of the three user-
groups is drawn from the same origin and this process was conducted for
each company and the combined sample. An example of a star plot is






The unbroken line represents AQF, the dotted line SNFM and the
dashed line FLM. Medians have been used in preference to means because
of the non-parametric nature of the data. However, the procedure has
been repeated using means and there are only minor differences which do
not alter the general picture.
The major value of the star plots can be seen in Figure 5.2 where a
vast amount of data can be displayed in visual form on one sheet. This
allows the data to be examined at a general level and as a result a
better feel' for the results is produced. Conclusions from this form
of presentation are formed by visual inspection and are thus subjective.
They play a useful role in the analysis but need to be supplemented by
more precise statistical tests.
3.4.2b. Krushat-Wattts test. Questions Cl, C2, Dl, D2 and G3 now have
two dimensions : the various features or parts of the question (e.g.
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budget purposes in question Cl) and the user-groups. It is therefore
possible to investigate differences focussing either on the parts of
each question or on the user-groups over a whole question.
The Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance is a non-parametric
equivalent of the more common one-way ANOVA test and is the generalisa-
tion to n cases of the Mann-Whitney test. The test was run using the
SPSS package at SWURC. The null hypothesis for this test is that the
responses indicate that the three user-groups come from the same popula-
tion (or more precisely, that the three population distribution func-
tions are identical).
In this test it is differences within a part of one question (e.g.
for one particular budget purpose) that are revealed. The test does not
indicate the cause of the difference. Further investigation must be
made to discover whether the cause lies in one user-group or whether the
three user-groups are all different from each other. The cut-off level
of significance has been set at 10% which is at the upper end of what is
usually accepted as significant. This level of significance has been
chosen in the light of the small sample sizes and the nature of the
data.
Before the Kruskal-Wallis tests were conducted, consideration was
given to standardising the data in some form. It is generally accepted
that different individuals may interpret the scale on which they answer
questions in different ways. An examination of the completed question-
riaires revealed that this may be so. It was clear that some had a
tendency to use the whole scale, some to bunch their responses around
the middle and others to use mainly the top end of the scale. There are
two alternative explanations for this.
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(a) That the responses on the questionnaire correctly represent the
perceptions and attitudes of the respondents; some people may
consider that all the aspects of one question are important and
their response is thus bunched at the high end of the scale.
(b) that the scales have been interpreted differently and so similar
attitudes are being recorded with different scores.
There is no way of determining which of these two explanations is
correct or whether both are occurring at different instances.
If (b) above were a problem, then there are various methods of
standardising the data to minimise the effect. Four such methods were
investigated. These involve modifying the original score, x, by
where there are i parts to each question.
ii. .--- where a 1
 = standard deviation of the i parts of the question.
iii. x -
	
where	 = mean of the i parts of the question.
iv. x-i
ai
Each of these standardising procedures minimises a particular scale
effect and none is obviously better than the others. Having examined
the properties of each it was decided that method (ii) was appropriate
for questions A and C and method (i) was appropriate for questions B and
D. The Kruslcal-Wallis tests were run using the standardised and original
data. The results using the two methods were not greatly different and
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it was decided to concentrate on the original data. This was on the
assumption that the scale effects were not great and did not outweigh
the individual's perceptions and attitudes as recorded on the question-
naire (i.e. that point (a) above has greater importance than (b)).
3.4.2c. Direct correlation. In section 3.4.2b two approaches to the
issue of differences between user-groups were mentioned. The Kruskal-
Wallis test indicates where there are differences in the individual
parts of each question. The other approach is to investigate whether a
user-group is giving a different response over a whole question. Whilst
this approach seemed quite straightforward an examination of the non-
parametric statistical tests and discussion with the department's
research officer, who had considerable expertise in this area, revealed
that there was no standard test available. The problem was to find a
test which would estimate the level of agreement between two or more
sample populations where the individuals in the sample had assigned
ranks to two or more objects.
A review of statistical journals was undertaken by the research
officer, and this revealed a further problem. Whereas there were a
number of tests available, there was no consensus among the writers as
to what constituted agreement. In particular, there was controversy
over how much agreement, if any, there must be within the user-groups
before agreement between the user-groups could be considered. This
problem is reviewed in Snell (1983), the data in which comes from this
study. One of the writers, Kraemer (1981), suggested that pair-wise
correlation coefficients and confidence intervals could be calculated
using a 'jack-knife' procedure. Having reviewed the available tests it
was decided that the pair-wise direct correlation tests was the most
appropriate.
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Thus for questions Cl, c2, Dl and D2 the correlation coefficients
of the three pairs of user-groups have been calculated and are presented
in Figure 5.11. From these it is possible to make a judgement as to
whether any user-group is different from one or both of the others.
3.Ii.2d Bar charts. For the questions where Yes/No answers are required
or where there is a choice of one alternative from two, the user-groups
have been classified using the 'two-thirds rule' described in section
3.4.lf. This is done for each user-group in each company and for the
combined sample. The results are plotted on a bar chart which enables
the general pattern of the results to be seen visually. An example of a
bar chart can be seen in Figure 5.8.
3.5 FINAL XMMF11S
Certain probability tests have been used at various points in
Chapters 4 and 5 and these are explained where used.
It was a general intention that where possible the data and results
should be presented visually as well as numerically. This is particu-
larly important with data of the kind being analysed in this study. When
the data is 'soft' in nature, usually being expressions of perceptions
or attitudes, it is possible to over emphasise the statistical tests,
which may be more powerful than the data can justify. With this in mind,
the simple visual presentations of data, as in charts of means, star
plots and bar charts, help to keep a balance between these tensions and




THE ROLE OF THE BUDGF AND THE RELATIONSHIP WITH
BUDGET PRESSURE AND PARTICIPATION
4.1 THE PROPOSITIONS STATED
To enable the issues that have been stated in Chapter 1 to be
examined, a number of general propositions are stated at the outset of
this Chapter. The propositions provide a focus for an examination of
the study's results and they are based on the review of the literature
in Chapter 2. The purpose of this examination is to assess the extent
to which the evidence from the thirteen companies in this study supports
or contradicts the propositions, and to gain new understanding of the
issues under consideration.
The propositions refer to the UK and are stated in general terms.
They are not to be viewed as testable hypotheses in the usual sense, as
the nature of the inquiry and the limited number of companies involved
renders such an approach inappropriate. One of the primary objectives
of the study is to extend the current understanding of company budgeting
behaviour and to explain, where possible, this behaviour. The proposi-
tions are a focus for these investigations and in a number of areas
provide a basis for further more detailed research.
4.1.1 Proposition 1 : The Budget as a Forecast of Expected Performance
Section 2.2. reviewed the literature on the use of budgets as
targets and section 2.3 reviewed the use of the budget as a forecast.
These sections revealed that in the academic literature the two uses
were considered usual, but the potential incompatibility of adopting
both roles simultaneously was rarely discussed. Section 2.7 reviewed
the UK empirical evidence on the rOle of the budget in which the
forecast rOle was clearly dominant. As a result, the following
proposition was drawn.
Proposition 1: The budget in UK contpantes is primarily
intended as a forecast of expected future performance rather
than a motivational target.
4.1.2 Proposition 2 : The Budget as a Control Device
In Section 2.4, which reviewed the managerial use of budgets, the
rOle of the budget as a means of organisational control was stressed by
many writers. Section 2.5 examined the familiar rOle of budgets as
standards for performance evaluation. From these two sections and the
empirical findings in Section 2.7, the following proposition was drawn.
Proposition 2: In UK conipa.nies the major rOle f or the budget
is as a control device through the comparison and explanation
of the differences between the budget and actual results.
4.1.3 Proposition 3 : Budgt Pressure
If proposition 2 is found to hold, then propositions 3a and 3b can
be examined. Section 2.5.1 reviewed the literature on budget pressure
from which the following two general propositions were drawn.
Proposition 3a: The use of the budget as a control device is
Lihely to put pressure on employees.
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Proposition 3b: If the pressure is great, it will, be resented
by employees and wilt result in dysfunctional behaviour.
4.1.4 Proposition 4 : Partici pation in Budget-Setting
The large literature on participation in budget-setting was
reviewed in Section 2.6. From this it would have been possible to state
many detailed and specific hypotheses for testing. However, the nature
of this study is broader and thus a more general proposition is used and
the detail available from the literature is employed in the analysis
stage when explanations for the results are being sought. The review of
the enpirical data on the role of the budget found very little discus-
sion of participation in UK companies. From the above the following
proposition was drawn.
Proposition Li': The degree of participation in budget-setting
in ilK companies is not great arid employees desire a greater
degree of participation.
4.1.5 Proposition 5 : Explanation of Differences Between Companies
In Section 2.4 on the managerial use of budgets a few of the well-
known papers which relate the contingency theory approach to budgeting
were mentioned (a fuller discussion will occur in Chapter 6). From this
material the final general proposition is drawn. It is important to
re-emphasise that this proposition is not to be seen as a test for
Contingency Theories, rather, that the Contingency Theory approach may
provide insight which will help to explain differences that may occur
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between the companies.
Proposition 5 : Differences in the resutts which arise between
companies may be exptained by differences in their orgcintsat ion,
structure artd enutroniment.
4.2 PROPOSITION 1 ThE BUI)CET AS A FORECAST OF EXPECTED PERFORMANCE
This proposition is examined principally by the questions set in
Section C of the questionnaire which are set out in Figure 4.1 below.
The abbreviations put in brackets after each of the purposes are used in
the figures, tables and text which follow. The final question, where
respondents are invited to add any other purpose of the budget which
they consider important, produced very few responses. These responses
were very diverse and so this part of question Cl has not been included
in the analysis. It would be comforting to think that this indicates
that the questionnaire includes all the important purposes of the
budget, but, unfortunately, pressure of time or inertia would also
explain the lack of responses to this open question.
Question Cl asks directly how important is each of the listed purposes
of the budget while Question C2 asks the respondent how important each
purpose ought to be. The question is answered over the range 'not
important' to 'extremely important'.
Question 3 asks the respondents to select one description of the
budget from a list of six which "best describes the budget in your
company". The aim of this question is to require the respondents to
make a judgement about which purpose or description is most appropriate
for their company, thus simplifying the picture which arises when seven
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EIGUE 4.1
Questions From section C
Question Cl
Budgets have a nnber of different purposes to fulfil in your company.
Indicate how important you think each of the following purposes is for
your company.
To forecast the future
	 (FORECAST)
To assist profit maximising	 (11 MAX)
As a means by which management communicate
to other levels in the company 	 (COMM)
To judge performance	 (JUPERF)
As a means of calculating rewards 	 (REWARD)
To motivate employees to do better	 (MorIv)
To control performance by calculating and
investigating variances	 (CONvAR)
Any other purpose you think is important
(please state below)
Question C2
Now indicate how important you think each of these purposes ought to be
(purposes as above).
Question C3
Which of the following best describes the budget in your company?
Average past performance 	 (APP)
Realistically attainable but not too loose 	 (RABNTL)
A target to be aimed for 	 (TARGET)
forecast of expected performance	 (FEP)
Performance under normal conditions 	 (PUNC)
Such high performance than no-one can make it 	 (TOOHI)
purposes are being assessed simultaneously in questions Cl and C2.
4.2.1 Question Cl : Perceived Purposes of the Budget
Figure 4.2 displays the responses to this question in summary form.
Clearly the three least important purposes of the budget are REWARD,
MOTIV and COMM. The low scores given to REWARD (mean of 6.27) can be
better understood in the light of the data from Section E of the
questionnaire which is discussed later in this chapter. REWARD has the
lowest importance with MOTIV (mean of 8.34) and COMM (mean of 10.38)









Chart of Means for Question Cl
FIGURE 4.3
Rank Data for Questions Cl and C2
COMPANY	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 10	 11	 12	 13
C1,FORECAST	 6	 7	 4	 6	 7	 4	 6¼	 4	 6	 7	 7	 6	 4	 5.73	 6
II MAX	 4	 6	 5	 5	 6	 7	 6¼	 6	 7	 6	 5	 7	 5	 5.61	 7
CV4	 3	 3	 3	 3	 3	 3	 3	 3	 3	 3	 3	 3	 2	 2.92	 3
J1JPERF	 5	 4	 7	 7	 5	 6	 5	 5	 5	 4	 6	 5	 7	 5.46	 5
R.EWI,RD	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1
MOTIV	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 3	 2.00	 2
CON.VP.R	 7	 5	 6	 4	 4	 5	 4	 7	 4	 5	 4	 4	 6	 5	 4
C2,FORECAST	 5	 6	 6	 4	 7	 4	 5	 3	 7	 7	 5	 5	 4	 5.23	 5
IIJ8AX	 4	 7	 4	 7	 6	 7	 7	 6	 6	 6	 7	 7	 6	 6.15	 7
COMM	 2	 2	 3	 3	 3	 3	 2',	 4	 3	 2	 3	 3	 3	 2.61.	 3
.7UPERF	 6	 4	 5	 5	 4	 5	 4	 5	 5	 3	 4	 4	 5	 4.54	 4
REWARD	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1
MOTIV	 3	 32	 2	 2	 2	 2',	 2	 2	 4	 2	 2	 2	 2.35	 2
CON.vkR	 7	 S	 7	 6	 S	 6	 6	 7	 4	 5	 6	 6	 7	 5.92	 6
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but one company this ordering is found.
There are four purposes which have been given similar importance in
that their means range from 13.11 to 13.83. These purposes, in descend-
ing order of means are FORECAST, UMAX, CONVA1 and JtJPERF; all of which
relate to the traditional budget roles of planning and financial
control. The rank data shows a similar picture but with the ordering
UMAX, FORECAST, JUPERF, CONVAR
The results for the individual companies are in general agreement
with the overall results. For exanpie:
REWARD is ranked least important by ^ individuals in all
companies
MOTIV is ranked least important or next to least important by ^
individuals in 11 companies
FORECAST is ranked as most important by ^	 individuals in 5
companies
UMAX is ranked as most important by ^ individuals in 4 companies.
There is a further feature which is immediately apparent from an
examination of the chart of means, that is, certain companies appear
frequently as outliers. The features and circumstances of these compan-
ies were investigated to see if there were factors which may explain the
different responses.
Company 5 has four responses which are unusually low. During the
interview with the company's finance director, he stated that
budgets were not an important part of the company's control proce-
dures. The nature of its business meant that the company had to
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tender for roost of its business and the primary control features
'were the tender and its associated job cost record. A budget did
exist, but it was not allocated to cost centres, and it was seen as
a planning document. This job-cost/tender system was being used
for purposes very similar to that of the budget in other companies,
but because there was also a document called the budget', the
questionnaire only reveals the relative unimportance of this budget
but does not reveal the alternative system for control.
Company 4 has three distinctly lower responses (FORECAST, UMAX,
tXNVAR). In this company, budgets are primarily the responsibility
of the accounting function where there is a budget officer and
staff, who deal with middle-management or above. The use of budgets
has not filtered down through the organisation and shop-floor
control is by means of physical standards. Thus responses which
give a lower importance to the budget are not unexpected.
4.2.2 Question (22 : Desired Purposes of the Budget
Question C2 asks respondents to indicate what they think the
purposes of the budget ought to be and the chart of means for this
question is shown in Figure 4.4. The general pattern is not greatly
dissimilar to that found for question Cl. The detailed differences
between Cl and C2 will be discussed in the next section, but at the most
general level, it can be seen that there are fewer outliers, that the
four most important purposes are slightly less closely bunched, as are
the three least important purposes.
The respondents from company 5 clearly think that their current











Chart of Means for Question C2
FICUE 4.5
Graph of Questions Cl v C2
The purpoie i.
-' The purpose ought to be
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in the role of the budget.
4.2.3 Comparison of Questions Cl and C2
In Figure 4.5 the results shown in Figures 4.2 and 4.4 have been
drawn together, without the outliers. From an examination of means it
can be seen that uMAX is considered the most important purpose in
question C2 followed by CONVAR and FORECAST, I . e. ffMAX and FORECAST have
exchanged positions. From the rank data in Figure 4.3 a slightly
different position emerges as summarised below.
QUESTION Cl
	 QUESTION C2
average	 ranking of	 average	 ranking of
rank	 average ranks	 rank	 average ranks
uMAX	 5.81	 7	 6.15	 7
FORECAST	 5.73	 6	 5.23	 5
JUPERF	 5.46	 5	 5.54	 4
CXJNVAR
	 5.00	 4	 5.92	 6
UMAX is confirmed as the most important purpose, with a higher
average rank and (X)NVAR, is ranked second rather than fourth. At the
individual level the responses to question C2 show the following:
FORECAST is ranked as most Important by ^	 individuals in 6
companies
uMAX is ranked as most important by ^ individuals in 6 companies
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(X)NVAR is ranked as most important by ^ individuals in 4
companies.
From the results above it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions
concerning which purposes the respondents think ought to be most import-
ant or about differences between Cl and C2. These four purposes are all
considered to be important and it is the view of this sample that they
should be important. Perhaps it is worthy of note that UMAX, which is
seen in C2 as being worthy of increased importance and thus clearly
making it the most important purpose, is very much 'business' oriented.
From this sample the most important role for the budget should be
assisting profit maximising behaviour, rather than some more technical
purpose such as forecasting or control through a variance analysis
procedure.
This result can be related to the findings from Section A of the
questionnaire (see Appendix 1) where respondents were asked to assess
the importance of eight objectives for their company. The two most
important were "to stay in business" and "to maximise profits". Thus,
there is some consistency between overall company objectives and the
more specific rOle for the budget.
At the other end of the scale REWARD is even more clearly consid-
ered the least important rOle for the budget. HOTlY has a mean which is
closer to COMM and both of these are closer to the most important four
purposes already discussed. In the rank data this pattern is repeated.
In these companies the budget is not used in as a basis for rewards and
the respondents do not wish to see any change in this.
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An interesting feature of these responses can be seen on Figure
4.5. For each of the purposes listed in Cl, the 'ought to' score in C2
is greater. In other words, the respondents consider all the rles of
the budget should have greater importance. This could be interpreted as
an irrational or mistaken response, though this is unlikely when the
total number of respondents exceeds 200. Alternatively, it could be
seen as an indicator that a general increase in the use and importance
is desired. There is evidence later in the chapter which supports this
alternative view. Further evidence for the desired general increase in
the importance of the budget is seen in the fact that all three user-
groups exhibit this pattern, although it is more pronounced among
accountants.
The largest increase in the score of 2 over Cl is seen for MOTIV.
The means for MOTIV and COMM are almost the same and in the rank data in
Figure 4.3 there are four companies where the mean scores for MOTIV are
equal to or greater than COMM. The Wilcoxon matched-pairs data in
Figure 4.6 show that the increase in the scores given to the purposes
listed in C2 are significantly higher in many of the companies. Using
10% as the cut-off level for significance, it can be seen that:
NOTIV has a significantly higher score for C2 in 12 companies
CONVAR has a significantly higher score for C2 in 10 companies
uMAX has a significantly higher score for C2 in 10 companies.
In fact, only FORECAST has fewer than 6 significantly higher
scores. If the data are viewed on a company basis there are some consid-
erable differences. Company 10 has significantly higher C2 scores for
each purpose, while companies 4, 7, 9 and 11 have significantly higher
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FIGURE 4.7
Responses to Question 3 by User-Group
Description	 TYI'AL %	 ACCT I	 SNFN I	 FLM
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contrary to the general trend, is the fact that company 3 and company 5,
have only one purpose where C2 is significantly higher (MOTIY) and
company 6 has only two purposes. The senior financial official for
company 3 stated that his company puts great emphasis on its budget and
so it is not surprising that no further importance is desired. Company
5 has the job cost control system and it appears that the respondents
are happy with this and do not want any increased importance for the
budget. Company 6 is an oil company where external factors, which can
have a great impact on performance, are difficult to forecast
accurately, whereas the internal consequences of these factors are well
understood. Thus the budget is not a great help in the control process
and respondents do not wish it to be given increased importance.
4.2.4 Question 3 : Forecasts and Targets
The overall results to the question are shown in Figure 4.7 where
the clearest result is that more than half of the respondents consider
the budget is primarily a 'forecast of expected performance'. This
response is found at similar levels in the three user-groups and figure
4.8 shows that in every company but two FEP has the highest response.
Companies 5 and 6 have the greatest emphasis on the forecast
description. The characteristics of these companies given earlier, i.e.
that both do not use their budget for control purposes, is in accord
with such a result as the forecasting and planning purpose is primary.
The Senior Financial Official in every company stated that their firm's
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The responses to this question can be rearranged into two groups,
one in which the definitions describe the budget as a pure forecast and
another where there is some element of target. The target group includes
definitions 2 (RABNTL), 3 (TARGET) and 6 (TOOHI) while the forecast
group contains 1 (APP), 4 (FE?) and 5 (PUNC). The rearrangement
produces:
number
pure forecast	 124	 60
some target	 83	 40
207	 100
This shows that 40% of those questioned chose a budget description
that had some target element within it. This is considered a surprising
result in the light of the Senior Financial OfficiaFs comments above
and the low responses to motivational purposes in the preceding
questions.
One possible explanation for this apparent inconsistency is that
one of the three user-groups has a different view of the purpose and
description of the budget which is not evident in the analysis of the
mean responses to question Cl. For example, it could be hypothesised
that the FLM perceive much more of a target element in the budget, as
the budget is often set by accountants or senior management at a level
which FLM feel is difficult to achieve, whereas the budget setters
regard the budget purely as a forecast. However an analysis of the
three user-groups in Figure 4.7 reveals that this 40% who see some
target element is almost equally split among the three user-groups.
Thus the hypothesis is rejected.
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The detailed analysis of question C3 shows that there are clear
differences In the perception of the budget within the saDie company. It
is possible that these differences represent varying perceptions of the
tightness of the budget. For example, one manager may find the budget
hard to achieve and so consider it a target while another may have an
easier budget and view it as a forecast. In Figure 4.9 the responses to
this question have been divided into the target and forecast groups and
shown by company and the diversity between companies is evident.
In only four companies is there a clear response, i.e. where either
the target or forecast group has two thirds or more of the responses,
and even then the response is far from unanimous. In an attempt to
understand this diversity a second hypothesis was examined : that the
spread of replies to question C3 was related to the degree of differ-
ences between questions Cl and C2. The rationale for this hypothesis is
that the spread of the C3 replies indicates confusion within the company
as to the role of the budget and the greater this confusion the greater
will be the difference between how the budget ts used and how the
respondents think it ought to be used.
This was tested by calculating for each company
n
x	 =	 E (ci - C211)2
1=1
n-
and	 y =	 (C31 - (13)2
i=l
where	 I = individual in company j
and	 (13 = mean response for question (13 in comPanY ,i
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and calculating the correlation between X and Y for all j. The corre-
lation obtained was 0.377 and thus the hypothesis could not be substan-
tiated and the cause of this diversity in the responses remains
unexplained.
4.2.5 Further Motivational Uses of the Budget
Section E of the questionnaire seeks further information concerning
the motivational use of the budget and the results from these questions
will be considered before drawing any conclusion on proposition 1. The
questions from section E are shown in Figure 4.10 and the results are
shown in Figure 4.11.
In Figure 4.10 where 'Yes' and 'No' answers are given an arbitrary
rule has been adopted to classify the companies. Where the replies to
one answer (either 'Yes' or 'No') are two thirds or more of the total
number of replies, then the company is classified by that response. Or,
expressed differently, where the replies to one question of one type are
^ twice the replies of the other type, the company is classified by that
response (i.e. a 'Yes' company or No' company). Where this rule is not
met, the company remains unclassified.
The answers to question El in Figure 4.11 show that in only one
company is there a financial reward based on achieving the budget. Two
companies are unclassified while ten have no budget-based financial
reward. These results must be treated with some care as the question is
particularly sensitive to the role and position of the respondents in
the organisation. Particularly important is that ACl' are not usually
subject to a budget in the same manner as line managers. The results
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FIGURE 4.10
Questions from Section E
Questions
El Do you receive any financial reward for achieving the budget you
have been given (e.g. bonus, commission, etc)?
E2 Do you suffer any financial penalty for not achieving the budget?
E3 Do you receive any financial reward for "good performance" in your
job?
E4 Do you suffer any financial penalty for "poor performance" in your
job?
E5 Do you consider that your promotion prospects depend on your
ability to achieve the budget?
E6 Do you receive any non-financial rewards (e.g. perks of some form)
for achieving the budget or "good performance"?
FIGURE 4.11
Results from Section E by Company
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 10	 11	 12	 13
El FIN.R.S	 N	 N	 N	 N	 N	 N	 N	 N	 N	 N	 Y
E2 FIN.PEN.B	 N	 N	 N	 N	 N	 N	 N	 N	 N	 N	 N	 N
E3 FR.mOO p
	T	 N	 Y	 N	 N	 N
E4 FP.Pool p
	Y	 N	 N	 T	 N	 N	 N	 N	 N	 N
ES PRT1	 N	 N	 N	 N	 N
£6 PERZSFONB	 N	 N	 N	 N	 N	 N	 N	 N	 N	 N	 N	 N	 N
The answer Y (Yes) or N (No) indicates responses to a ratio of 2 2. in favour of that answer.
Blank indicates the responses are not clearly in favour of either alternative.
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from this question by user-group are shown in Figure 4.12 and there is a
small difference between the user-groups ranging from 12% of AXF who
consider there is a financial reward for meeting the budget to 26.8% of
SNFM. The results for question El in Figure 4.11 have been recalculated
excluding ACCI' and the pattern does not change. Thus it is safe to
conclude that the great majority of respondents (81.3%) do not receive
any financial reward for meeting the budget and this pattern is seen
generally across user-groups and companies.
The result from company 13, the only company to have a Yes result
is surprising in the light of the responses to earlier questions. In
question Cl, the responses to the purposes MOTIV and 1EWARD, whilst
among the higher responses, are not distinctly different from many other
companies. For question C2 the responses are closer to the overall mean
than for Cl. Thus the response to question El, indicating that financial
rewards are paid on the basis of budget-related performance, is not
consistent with question Cl, where the use of the budget for motivation
or as a basis for calculating rewards is relatively unimportant and
similar to other companies who answered Yes' to question El. In
question 3, company 13 has four people who state that the budget is a
target while ten say it is a forecast. It appears that the result for
El may be an aberration.
There is an overwhelming negative response to questions E2 and E6
which ask whether there is a financial penalty associated with non-
achieving of the budget or whether there are any perks given for good
budget-related performance. Question E5 is potentially of more interest
as the slightly less direct link between budget-related performance and
promotion has been mentioned in the academic literature and does not
need any formal system to be implemented. The results here are not
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FIGURE 4.12
Responses to Question El by User-Group
TOTAL %
	 ACCT %	 SNFM %	 FLM %
El	 FIN. PEW. B
	
Yes	 18.6	 12.1	 26.8	 16.4
No	 80.9	 87.9	 73.2	 82.2
No response	 0.5	 0	 0	 1.4
E2	 FIN. PEN. B	 Yes	 10.5	 3.0	 16.9	 11.0
No	 88.5	 95.5	 83.1	 87.6
No response	 1.0	 1.5	 0	 1.4
E3	 F.R. GOOD P	 Yes	 46.6	 42.4	 47.9	 49.3
No	 52.9	 56.1	 52.1	 50.7
No response	 0.5	 1.5	 0	 0
E4	 F.P. POOR P	 Yes	 28.6	 27.3	 38.0	 20.5
No	 70.9	 71.2	 62.0	 79.5
No response	 0.5	 1.5	 0	 0
ES PROMOTION	 Yes	 40.9	 13.6	 63.4	 43.8
No	 58.6	 86.4	 36.6	 54.8
No response	 0.5	 0	 0	 1.4
E6 PERKS FOR B Yes	 0.5	 1.5	 0	 0
No	 99.5	 98.5	 100	 100
No response	 0	 0	 0	 0
Number of Respondents 	 210	 66	 71	 73
FIGURE 4.13
Responses to Question ES Adjusted for AiXT
Company	 1 23456789 10111213
ES per Appendix 4b
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clear with eight companies being unclassified arid five responding No'.
The arguments mentioned above, that AcCI' will not usually be assessed on
the basis of performance in relation to budget, also apply here. Thus
in Figure 4.13 the results for question E5 are presented with ACT
excluded.
When just the two groups of managers are included five companies
indicate that there is a relationship between good budget-related
performance and promotion; five indicate no relationship and three are
unclassified. If there is a relationship between budget-related
performance and promotion, then it might be expected that the purpose,
MOTIV, in question Cl would be more important to the non-accountants in
the five Yes' companies. Unfortunately, this is not the case.
4.2.6 Conclusions for Proposition 1
Proposition 1 stated that, in UK companies, the budget is primarily
intended to be a forecast of expected performance rather than a motiva-
tional target. The results from questions Cl to (13 are generally in
support of this proposition. In question Cl the forecast is considered
to be the most important purpose and in (13 60% of respondents chose one
of the forecast descriptions as being the most appropriate for their
company. When considering which role ought to be the most important,
FORECAST was the second most important. The rank data showed that this
general result was found in most companies, i.e. in nine companies
FORECAST was ranked one of the highest two purposes.
The response to Cl and El indicate that the budget is not directly
used to motivate and reward to any significant degree. There is some
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link between budget-based performance and promotion among managers in a
minority of the companies. Thus it can be seen that the role of the
budget in motivating is slight and indirect.
Discussions with company officials revealed that in most cases the
motivational procedures used were based on the firm as a whole and
relied on loyalty to the firm by employees in response to the company
being perceived as a good and fair employer. This was not tested in the
questionnaire. The issue of motivational methods in UK companies appears
to be a productive subject for further research, particularly motivation
of middle and lower management who rarely participate in share options
or similar motivational reward schemes.
The results considered in this section generally support proposi-
tion 1, but the comments from the following section will need to be
borne in mind also.
4.3 PROP(ITION 2 : THE BUDGET AS A (DNTROL DEVICE
Proposition 2, that in UK companies the major rOle of the budget is
as a control device through the operation of some form of variance
analysis, is also examined primarily using the questions in section C of
the questionnaire. The findings presented in Figures 4.2 and 4.3
generally support this proposition. In questions Cl and C2 the purposes
ONVAR and, to a lesser extent, JUPERF cover this issue.
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4.3.1 Questions Cl - C3 arid Proposition 2
In Figure 4.2 CONVAR has an overall mean of 13.11 while JUPERF is
almost identical at 13.13. As was mentioned in section 4.2.1, these are
only marginally lower scores than were given to FORECAST and TrMAX.
These four purposes are almost indistinguishable in question Cl. The
rank data in Figure 4.3 show (X)NVAR ranked 4 (with average rank 5.0) and
,JUPERF ranked higher at 5 (with average rank 5.46). This confirms the
picture seen in Figure 4.2. This general pattern is not found in all
companies as the outliers in Figure 4.2 reveal. Company 5, for the
reasons given in section 4.2.1, i.e. the use of a job-cost control
system, not unexpectedly gives less importance to CONVAR and JUPERF.
Company 3 is of particular interest as it gives higher scores for ONVAJ
(mean 15.53) and JUPERF (mean 16.0). The senior financial official
interviewed stated that the company viewed budgets as a vital control
device and considerable time was devoted to budget preparation and
follow-up. Participation was actively encouraged. It would appear that
this 'company view' has been accepted by those completing the question-
naire.
In question C2, which asked what the role of the budget ought to
be, DNVAR becomes slightly more important and has the second highest
overall mean of 15.17 while JUPERF is the fourth highest with a mean of
14.24. The rank data show the same picture (X)NVAR is ranked at 6
(i.e. next to the highest) while JUPERF is ranked 4. Thus it would
appear that, overall, respondents would be happy with increased
importance being given to this control rOle for the budget, even though
it has been given a high level of importance in question Cl.
The combination of propositions 1 and 2 produces a picture of the
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budget being used as a control device through the operation of a
variance analysis system where the budget Is designed primarily as a
forecast of expected performance. This view is supported by the
discussion with a senior financial official in each company who, in
almost all cases, endorsed this composite view of the budget.
However, there are two aspects of these results which do not
completely agree with this overall picture. First, there are 40% of the
respondents who saw a target element in the budget and, secondly, there
is the very high importance given to the purpose TIMAX. As some of the
literature reviewed in Chapter 2 suggests, there is a potential
inconsistency between viewing the budget as a means of assisting in
profit-maximising and using the budget as a major control device. In
Hopwood (1972) and Otley (1978) the managers were divided into groups
which included 'Profit Conscious' and tBudget Constrained'. It is
possible that these two emphases will not come into conflict and that
careful use of the budget will be beneficial for control purposes and
profit ma.ximisation, but it is certainly not clear from the literature
that this is likely to occur. Neither is it clear whether there has
been any conflict between the profit conscious and budget constained
attitudes in the companies studied. The limited evidence from
discussions and the very similar scores given to control purposes and
the ffMAX purpose, suggests that there is no serious conflict.
4.3.2 Conclusions for Propositions 2
The budget in these companies is generally used for control
purposes and proposition 2 is therefore supported. In combination with
proposition 1, it would appear that control is based on the budget being
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primarily a forecast. However, there are some complications to this
simple conclusion arising from the substantial minority who see some
target element in the budget and from the high importance given to the
role for the budget in assisting profit maximisation.
4.4 PROPCITION 3a : USINC THE BUDCET AS A (DNTROL DEVI( (IkUSES
P1SHRE
As general support for proposition 2 has been found, proposition
3a, that the use of the budget as a control decise is likely to put
pressure on employees, can now be examined. Section C of the
questionnaire contains five questions on budget pressure and these are
shown in Figure 4.14.
FIGU1E 4.14
Questions from Section C of the Questionnaire
Question Gi
Do you feel any pressure put on you to meet the budget?
Question G2
How strong is this pressure to meet the budget?
Question G3
How much of this pressure comes from the following groups?
Top Central Management 	 (TcM)
Top Divisional Management 	 (TDN)
Accountants	 (ACCT)
limnediate superiors 	 (IMSUP)
Yourself	 (Y0uSF)
Question G4
Do you think more or less pressure to meet the budget would help in
attaining the company's major objectives?
Question G5
During the last year or so has any pressure on you to meet the budget
increased / remained constant / decreased?
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There are far more detailed instruments available to measure budget
related pressure, e.g. Bonini (1962), but in the interests of
questionnaire brevity these were not used. There is a dilemma in the
design of the study that applies particularly to propositions 3a and 4.
There are major instruments available to measure pressure and
participation (e.g. Hofstede (1967) and Milani (1975)) but they are
substantial and take quite some time to complete. In the initial
discussions with colleagues and practicing management accountants, it
was felt that the questionnaire would have to be relatively brief if it
were to be acceptable to the management of the companies being
approached, particularly as it was to be completed by eighteen employees
in each company.	 Thus these simple questions were used on the
existence, source and consequences of budget pressure.
4.4.1 The Existence of Budget Pressure
Question Cl asked whether the individual felt any pressure to meet
the budget and the responses are shown in Figure 4.15. 75% of the
respondents felt pressure to meet the budget and this was the
predominant view in ten of the companies, while in none of the companies
was there a 'No' response. The arguments mentioned earlier concerning
AcCr' not being subject to direct control by the budget may also have
relevance here and so the analysis was repeated excluding ACXT. 86% of
the managers felt pressure to meet the budget.
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FIGURE 4.15
Responses to Question Cl
DO YDG FEEL PRESSURE TO MEET THE BUDGET
COMPANY	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5
	 6	 7	 8	 9	 10	 11	 12	 13	 TOTAL
YES	 14	 15	 14	 8	 7	 11	 11	 14	 15	 12	 B	 15	 153
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4.4.2 Strength of Budget Pressure
Question C2 was intended to give an indication of the strength of
the pressure to meet the budget that was being experienced by the
respondents. However this question has proved to be unsatisfactory as
it is difficult to analyse the replies. The overall replies, answered
over the range 'very weak' to 'extremely strong', have a mean of 9.5 and
a standard deviation of 6.8. The best that can be said from this is
that budget pressure is not found in these companies in extreme form and
that there is considerable diversity between companies and within
companies.
4.4.3 Conclusion for Proposition 3a
It is clear from the results above that in the companies in this
study an overwhelming majority of the respondents feel pressure to meet
the budget and that this pressure is not insignificant. The previous
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proposition that the budget was used as a control device was supported
by the evidence and thus it is concluded that proposition 3a is also
supported by the evidence from this study. As proposition 3a is
supported, proposition 3b can now be examined.
4.5 PROPOSITION 3b BUI)CE'F PRESSURE WILL BE RESENTED AN]) WILL LEA]) TO
DYSF(JNCFIOAL BEHAVIOUR
This proposition was not investigated by a direct question about
resentment and dysfunctional behaviour. It was considered that asking
such a question would produce a very wide range of answers resulting
from different interpretations of the words in the question. The issue
of resentment was examined indirectly by seeking the source of budget
pressure using question C3 and dysfunctional behaviour was investigated
by information from questions C4 and C5 and the questions in section F.
4.5.1 The Source of Budget Pressure
Question C3 seeks to ascertain the source of budget pressure and
the results are by far the most varied in the study. Figure 4.16 dis-
plays the results in graphical form and Figure 4.17 gives the rank data
for this question. The results displayed in Figure 4.16 have to be
treated with considerable care as the standard deviations are large and
there are many outliers, indicating considerable differences between and
within companies. There are also some problems in interpreting the
results as the question can be understood in different ways in different
organisation structures or even in different parts of the same organisa
-
tion. For example, to a member of the FLM group TDM and IMSTJP may be
the same person.
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Chart of Means for Question C3
FIGURE 4.17
Rank Data for Question C3
AVERAGE6	 7	 8	 9	 10	 11	 12	 13 PANE
TCN	 I	 2	 1	 1	 1	 3.5	 2	 2	 2	 2	 3	 2	 4	 2	 2.11
TDM	 3	 3	 3	 2	 2	 4	 4	 4	 3	 1	 4	 2	 4	 3.0
ACCT	 I	 1	 2	 2	 3	 1	 1	 1.	 1	 1	 2	 1	 1	 1	 1.38
IMSUP	 5	 4	 5	 4	 3.5	 3	 3	 3	 4	 4	 3	 3	 3	 3.65
YOUSF	 I	 5	 5	 5	 5	 5	 5	 5	 5	 5	 5	 4.85
COMPANY I	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5 RANKING OFAVERAGE RANKS
2
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notwithstanding these comments, there are two main implications which
are clear from these results. First, that pressure from YOUSF is
clearly the greatest. The mean for YOUSF is 10.5; the next group has a
mean of 9.9. The rank data in Figure 4.17 show a much clearer picture
as only two companies do not rank YOUSF as the most important source of
pressure. This result was not predicted by the literature reviewed in
section 2.5.1. This may be interesting evidence for those who advocate
that self-motivation and pride in work are important but neglected
characteristics of employees at all levels. There were not sufficient
data to investigate this result further, but it would be a profitable
area in which to conduct future research. In particular, to ascertain
whether this result is an aberration and, if not, to investigate the
relationship between high self-generated pressure and the motivational
methods employed in companies where this occurred. This is particularly
important as the academic research on this issue suggests that self-
motivation produces very good performance and few dysfunctional conse-
quences (e.g. Katz 1964).
Second, pressure from ACI' is clearly the least. This is in spite
of the fact that most of these companies have accountants playing a
major role in the setting of the budget and the subsequent monitoring of
performance. These two results taken together are in strong contrast to
the general picture found in the literature reviewed in Chapter 2 where
pressure is usually seen as having its source in superior managers and
accountants (Argyris (1952) being a classic example of this).
It is also important to note that there are substantial differences
between the three user-groups on this question but this is dealt with
more fully in Chapter 5.
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The first part of the proposition that budget pressure will be
resented is not supported by this evidence as individuals are unlikely
to resent pressure which they have the power to reduce or remove if they
please, i.e. it is self-generated pressure.
4.5.2 The Consequences of Budget Pressure
This issue was again approached by means of indirect questions.
First was question C5 which asked whether more or less pressure would be
helpful in attaining the company's major objectives. The reasoning
behind this question is as before; that respondents may misunderstand
terms such as 'dysfunctional consequences' and may not even be happy
with the concept and so find the question impossible to answer properly.
Thus question C4 was used, on the basis that if more pressure were to be
desired it would indicate that the present level of pressure was not
hindering the attaining of company objectives, i.e. there were no
serious dysfunctional consequences.
The results for question C4 are presented in Figure 4.18, which
shows that an overwhelming majority of respondents consider greater
pressure to meet the budget would be helpful. 85% of those who answered
this section believed greater pressure would be helpful and all the
companies were classified as 'more'; there were only small differences
between the user-groups. This result is best considered in the light of
the response to question C5 which are shown in Figure 4.19. Only 3% of
respondents stated that they had experienced reduced pressure in the
preceding year, 54.5% stated that pressure had remained constant and
42.5% had experienced increased pressure. Thus the belief that increased
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FIGURE 4.18
Responses for Question C4
G4 : Do you think sore or lese preesure to .eet the budget would help in ettaining the coapanye priaary objectives?
COMPANY	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 10	 11	 12	 13	 T0rAL
MORE	 15	 12	 12	 12	 9	 10	 12	 8	 10	 15	 14	 11	 12	 152
LESS	 3	 5	 3	 0	 3	 1	 3	 3	 1	 1	 1	 1	 0	 25
CATEG0RY	 N	 N	 H	 N	 N	 H	 H	 H	 H	 H	 H	 H	 H	 H
FIGURE 4.19
Responses for Question CS
CS During the lest yeaz or so, has any pressure been put on you to meet the budget?
COMPANY	 1	 2	 3	 1	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 10	 11	 12	 13	 TOTAL
INCREASED	 11	 9	 8	 2	 5	 3	 3	 9	 5	 8	 7	 3	 9	 82
6	 8	 8	 7	 10	 9	 13	 6	 7	 7	 8	 10	 6	 105
DECREASED	 1	 0	 0	 1	 0	 1	 0	 1	 1	 0	 1	 0	 0
CATEGORY 2
	I	 C	 -	 C	 C	 C	 C	 I	 C	 I	 C	 I	 C	 C
1. To be categorised as 'sore, those answering the question oust be 2 1 in favour of that answer
2. The category here is sieply deter.ined as the answer with the largest response.
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pressure would be beneficial does not result from a reduction in pres-
sure and in three companies this view is held despite a general increase
in pressure.
This conclusion Is contrary to many results and theories found in
the literature; Hopwood (1973) pp. 21ff, and Bruns and Waterhouse (1975)
are two examples which consider decreased pressure desirable. Hofstede
(1968), p.153, found that 15% of his sample thought that standards were
'fairly loose' or 'too loose'. It could be argued that this group would
consider that an Increase in the standard would be beneficial and that
this is similar to an increase in pressure. 1-lowever, although this is
the closest similarity in the literature to the result found in this
study, it was only 15% of the sample who gave this result as opposed to
the great majority who did so here.
4.5.3 The Importance of the Budget
Further evidence concerning this proposition was gained from the
questions in section F which are displayed in Figure 4.20. The first
two questions suffer the same drawbacks that were described in section
4.4.2 f or question G2. Nevertheless, some information can be gained
from the replies. The mean response for all respondents is 15.0, the
standard deviation is 3.9 and there is only one outlier (company 5).
This gives a general picture in which the budget is regarded as import-
ant in attaining the company's objectives and this view is widely held.
Question F2 asks how much the budget helps to improve individual perfor-
mance. The mean is 10.0 and the standard deviation is larger at 5.0;
there are three outliers. The very limited conclusion from this is that
the budget is seen as having some role in helping to improve individual
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FIGURE 4.20
Questions from Section F of the Questionnaire
Question Fl
How important is the budget in attaining the company's primary objectives?
Question F2
How much does the budget help to improve individual performance?
Question F3
Does the budget ever hinder the improvement of performance?
FIGURE 4.21
Responses for Question F3
DOES THE BUDGET EVER HINDER THE IMPROVEMENT 	 YCUR PERFORMANCE?
Cc.4PANY	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 9	 9	 10	 11	 12	 13	 TOTAL
YES	 3	 6	 B	 6	 3	 3	 3	 3	 1.	 5	 1	 1	 5	 48
NO	 15	 11	 9	 8	 13	 12	 13	 11	 15	 1].	 15	 13	 11	 157
CATEGORY	 N	 -	 -	 -	 N	 N	 N	 N	 N	 N	 N	 N	 H	 N
To be cateqoriaed as N (No) those answering the question must be ) 2 r 1 in favour of that answer
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performance, but there Is greater diversity within and between companies
than there was in the previous question.
Question F3 requires a 'Yes' or 'No' answer in response to whether
the budget hinders the improvement of performance. The responses are
shown in Figure 4.2.1 Overall, 77% of respondents state that the budget
does not hinder the improvement of performance and in ten companies the
consensus is clearly 'No'. Company 13 is the only one where the 'Yes'
and 'No' responses are approaching equality. This company produced
results in section C which showed a considerably greater emphasis on the
budget for control purposes (see section 4.3.1). If AcCI' were excluded
(on the same grounds as before) this company would produce a 'Yes'
response, but no others would do so and eight continue to be classified
as 'No'.
The evidence available from the questions in section F suggests
that the budget is not producing dysfunctional consequences. The budget
is seen as important in attaining company objectives, it is moderately
helpful in improving performance and the great majority do not consider
that it hinders performance. Thus there appears to be no evidence that
the pressure to meet the budget is causing any dysfunctional behaviour
or attitudes.
4.5.4 Conclusions for Proposition 3b
The evidence reviewed above, from the responses to questions in
section C and F, does not support proposition 3b, Further evidence
against this proposition caine from the interviews with the senior finan-
cial officials who gave no indication of any resentment or of dysfunc-
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tional behaviour in their companies. Nor were there any comments on the
questionnaires which would lend support.
In the companies in this study there is no evidence that pressure
to meet the budget gave rise to resentment and dysfunctional behaviour.
This is not in accord with the literature reviewed in section 2.5.1 but
it is not surprising in the light of the results from section 4.5.1,
i.e. that the most important source of pressure caine from the individual
himself.
4.6 PROPOSITION 4: PARTICIPATION IS NOT GREAT AND F(JRTFIER PARTICIPATION
IS DESIRED
This proposition has been examined in a similar manner, and £ or
similar reasons, to Proposition 3 on budget pressure. In particular,
none of the major questionnaires on participation has been adopted and
the brief questions asked do not mention participation directly, rather
they ask which groups have and ought to have influence when the budget
is being drawn up. Indirectly, this yields information about the degree
of participation that is perceived by the respondents and the degree of
central control that exists.
4.6.1 Questions Dl : Perceived Participation in Budget-Setting
The questions asked in Section D are set out in Figure 4.22. Four
particular groups were listed which, in the literature, were the major
groups likely to have influence in setting the budget. The write-in
fifth group was almost totally unused and there was certainly no further












Questions from Section D
Question Dl
Within your company various groups will have influence when the budget
is being drawn up. Indicate below how much influence each of the
following groups has in your company.
Top Central Management 	 (TcM)
Top Divisional Management
	 (TDM)
People throughout the firm	 (0THP)
Accountants	 (ACCT)
Any other group (please state)
Question D2
Now indicate how much influence you think each group ought to have when
the budget is being drawn up.
FIGURE 4.23
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setting.
Figure 4.23 depicts the summary results for questions Dl and D2 and
Figure 4.24 shows the rank data. Company 5 does not have a TDM in its
organisational structure and in all the statistical calculations this is
allowed for; usually by substituting 0 for a ranking and then calculat-
ing statistics on the basis of twelve companies.
The responses to this question give a pattern that many would have
anticipated and which is in accord with some typical text book descrip-
tions of the budget-setting process. TDM have the greatest influence,
followed by TCM and ACF and much less influence being given to other
people throughout the firm. At the individual level:
OTHP is ranked as having least importance by ^ -- individuals in 12
companies
OTHP is ranked as having least importance by ^ * individuals in 9
companies.
Only company 7 does not rank OTHP as having least influence and
this company produces the two clearest outliers for question Dl in
Figure 4.23. There appears to be a good explanation for this result in
the fact that Company 7 is one of the smaller in the sample and is
family owned with many employees who have served the company for a long
period. The TCM is small and not involved in daily management and it is
company policy (according to the senior financial official) to allow a
large input from all levels of operating management in the preparation
of the budget. The results for Company 4 are also compatible with the







Rank Data for Questions Dl and D2
AVERAGE	 RANKING OFCOMPANY	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 0	 9	 10	 11	 12	 1.3 RANK	 AVERAGE RANKS
DLTG14	 3	 3	 3	 3	 4	 2	 1	 3	 4	 4	 3	 4	 2	 3	 3
TOIl	 4	 4	 4	 4	 0*	 4	 4	 4	 3	 2	 4	 3	 4	 3.38	 4
0TH?	 3.	 1.	 1	 1	 2	 1	 3	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 3.	 1.23	 1
ACCT	 2	 2	 2	 2	 3	 3	 2	 2	 2	 3	 2	 2	 3	 2.31	 2
02:TCM	 3	 2'i	 3	 3	 4	 3	 1	 3	 4	 4	 3	 3	 3.	 2.88	 3
TOM	 4	 4	 4	 4	 0	 4	 4	 4	 3	 3	 4	 4	 4	 3.54	 4
OFIIP	 1	 1	 1	 1	 2	 3.	 3	 1	 2	 3.	 1	 1	 2	 1.38	 1
ACCT	 2	 2i	 2	 2	 3	 2	 2	 2	 1	 2	 2	 2	 3	 2.12	 2
Cnopany 5 does not hace divstona1 managesent
FIGURE 4.25
Craph of Questions Dl v D2
Influence is
- - - - -' Influence ought to be
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system which is run primarily by accountants and the mean score for ACC1'
in question Dl is almost the same as for TQ'I and both TCM and TDM are
shown as outliers with less influence than is normal in this sample of
companies.
Only three companies do not rank TDM as having the most influence
in budget-setting and the standard deviation for this group is the least
indicating a relatively high level of agreement among the companies on
this issue. At the individual level, TDM is ranked as having the most
influence by ^ individuals in all but three companies.
4.6.2 Desired Amount of Participation
The results for question D2, where respondents are asked how much
influence they think each group ought to have, produced a similar
pattern to that for question Dl. The ordering of means in the rank data
is the same, but the pattern is less clear. There are a number of
isolated outliers and also Company 7 shows the same differences that
were apparent in Dl, indicating that the employees are content with this
rather unusual position.
4.6.3 Comparison of Dl and D2
There are a number of interesting features that arise from this
comparison. The chart of means in Figure 4.25 shows a remarkable simil-
arity in responses for TQ!1 and AWT. (This is also important in the
light of the discussion in section 4.2.3 where all the C2 responses were
greater than Cl. The fact that similar or slightly lower responses exist
for these two D2 questions reduces the probability that the C2 results
were irrational and thus more can be read into them).
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The overall result for TDM indicates that a slightly increased
importance is desired for this group and the smaller standard deviation
is evidence of reasonable agreement on this subject. From Figure 4.26
it can be seen that four companies have significantly higher responses
for this part of the question and for the sample as a whole this is also
the case, the difference being significant at the 1% level.
FIGURE 4.26
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A more distinctive difference can be seen in the comparison of the
responses for OTHP. The overall mean for D2 is 10.3 in comparison with
7.67 for Dl; nine companies reveal a significant increase in the score
in D2; the overall difference is significant at 1% level and only 21 of
the 210 respondents give a score for D2 which is lower than for Dl.
This is very clear evidence that in this sample there is a general
feeling that other people throughout the company should have increased
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influence in the setting of the budget. This pattern is seen in all
three user-groups, but especially among AcCF.
Only company 2 has three or more significant differences between Dl
and D2; the respondents desire increased influences for TDM and OTHP and
a decrease in the influence of TCM. The senior financial official
described the budget-setting process as one in which the objectives and
key factors were set by TCM and budget holders (usually FLM) had to keep
within these constraints. AT played a large role in the preparation
of the budget and the degree of participation by lower level staff was
determined by department heads. This description is compatible with the
results described above.
4.6.4 Conclusion for Proposition 4
The basic elements of proposition 4 are confirmed. Participation
does not appear to be widespread in these companies (OTHP is given the
least influence by a large margin) and 90% of the respondents desire
increased involvement of people throughout the firm. AX1' are the group
who are most keen for this increased participation. This is in contrast
with much of the literature which depicts accountants as seeking to
control a reluctant work-force by means of a centralised budget. Argyris
(1952) describes this situation in extreme form, with comments from
accountants which reveal they consider the work-force and line-managers
as lazy and scheming and in need of strict control.
The picture from this study is that AXT believe there should be
increased participation in the budget-setting process with the budget
itself having increased importance.
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4.7 PROPOSITION 5: DIFFERENQS BETWEEN (DMPANIFS MAY BE EXPL&INED BY
DIFFERENS IN ORGANISATIOI. STRUCIIJRE A?D ENVIRONMENT
This proposition is drawn from the contingency theory literature as
explained in section 4.1.5. However, the data available in this study
are not such that a rigorous test for contingency theory is possible or
was ever intended. Rather than this study being a test for Contingency
Theories, it is the contingency approach which is being used as a source
of explanation for the results that have been found. From the descrip-
tion of the results in the preceding sections, it is clear that these
companies do not have identical uses or perceptions of the budget or the
budgeting process. It is therefore necessary to seek explanations for
the differences that exist between the companies (Chapter 5 will examine
some of the differences which exist within the companies).
The proposition is investigated in two ways:
(a) by examining the companies who frequently appear as outliers, i.e.
those whose responses are clearly different from the majority;
(b) by examining the pattern of results for the thirteen companies and
searching for general explanatory features.
4.7.1 Explanation for individual company differences
Throughout this chapter companies which have appeared as frequent
outliers on the charts of means have been examined in an attempt to
ascertain factors which have contributed to the differences observed.
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With the limited knowledge available from interviews and questionnaires
it is not possible to fully explain such differences. However, there
have been a number of examples where the background information regard-
ing organisation, structure and environment has produced a possible
explanation that is fully in accord with results in question. A couple
of examples will be summarised from the discussion in various sections
of this Chapter.
4.7.la Comxinij 5
Company 5 is unusual among this sample in that it does not use its
budget for short-run control purposes. The budget is not broken down
into detailed heads in each cost centre and it is used predominantly in
forecasting and planning. The nature of the company's work is mainly to
produce customised forms of a basic product. Work is therefore organised
in batches, some of which are very large. The key control procedure is
to ensure that each batch makes a profit and to do this an elaborate
job-cost accounting system existed.
When the results for the questions Cl and C2 were examined, Company
5 was the most frequent outlier, in all cases giving less importance to
the budget than is normal. In questions 3, 75% describe the budget as
a forecast. In question Cl, Company 5 is the only one which does not
have a majority who experience budget pressure. Thus it is clear that
the specific circumstances in which company 5 is found substantially
explain its unusual results.
'#.7.lb Cornparnj L
Company 4 is the largest in this sample and the only one with a
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Budget Officer and staff to operate the budget system. The budget is
produced by budget staff in consultation with various levels of manage-
ment and it is budget staff who prepare and explain the monthly operat-
ing statements and variances. The budget is firmly placed within the
accounting function and much of the detailed control of production is by
physical units rather than a financial budget.
Not surprisingly, in the light of the above, company 4 has three
outliers for question Ci, showing less importance being attributed to
three of the four most important purposes for the budget. It would
appear that outside of the accounting function the budget is not viewed
as being as important as in most companies in the sample. The results
for question C2 show no outliers for this company and may indicate that
the respondents believe the budget in their company should have similar
importance to that of others. Again there appears to be a satisfactory
explanation for the unusual results of this company.
The results for company 3 in questions Cl and C2 and for company 7
in questions Dl and D2 have been described in the preceding sections and
a satisfactory explanation is apparent for both. Thus, there are a
number of examples where proposition 5 is substantiated at the micro-
level, i.e. when explanations for individual companies are sought.
4.7.2 Explanations of the Pattern of Differences between Companies
A Contingency Theory approach, at its very simplest, suggests that
there are observable relationships between various contingent factors
and a company's control procedures, such that performance will be better
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when there is an appropriate match between contingent factors and
control procedures. The data available in this study cannot be used to
test even this simple version of Contingency Theory, not least because
there is no measure of satisfactory performance available. However, it
is possible to examine these companies and see whether there are
relationships between certain control practices and some of the contin-
gency factors for which data were collected.
In particular, some of the differences that occurred have been
examined with the hope that these may be explained by systematic differ-
ences in the contingent factors. With a sample of only 13 companies and
some difficult measurement and classification problems, statistically
significant relationships will only exist when the pattern is very
strong.
The following method was adopted to investigate the differences
found between companies. Where there were clear differences among the
responses to certain questions, hypotheses were drawn up, based on the
literature reviewed in Chapter 2 (and occasionally drawing on some of
the literature to be discussed in Chapter 6). The relevant explanatory
factor was used to divide the thirteen companies into two groups and the
differences observed also produced two groups; thus a 2x2 contingency
table was prepared. From this the probability of the results in the
table occurring by chance could be directly calculated (in fact, one is
calculating the probability of the null hypothesis that there is no
difference between the groups). This technique, which is not without
some statistical problems, was reviewed and analysed by Yates (1984). A
more simple explanation, and that used in this study, can be found in
Bailey (1964), pp. 61-65.
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7.2a Parttctpattoa and. Budget Tqpe
There were clear differences in the description of the budget given
in different companies. One hypothesis is that the degree of participa-
tion in the budget-setting process is related to the type of budget,
i.e. to the role that the budget is fulfilling. It is hypothesised that
high levels of participation will be related to instances where the
budget is used as a target. To test this hypothesis, the companies were
divided into two categories on the basis of the replies to question c3
(which have already been categorised into 'target' and forecast'
descriptions) and also into two categories on the basis of the degree of
participation allowed in the budget-setting process. This was
determined using the descriptions of the budget-setting process that
were given in the interviews with the senior financial officers. Two
companies were excluded because the scores for 'target' and 'forecast'
were either equal or only different by one.










The probability of this contingency table occurring is:
5! 6! 8! 3!	 4
11! 5! 0! 3! 3!	 =	 .1212
If the test could be viewed as a one-tail test, then this is the
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relevant probability.	 However, in this case a two-tail test is
appropriate.	 Therefore to this probability must be added the
probabilities of any more extreme outcomes which are possible (whilst











which yields a probability of
	 and thus the total probability of this
particular result occurring (i.e. of the Null Hypothesis that the two
groups are equal) is -
	 or 0.182. As the result is higher than the
highest usually acceptable level of 0.1, the null hypothesis cannot be
rejected.	 However, with a sample as small as this it may be an
indicator that there is a relationship between the type of budget and
the degree of participation in the budget-setting process.
Parttctpattoa and Other Common Conttngencij Factors
A number of hypotheses can be advanced concerning the degree of
participation that was found in these companies. The contingency factors
which were examined were:
i. company size - measured by number of employees and turnover;
ii. profitability - measured as return on net assets;
iii. degree of divisionalisation.
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Each of these measures was tested against participation as measured by
the total score for question Dl, i.e. the total influence of the four
groups who have influence In setting the budget.
This relationship was tested by plotting the two scores and corre-
lations would have been calculated had there been any possibility of a
relationship between the two. In no case was there any sign of a
relationship between participation and these contingency factors.
4.7.2c Parttctjxition and ResuLts froa Questton D.t
During the interview, the senior financial official in each company
gave an official' view of the degree of participation that existed in
his company. Question Dl of the questionnaire has been used as an
indirect means of ascertaining the degree of participation in budget-
setting, as perceived by a sample of members throughout the company.
Two hypotheses are stated below which enable these two measures' of
participation to be compared.
First, it was hypothesised that the companies where TDM were given
the highest scores in question Dl would be those with the least partici-
pation. The rationale for this is that a high score for the influence
of divisional management indicates a company in which the budget is
predominantly set by senior line-management rather than one in which the
budget results form general participation throughout the organisation.
The evidence from the contingency tables does not support this
hypothesis.
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The second hypothesis is that companies where A(XT were given the
second lowest score (0TH? was given lowest score in twelve companies)
were those where participation was greatest, i.e. where AQI' played a
stronger role in the budget-setting process there was less general
participation. Participation was again measured' by the description
given by the senior financial official. The contingency table for this
hypothesis is given below.
Participation
High
Low	 5	 5Accountants	 -
rOle High	 3	 0
The probability of this result occurring is 0.196. However, this does
not lend any support to the hypothesis as the three companies where A(X
were not ranked as having the second lowest score are all in the high
participation category.
'.7.2d Retationshtp Between Actual and Desired ROte of the Budget
In section 4.2.3, a comparison was made between the results of
question Cl on the actual rOle of the budget and question C2 where the
respondents showed what they thought the rOle ought to be (herein
referred to as the desired rOle' of the budget). In many companies
there were noticeable differences between these questions for which no
explanation has yet been attempted. In five companies there are signif i-
cant differences between the answers to the two questions for six or
seven of the seven budget purposes listed (this is shown in Figure 4.6).
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Explanation has been sought for these differences using the follow-
ing reasoning. There are a number of potential factors which may explain
why the respondents do not consider the budget is fulfilling the role
that it should be. Examples of such factors include:
Size - maybe when the company is very large the problems of
communication are such that employees do not know what the budget
is intended to do, nor why.
Participation - where participation is great, then the budget
purposes may be better understood, and have possibly been set in
the light of a much wider range of views, in which case there
should be less divergence between the actual and desired rOles of
the budget.
The explanatory variables listed below were tested to see if any
statistical relationships existed between them and the differences in
questions Cl and C2. The tests were conducted by classification and the
use of contingency tables from which the direct probability of a result
could be calculated. The following factors were examined.
i. The degree of participation in the budget-setting process, as
measured' by the descriptions from the senior financial
officials.
ii. The origin of the budget; this is another possible measure of
participation by determining whether the budget originates from
the accounting function or from operational management.
iii. The degree and importance of variance analysis used by the organi-
sation, as determined by the interviews with senior financial
officials.
iv. The size of the company, measured by number of employees and by
turnover.
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v. The product type, particularly its adaptability as measured by the
length of the production cycle.
vi. The market in which the company operates as determined by:
(a) whether predominantly UK or not;
(b) the effects of the recession on profitability.
The probabilities calculated from the contingency tables indicate that
there is no statistically significant relationship between any of the
above factors and the occurrence of large differences between the actual
and desired purposes of the budget. Neither are there any non-signif i-
cant probabilities which may nevertheless be interesting indicators.
4.7.3 Conclusion for Proposition 5
This proposition states that the differences between companies can
be explained by differences in their organisation, structure and envir-
onment. At the micro-level (i.e. looking at individual companies), there
are satisfactory explanations to account for the unusual results that
occur. Thus, for all the companies which appeared as frequent outliers
on the charts of means, there were factors in the organisation, struc-
ture and environment of the company which explained the situation. At
this level the proposition can be supported.
However, at the second level, where more general explanatory
factors were being sought to account for the pattern of differences
among the companies, there was no satisfactory evidence to support this
hypothesis.
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4.8 GENERAL COMMEWIS AN) (X)a.,US IONS
To conclude this chapter a number of general comments will be made
which relate to one or more of the propositions that have been examined
and finally the conclusions to the five propositions will be summarised.
In a survey of management accounting, Scapens (1984, p.17) comments
that the practices observed in the United States should be compared with
those of the companies in the United Kingdom as there appear to be
differences. In this Chapter there are two aspects where such differ-
ences were apparent, namely the use of the budget as a target and the
extent of and reaction to budget pressure.
4.8.1 US v UK Differences - The Bud get as a Target
In section 2.7 the empirical evidence on the role of the budget
from the UK was reviewed. This review included an examination of direct
research reports, published case-studies and UK text books. The clear
conclusion from this is that in the UK the budget is primarily intended
as a forecast of likely actual performance which can be used for plan-
fling and control purposes.
However, in the US, the typical description of the budget can be
summarised in the phrase "realistically attainable but not too loose",
which incorporates some target element. This difference can be seen in
Sord and Welsch (1958) which reviews budget practices in the US at the
same time that Perrin (1958) wrote about UK practices. Dew & Gee (1973)
report findings similar to Perrin on this matter and in contrast to the
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US situation where the budget typically has some target element.
US budgeting texts, such as Knight & Weinwum (1964) and Welsch
(1976), tell the same story. Welsch states:
"the objectives and goals should be capable of attainment
(but) must represent a real challenge to the manager and the
operational unit."
In the past there has been a clear difference of emphasis between US and
UK attitudes to the rle of the budget. It is interesting in the light
of this to note that although each company 'officially' stated that
their budget was a pure forecast, there is a significant minority of
respondents (40%) who see some target element within the company budget.
It may be that attitudes in the UK are being influenced by US thinking
on the role and use of the budget or, alternatively, that this target
element is only revealed when non-accounting functions of a UK company
are exajnined. This has rarely been done in the past.
4.8.2 US v UK Differences : The Extent and Reaction to Budget Pressure
The second aspect where there appears to be an important difference
between US and UK practice concerns the extent of and reaction to budget
pressure. The academic literature on the effects of budget pressure has




The Traditional Understanding of Budget Pressure
Budget in
	
Resentment	 fti1use as a	 Pressure to
	
of Budget	 Behaviourcontrol meet budget	
Pressuredevice
However, section 4.5.2 reported that in this study 86% of the respond-
ents stated that increased budget pressure would be desirable and there
was no evidence of any dysfunctional behaviour. The traditional under-
standing of the effects of budget pressure is derived, in the main, from
research and writing from the US. Thus, a possible explanation of the
unusual results in this study may be found in the differences between
the UK and the US. It may be that in the US the general level of budget
pressure is higher than in the UK and is high enough for there to be
general resentment and consequent dysfunctional behaviour. Whereas in
the UK company ethos is different, there is less budget-based pressure
producing little or no resentment. Further, the source of budget
pressure in the UK is primarily personal, in contrast to the situation
described in the US literature where pressure is applied by accountants
and higher management.
It is also possible that the effective level of pressure in the UK
is as high as in the US but, because it is self-created pressure, the
individual is content with the situation and feels no resentment. A
third possible explanation is that the results of this study are an
aberration and there is no difference between the two countries. How-
ever, against this is the overwhelming response that pressure is not
resented or the source of dysfunctional behaviour.
	 These possible
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differences between the US and the UK could not be further tested as
part of the study. However, anecdotal evidence, which compares UK
companies with US subsidiaries in the UK, lends further support to the
existence of these differences.
4.8.3 Conclusions for Chapter 4
The major conclusions for this Chapter are restated below.
Proposition 1. The company budget is most commonly viewed as a forecast
of future performance; however, there is a sizeable minority, spread
through all the companies, who perceive some target element in the
budget.
Proposition 2. The use of the budget as a control device through the
calculation ai-id explanation of variances was considered one of the major
purposes of the budget, along with forecasting, assisting profit maximi
-
sation and judging performance.
Proposition 3a. The pressure felt by most respondents in this study was
not perceived as emanating from accountants or senior management; the
greatest pressure experienced was internally generated and indicates
that the major motivation was personal.
Proposition 3b. There was no indication that pressure to meet the
budget caused dysfunctional behaviour; in fact, 86% of respondents
considered increased pressure would be beneficial, even though 97% of
respondents had experience increased or constant pressure in the
preceding year.
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Proposition 4. General participation in the setting of the budget was
not a feature generally found in these companies though, in all, there
was a desire to see increased participation. This desire was most
strongly expressed by accountants.
Proposition 5. The differences found between the companies could not be
explained by systematic differences in their organisation, structure and
environment. However, the particular unusual features of individual
companies could usually be understood in the light of their particular
circumstances. This may indicate that
(a) the relationships that could provide systematic explanations of the
differences between companies are more complex than this study was
able to elucidate, or
(b) the most important explanatory features are company specific and
are not likely to produce systematic explanatory relationships.
From a sample of thirteen companies it is not easy to draw general
conclusions. However, on the basis of this sample, which is not unrepre-
sentative of medium and large UK companies, these results provide a good
indication of the use of the budget, the rtle and effects of budget




THE WR(VfIO(S AN]) AlTITUDES OF DIFFERENT USER-CR(XJPS
5.1 ThTRO1XJCFIO
In the preceding Chapter the role of the budget has been examined
and the differences that exist between companies have been of particular
interest. Although mention has been made of the different user-groups,
in the main each company has been treated as if there were company-wide
views and attitudes to the issues under examination. In this Chapter
that assumption is no longer maintained and the differences between the
user-groups become the focus of attention. User-groups could be defined
in various ways and it was the intention at the outset of this study to
choose three groups which were:
(a) distinctly different i.e. they could be defined in such a manner
that there would be little or no doubt which individuals belonged
to the group
(b) potentially of interest to researchers and practitioners.
The three groups that were selected as a result of these criteria
have been defined in section 3. It should be apparent that not all
employees will belong to one of these user-groups, for example shop-
floor workers will not fall into any of these groups. The three user-
groups are quite distinct in the companies that were investigated. The
potential interest in these user-groups arises from the fact that they
are frequently mentioned in textbooks and the academic literature on
budgeting.
In Chapter 4 the investigation was centred around five propositions
and in this chapter a similar approach will be adopted. Proposition 5
concerned the explanation of inter company differences by means of
various contingency factors and it is not as appropriate in this
chapter. This is because the sample sizes of the user-groups within
each company are small and thus it is rare that conclusions can be drawn
at the company level. However, the other propositions form the basis of
the investigation in this chapter but certain additional hypotheses are
also required.
The reason for setting up the three different user-groups is that
it was the researcher's a priori view that these groups might not have
the same perceptions of the budget or the same attitudes to other
budget-related issues. Thus the first stage is to state where such
differences between the user-groups might exist and the reasons for the
differences. To enable this to be done, a brief review of some of the
relevant literature will be presented and some hypotheses will be
stated.
5.2 BRIEF LITERATURE REVIEW
There are nny areas of the literature which are relevant to the
question of whether the three user-groups have or should have different
perceptions of the budget role or different attitudes to participation
or budget pressure. This review is brief and deliberately includes a
number of different strands of the academic literature.
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The basic issue to be considered in this review is whether the
user-groups should have similar perceptions of the budget and attitudes
towards the budget-related issues included in the four propositions to
be investigated. Put simply, should the basic hypothesis be that the
user-group have similar perceptions and attitudes, or does the litera-
ture suggest that the opposite is more appropriate?
5.2.1 Literature which Supports Agreement Between User-Croups
F.W. Taylor and his disciples developed a notion of management
behaviour in what is now termed Classical Management Theory. The origins
of this theory were in the manufacturing process, but others developed
the principles for use in the administrative function. The theory, as
put forward by Taylor, was fully authoritarian and involved all parties
knowing precisely what was required of them. In the words of Taylor
(1911):
• .to work according to scientific laws, the management
must take over and perform much of the work which is now
left to the men; almost every act of the workman should
be preceded by one or more preparatory acts of the
management which enable him to do his work better and
quicker than he otherwise could." p.26
"Under Scientific Management the 'initiative' of the
workmen (that is their work, their goodwill and their
ingenuity) is obtained with absolute uniformity and to a
greater extent than is possible under the old
system. . . ." p 36
When this principle is applied in the budgeting context, it implies that
all parties will view the budget in the same light, i.e. that management
has effectively communicated its view of the budget and this has been
accepted by all other parties.
5.3
At the same time that Taylor was advocating the ideas that he later
developed into Classical Management Theory, Henri Fayol was advocating a
complementary theory of company administration and management. In Fayol
(1949), first published in French in 1916, he specifically considers the
role of planning and forecasts. The planning system advocated by Fayol
has a high management input, but also has some degree of participation.
One of the rOles of the forecasts is to ensure 'unity' within the
organisation. He also comments:
"The study of resources, future possibilities, and means
to be used for attaining the objective call f or contri-
butions from all departmental heads within the framework
of their mandate ... Knowing what are its capabilities
and its intentions, the concern goes boldly on
(Fayol (1949) p.48)
This is an example that complements Taylor and is typical of many
writers in the first half of the twentieth century. In these writings,
budgets, or similar devices such as plans and forecasts, are designed to
communicate and unify and there is the clear implication that all
managers will have a similar understanding of their rOle within the
organisation.
Rensis Likert has proposed his own style of 'science-based' manage-
ment theory which is in almost complete contrast to Taylor. He has
proposed a highly participative style of management which he believes
would be effective in all situations in the long-run. This 'System 4'
has the following characteristics according to Likert (1967, pp. 4-10).
5.4
Direction of information flow
Amount of cooperative teamwork
Orqant sat tonal Variable	 System 4 Im-plemerttatton
Amount of responsibility felt by
each member of organisation for
achieving organisation's goals
Extent to which the review and
control functions are concentrated
Extent to which control data
are used
Personnel at all levels
feel real responsibility
for organisation's goals
and behave in ways to
implement them.




bility for review and
control
Used for self-guidance and
co-ordinated problem so lv-
ing and guidance.
An organisation which operates on a 'System 4' basis will have consid-
erable unanimity on important features of its control and decision-
making processes. Thus, one would expect that there would be agreement
between the user-groups in the areas to be examined in this chapter.
However, it should also be noted that Likert recognises the existence of
systems 1-3 which are very different in character and in which agreement
and cooperation between the user-groups is frequently absent. System 1
is very similar to Taylor's view of the organisation, however, Likert
insists that System 4 is universally better in the long term.
P.F. Drucker is typical of a school of thought which has produced
many prescriptive management texts. Drucker draws on Classical Manage-
ment Theory, but insists that it needs to be updated as it has become
moribund in the hands of over zealous followers of Taylor. He sees
motivation and communication as the two vital tasks for management.
Particularly, he describes the role of the manager in the following
manner.
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"Next a manager motivates and communicates, he makes a
team out of people that are responsible for various
jobs. He does that through the practices with which he
manages. He does it in his own relation to the men he
manages. He does it through incentives and rewards for
successful work. He does it through promotion policy.
And he does it through constant communication, both from
the manager to his subordinate and from the subordinate
to the manager." 	 (P.F. Drucker (1968) p.410)
Such a view of the managerial process, one which highlights upward and
downward communication, is consistent with the hypothesis that the user-
groups will have similar perceptions of the budget.
The final writer to be reviewed in this section is Charles Handy
who has made comments which form a bridge between this section arid the
next. Handy discusses various forms of organisational culture which he
describes as:
"the feeling of a pervasive way of life or set of norms.
In organisations there are deep-set beliefs about the
way work should be organised, the way authority should
be exercised, people rewarded, people controlled."
(Handy (1985) p.186)
Where such a culture is strong and the beliefs are well understood and
shared by the members of the organisation, then there is a high proba-
bility that differences in perceptions and attitudes towards budget-
related matters will be greatly reduced. This argument does not rely on
any particular culture but can be equally effective in a variety of
different cultures as long as they are well-established and pervasive.
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In a later chapter of his book, Handy discusses 'goal diversity',
by which he means the degree to which individuals, or departments and
divisions within the company, subscribe to one set of goals. He states
that this is
"..,. what Lawrence and Lorsch have called differentia-
tion. They have shown that internal differentiation is
more appropriate, and more common, when the market
environment or technology is changing more rapidly."
(Handy (1985) p.300)
Handy further argues that individuals find it easier to identify with
smaller groups, thus "buried deep in a functional specialism it is hard
to feel committed to the aims of the total organisation." The sub-goals
of many, if not all, companies, will include roles or purposes for the
budget. So, If the arguments quoted by Handy have any substance, they
form two reasons why there may not be agreement between the user-groups
on the rOle of the budget. These reasons are:
(a) Under conditions of a changing environment there will be Internal
differences (i.e. between individuals or departments) concerning
the objectives of the company and this is likely to include the
objectives or purposes of the budget.
(b) Where smaller units within the organisation develop cohesion, the
individual is likely to work towards the goals of the smaller unit,
which may well not be the same as the stated goals of the organisa-
t ion.
This brief review suggests that there are reasons which may justify
a basic hypothesis that the three user-groups will have similar percep-
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tions of the role of the budget and similar attitudes to the budget
related issues under examination in this chapter.
5.2.2 Literature Which Does Not Support Agreement Between User-Croups
Sainuelson (1986) argued that negative attitudes towards budgetary
control systems have been frequently encountered by researchers and that
one of the major reasons for this is "the coexistence of different
expressions of the rOle of the budget at one point in time". He
suggested that a budgetee may be able to observe several expressions of
the rOle of budgeting, in particular:
(a) The rOte articulated by senior management. This can be seen in the
"statements made in budget manuals or similar official documents"
and in "the pronouncements made by senior management".
(b) The real rOte of budgeting can be inferred from the specific
demands placed on budgetees during the budget control process.
This will "emerge from detailed observations of the uses which
senior management makes of the budget and the budgetary process".
Several real rOles may exist although one will usually dominate.
(c) The rOte intended by senior management. Samuelson does not consider
this rOle as important in explaining the budgetary system as the
preceding rOles. However, "intentions can influence both technical
practices and the organisatiorial processes surrounding the budget"
and "can shape the expectations that are held of a system".
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Samuelson observed that in some companies there was no discrepancy
between the roles of the budget. This was particularly in industries
such as steel and wood pulp, i.e. heavy industry with low profit, low
uncertainty and strong centralised management. In other industries,
such as metal-working and engineering, this discrepancy in budget rOles
was apparent. These companies had been structured into profit centres
where the articulated rOle was planning (as was the case for the heavy
industries) but the real rOle appeared to be responsibility control.
Saniuelson advanced an explanation for the existence of different
rOles. He noted that the planning rOle and the responsibility control
rOle belong to different organisational paradigms and contain inherent
conflicts if they are used in parallel in the same organisation.
Further, these paradigms may be appropriate to different environments.
Samuelson also suggested that these conflicting rOles may result from a
chronological process. At different times in the past, circumstances
have required different rOles for the budget. However, it is much
easier to create a new rOle for the budget than it is to end an existing
one, thus rOles multiply and exist in parallel. The previous rOles may
remain due to inertia or because management choose to change the real
rOle even if the articulated rOle remains unaltered.
Thus it is a clear conclusion in Sarnuelson's paper that companies,
particularly those which have decentralised profit-centres, may have
multiple rOles for the budget and that different user-groups may be
influenced by different rOles.
Many writers who adopt a Contingency Theory Approach to organisa-
tions have advanced reasons why differing perceptions of the budget may
be evident within a single organisation. For the purposes of this brief
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review Mintzberg (1979) will be taken as a typical exaiip1e. In discuss-
ing the divisional ised form of organisation, Mintzberg shows that there
is a strong set of forces which encourages central management to usurp
divisional powers and so defeat the purpose of divisiorialisation.
Divisional management have access to a different information set which
is superior to that available to central management. For,
a good deal of the information needed for formu-
lating strategies is soft and speculative - bits and
pieces of information, rumour and the like that never
get documented or quantified. What the MIS carries back
to headquarters are abstracted, aggregated
generalisations." (Mintzberg (1979) p.419)
This argument applies directly to the budget in many of its roles.
Central Management ny have to rely on the budget as a primary source of
information and as a major control device in the absence of anything
better. While members of a division will have access to better informa-
tion and more personal contact. The result is likely to be different
perceptions of the rOle of the budget.
Parker (1978) has examined the rOle of communication in organisa-
tions and in corporate budgeting systems in particular. He argues that
a frequent cause of communication failure is "bypassing" which occurs
when individuals refer to an apparently common topic but in fact have in
mind different subjects. Parker states:
"Bypassing can easily occur when two people use the same
words to mean different things." (Parker (1978) p.197)
In the context of budgeting words such as the 'budget' may be used
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by individuals, or user-groups, who attach different underlying meanings
to the words. Different underlying meanings may produce different
attitudes to budget-related issues and different perceptions of the
purpose of the budget.
From the brief review presented in this section it is clear that
there are substantive contributions to the literature which state or
imply that different user-groups within an organisation may have
different perceptions and attitudes towards the budget.
5.2.3 Comments on the Literature Review
The review of the literature was undertaken with the objective of
developing an appropriate hypothesis concerning the perceptions of the
budget by three user-groups. Unfortunately this review has demonstrated
that the literature contains great diversity on this matter and there is
no consensus as to whether different user groups should have the same
perceptions and attitudes. There is certainly no agreement as to
whether they will, in practice, have similar views.
The review of the literature has not included any comments on the
possibility of budgeting system failure. There are some writers who
clearly believed that in a well run organisation there should be a high
degree of unanimity on the role and purposes of the budget. However,
differences may result from the failure of management and others to
operate the system properly. This adds a further complication to the
setting of an appropriate hypothesis and the analysis of the results of
the study.
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Another complication arises if it is thought inappropriate to
determine a single hypothesis that will be appropriate for all the
propositions which will be examined. For example, there may be good
reasons why the three user groups should have different attitudes
towards the existence and consequences of budget pressure, but far fewer
reasons for a difference in perceptions of the basic role and purpose of
the company budget. Similarly, as has already been mentioned in Chapter
4, there are reasons to suppose that accountants will not be assessed on
the basis of budget-related performance to the same extent as first-line
managers. The nature of the work carried out by accountants is the basis
for this difference.
In the light of the above comments, it has been decided not to
state the hypotheses regarding perceptions of the different user-groups
in general terms. Rather, it will be more appropriate to state a
hypothesis in relation to each of the propositions as they are examined.
The appropriate hypothesis will be formed in the light of the literature
reviewed above and the results presented in Chapter 4.
The analysis and conclusions in this chapter will be more tentative
than those in Chapter 4 and will often be of a more exploratory nature.
The literature on direct differences between the user-groups in relation
to budget-related issues is scarce, which makes it difficult to form
hypotheses. From the data available in this study it will only be
possible to highlight interesting questions in some of the areas
investigated although in others tentative conclusions may be drawn.
5.2.4 Approach to the Analysis of User-Group Responses
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For each of the hypotheses that will be stated, the first stage of
analysis will be to use the combined sample of the thirteen companies.
In so doing, the data are being treated as samples from each of the
three user-groups rather than samples of particular companies. Having
examined the results from the combined sample, the results for
individual companies by user-groups will be examined.
Comment on the results of the combined samples will be made and
explanations sought where possible. However, no detailed examination of
the data at the individual level will be reported. Some considerable
time has been given to examining the individual company results and
attempting to record and explain the differences found. It has been
concluded that the data and the results are not sufficient to enable
this examination to produce any comprehensive conclusions. There are a
few clear instances where a conclusion or comment can be made and these
are reported. The statistical tests used and methods of presentation
adopted have been explained in Chapter 3.
5.3 PROPITIO 1 : THE BU1XF IS A FORECAST OF FLfl1J1E PERFORMAN(
Proposition 1 states that in U.K. companies the budget is primarily
intended as a forecast of future performance rather than a motivational
target. In Chapter 4, the evidence gave general support to this proposi-
t ion.
5.3.1 The Null Hypothesis for Proposition 1
Before proceeding to an examination of the differences between
user-groups a hypothesis concerning these differences must be stated.
The review of the literature in section 5.2.1 supports the view that in
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a company which is operating effectively there will be a clear under-
standing of the role of the budget. The literature in section 5.2.2,
especially the article by Samuelson, casts some doubt on this. Never-
theless the conclusions from Chapter 4 and the literature in section
5.2.1 have led to the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis for proposition .1 : The three user-groups wilt have a
similar view of the budget as a forecast of future performance
rather than a motivational, target.
5.3.2 Questions Cl to 3 - The Purposes of the Budget
These questions are set out in figure 4.1 or can be seen in the
full questionnaire in Appendix 1. The responses of the three user groups
to question Cl are compared by using the Kruskal-Wallis test, results
for which are given in Figure 5.1. The responses are presented graphic-
ally in the star-plots shown in Figure 5.2.
The results for the budget purpose FORECAST indicate that there is
not a significant difference between the three user-groups for the
combined saniple, and there is only one company where there is a
significant difference for this budget purpose. This result is also
seen in the star plot for all thirteen companies in Figure 5.2. For
question Cl there are significant differences between the user-groups
for five of the seven budget purposes.
The mean responses of the user-groups to questions Cl and C2 are
shown in Figure 5.4. The SNFM appear to give FORECAST less importance
in questions Cl but the results of the Kruskal-Wallis test indicate this
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the Kruskal-Wallis test results as these are computed using rankings of
all the individuals. Occasionally, there appears to be a relatively
large difference in means but no significant differences are indicated
by the Kruskal-Wallis test results; the opposite also occurs.
FIGURE 5.4
The Mean Responses of the User-Groups to Questions Cl and C2
Question Cl
Question (:2
MEAN SCORESBudget____________ _________ _________ _________
Purpose	
Combined	 ACt	 SNFM	 FLM
FORECAST'	 13.83	 14.11	 13.01	 14.36
uMAX	 13.75	 12.06	 14.64	 14.11
COMM	 10.38	 8.73	 11.44	 10.84
JIJPERF	 13.13	 12.58	 13.42	 13.34
REWARD	 6.27	 4.41	 7.28	 6.96
MOTIV	 8.34	 7.0	 9.41	 8.52
cDNVAR	 13.11	 12.03	 14.21	 13.01
FORECAST	 14.77	 15.3	 13.49	 15.51
II'MAX	 15.46	 14.67	 16.11	 15.53
cONM	 12.43	 11.86	 12.72	 12.67
JUPERF	 14.24	 14.21	 14.42	 14.08
REWARD	 8.52	 6.27	 9.25	 9.84
MOTIV	 11.90	 11.52	 12.21	 11.96
GONVAR	 15.17	 15.02	 15.41	 15.08
The Kruslcal-Wallis results for question C2, where respondents are
asked to show how important they think the various budget purposes ought
to be, indicate a significant difference between the user-groups for
FORECAST. In Figure 5.4 it can be seen that the mean score given by
5.18
SNFM is noticeably lower than the other user-groups. The conclusion
drawn from this is that senior nnagers would prefer the forecasting
element of the budget to have less importance than the other two user-
groups.
The second part of the proposition is concerned with the budget as
a target. The budget purposes M011Y and IEWARD may give an indication
of whether the user groups have different perceptions as to the use of
the budget as a target. For question Cl, using the combined sample,
there are significant differences between the user-groups according to
the Kruskal-Wallis results. The mean scores from Figure 5.4 indicate
that it is ACT who are the cause of the difference as they give
noticeably lower scores for both of these purposes. Also for both
purposes there are four companies where there are significant
differences between the user-groups. For seven of the eight instances
it is crr who are giving noticeably lower scores while in the eighth
AO and FLM both give very low scores.
Question c3 asks the respondents to select one of six descriptions
which best suits the budget in their company. As in section 4.2.4, these
six descriptions can be combined into definitions which contain a target
element and those which do not. The result of this amalgamation is shown
in Figure 5.5.
FIGURE 5.5
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The table in Figure 5.5 can be used to test the null hypothesis that the
three groups come from the same population. This is done by testing
whether the observed proportions in the three groups are significantly
different from the expected proportions based on the whole sample. For
the table in Figure 5.5, x2 .834 which with 2 degrees of freedom is
not significant. Thus the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.
This result indicates that the three groups are not systematically
different in their view of the budget. In Chapter 4 it was seen that
there is a major divergence in opinion as to whether the budget is best
described as a pure forecast or at least partially a target, but this
difference is not explained by differences between the user-groups. The
individual companies can provide further evidence on this matter. Figure
5.6 uses the data for C3 in the amalgamated form. Each user-group is
classified as Target' if ^ of respondents give that response; None'
if ^ - of respondents gave a description which included no target
element or Split if this two-thirds' rule was not met and the
user-group was split between the two descriptions. This is similar to
the procedure adopted in section 4.2.5.
FIGURE 5.6
Responses to Question C3 by Company and User-Group a
	 F
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The results in Figure 5.6 reveal that 18 of the 39 user-groups have
a split response and 17 see the budget as a forecast. Only 4 groups
describe the budget as a target. Thus there are only isolated cases
where a user-group describes the budget as having any target element and
and in general there are no systematic differences between the user-
groups at the individual company level.
5.3.3 - Other Motivational Features of the Budget
Further evidence concerning the motivational use of the budget can
be gained from the questions in section E of the questionnaire which are
set out in Figure 4.10.
Question El asks whether there is a financial reward for achieving
the budget and the responses to this question are shown in Figure 5.7.
Figure 5.7
Responses to Question El by User-Croup

















The same test as was used on the table in Figure 5.5 can be used here.
This produces the result
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= 5.09 which with 2 d.f. is significant at 10%.
Thus there is some evidence that the groups differ on this issue. The
general result Is that the budget is not used as a basis for paying
financial rewards. However, 26.8% of senior managers do believe that
financial rewards are related to budget achievement.
This question can also be examined at the individual company level.
To do this the user-groups are classified as Yes' or No' by the two-
thirds rule' applied earlier or they remain unclassified if the rule is
not met. The responses for question El are shown in Figure 5.8.
FIGURE 5.8
Responses to Question El by Company and User-Group
A S
The clear conclusion from Figure 5.8 is that there is agreement between
the user-groups in most companies and there are only three companies in
5.22
which the SNFM believe that there is a financial reward for budget-
related performance. The statistically significant difference found in
the whole sample appears to be concentrated in a few companies.
Question ES is the only other question in this section that
directly relates to Proposition 1. The responses are shown in Figure 5.9
below.
FIGURE 5.9
Responses to Question ES by User-Group


















The null hypothesis that these three user-groups come from the same
population can be rejected. x 2 = 35.37 which is highly significant,
i.e. at a higher level than 0.5%. It is not unexpected that accountants
would answer this question differently from the managers. The appraisal
of accountants is likely to be based on features other than achieving
the budget. With this in mind, the two groups of managers were tested
to see if the null hypothesis that they come from the same population
could be rejected. This hypothesis could be rejected at 2.5% signif 1-
cance level, indicating that there were differences between the response
of senior managers and first-line managers.




responses to the question of whether budget-related performance is a
factor in gaining promotion. It appears that senior managers may well
find some motivational content in the budget, through the indirect route
of promotion prospects.
At the individual company level the situation appears to be rather
confused and is shown in Figure 5.10.
FIGURE 5.10
Responses to Question ES by Company and User-Group
Question ES. Does promotion depenà on achieving tiget?

























From this it is clear that accountants give a clear response in all but
one company, with 86% saying No'. However, the other user-groups are
divided in their responses. Overall there is only one company where the
three user-groups agree and only four where FLM and SNFM are in agree-
ment. There are no features in the context or organisation of these
companies available to the researcher which can account for the differ-
ences between the user-groups in different companies. It is also
interesting to note that eight of the groups of managers (30%) have a
split response and this may indicate that the use of budget-related
performance assessment as part of the promotion process is a specific
feature rather than a general one. For example, only in circumstances
where meeting the budget is a satisfactory reflection of good
performance, would it be used as part of the promotion appraisal.
5.3.4 Conclusions for the Hypothesis for Proposition 1
The conclusion to the hypothesis that the three user-groups will
have similar perceptions of the role of the budget as a forecast rather
than a motivational device, is based on a general assessment of the
results presented in the preceding section. There is no single statist-
ical test that is being used.
The evidence from questions ci - c is that the user-groups do agree
that the budget is primarily a forecast. There are some differences as
to the motivational aspects of the budget. Accountants generally
consider this rOle to be less important than the other groups. The
budget is used as a motivational device, linked to a general financial
reward or promotion in some companies. Accountants believe their promo-
tion prospects are much less dependent on budget-related performance,
and there are also differences between the two groups of managers.
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There is some evidence that senior managers see more motivational
features in the budget than the other groups and regard the budget as
some form of target.
Overall, the hypothesis presented in section 5.3.1 is supported
except for some differences over the use of the budget as a motivational
target. However, the occasions where these differences occur are not
such as to contradict the basic budget description as a forecast.
5.4 ROPCITIOE 2 - THE BUDCEF AS A (DNTROL DEVICE
In section 4.1.2, proposition 2 stated that in UK companies the
major role of the budget was as a control device through the comparison
and explanation of the differences between the budget and actual
results. In Chapter 4 this proposition was generally supported by the
evidence from the study.
5.4.1 The Null Hypothesis for Pro position 2
Textbooks invariably give prominence to this rOle and directly or
otherwise imply that this is a company-wide rOle and thus that different
user-groups should not have different perceptions of the manner in which
the budget is being used. The academic literature does not generally
contradict this. The few instances in the literature where differences
in budget rOles are examined suggest that there may be differences in
the importance attached to the control aspects of the budget. In this
light the following null hypothesis is adopted.
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Hypothesis for proposition 2 : the three user groups will, each
bel,teue that the major rote of the budget in their cornpcirty is as a
control cieutce.
5.4.2 Questions Cl and C2 - The Purposes of the Budget
Two of the budget purposes listed in questions Cl and C2 are part-
icularly relevant to this proposition. ONVAR is defined as "to control
performance by calculating and investigating variances" and JUPEPF is
"to judge performance". The Kruskal-Wallis data in Figure 5.1 shows
that of the combined sample there is no significant difference between
the user-groups for JUPERF, but there is a difference at 5% significance
level for ODNVAR. The means scores in Figure 5.4 do not show one of the
user-groups noticeably different for cXNVAR, rather each is different
from the others. Accountants give the lowest score and SNFM the highest
for both of these purposes. The star-plots in Figure 5.2 show more
similarity than difference for these two purposes.
For question C2 there is greater agreement between the user-groups
and for the combined sample there were no significant differences for
either question. For each user-group the C2 score is higher than for Cl.
This indicates a consensus as to the importance of the control rOle of
the budget.
The individual company results confirm the pattern seen for the
combined sample. In Cl there are four companies which have some differ-
ences between the user-groups for (X)NVAR. Company 5 is a particular
case which will be discussed later, but in the remaining three companies
there is no pattern to the results for which an explanation could be
found. For the purpose JUPERF there is one company with a significant
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difference at lOX, a result which seems to be a random event. For C2,
there are three significant differences from the possible 26 and no
examination of these differences has been carried out.
5.4.3 Conclusions for the Hypothesis for Proposition 2
Chapter 4 concluded that the budget does have a major control pur-
pose in these companies. The data here indicate that there is a signif-
icant difference between the three user-groups in the responses to the
question O)NVAR. Interestingly, it is senior managers who are perceiv-
ing most importance for this purpose and accountants the least. For
.JUPERF, there is agreement between the user-groups as there is for both
of these purposes in question C2. The individual companies show few
instances of differences on this issue. Thus, on balance, the evidence
here gives some support to the hypothesis that the three user-groups
have similar perceptions on the control role of the budget and there is
a strong similarity in their views as to how important this control rOle
ought to be.
5.5 OThER FEATURES OF THE ROLE OF THE BUDCET
Before considering proposition 3 there are a number of features
from the results to the questions in section C of the questionnaire
which, while not directly relevant to the propositions, are of interest.
They may help to produce a better understanding of the differences
between the user-groups.
5.28
5.5.1 The Role of the Budget in Ceneral
5.5.la In Figure 5.1 it can be seen that two of the most significant
differences between the user-groups arise in the purposes uMAX and QJMM.
Further, TIMAX has six individual companies where there are significant
differences. The mean scores for the combined sample in Figure 5.4 show
that in both instances it is the accountants who have noticeably lower
scores than the groups of managers. For TTMAX in ten of the companies
accountants give the lowest score and similarly for cOMM, but these are
not the same ten companies. This result could be interpreted as evid-
ence that accountants have a narrower view of the budget which centres
on planning and control. They give less importance to the wider, more
business-oriented purposes of assisting profit-maximising and communi-
cating.
5.5.lb In comparison with question Cl, question C2 has only 60% as many
significant differences for the individual companies and only two in the
combined sample. This may indicate that there is a greater consensus
among the user-groups as to what the rOle of the budget ought to be. It
has been noted in Chapter 4 that the mean scores in C2 are greater than
in Cl and thus there appears to be agreement among the user-groups that
the budget should have increased importance.
5.5.2 Individual Companies
While it is not possible to examine the differences between user-
groups at the individual company level in any detail, there are some
features that are very clear and worthy of comment.
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5.5.2a Company 5. There are a number of instances in Chapter 4 where
company 5 was clearly producing responses which were different from the
other companies. In the table of Kruskal-Wallis results for question
Cl, company 5 has six significant differences (no other company has more
than three). The cause of these results is clear from an examination of
the star plot for company 5 in Figure 5.2. For each of these six
purposes the accountants are giving a much lower score. The conclusion
from this is that accountants in company 5 are putting less emphasis on
the importance of the budget, and probably more on the job-cost system
which they perceive as the important control mechanism. Only for fore-
casting do the user-groups have agreement and the accountants rank this
more highly than the other user-groups.
The Kruskal-Wallis results for question C2 do not have this array
of significant differences for company 5. The star plots in Figure 5.3
still show the accountants as having lower scores than the other user-
groups, but the difference between the groups is much reduced. This may
indicate that the accountants believe that the budget should have a more
important role. This is supported by the fact that the other user-groups
have generally higher scores for C2 also and so the difference between
the user-groups has been closed by a distinct difference in the respon-
ses of the accountants.
5.5.2b. Comparuj 1. The other company for which there is a series of
significant results is company 1 for question (2. Here there are four
significant differences between the user-groups. For three of these
purposes (TIMAX, COMM and REWARD) it is accountants who give noticeably
lower responses and it appears that the narrower and less business
oriented view of the budget, described in section 5.5.la, is considered
desirable by the accountants in company 1. There is nothing in the data
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available that suggests why this result has occurred.
5.5.3 The User-Group in General
Thus far the responses of the user-groups have been examined by
looking at each part of (i.e. each purpose) of questions Cl and C2. The
pair-wise correlation tests look at the whole of each question, i.e. the
seven purposes in questions Cl and C2 and compare the responses of the
user-groups over the whole question. From these results it is possible
to draw some conclusions about the differences between the user-groups.
This test has been conducted on the combined sample and for each company
and the results are shown in Figure 5.11.
It is possible that these tests will produce results which are not
immediately compatible with those that have been corisidred thus far
this chapter. Up to this point, it has been noted that there have been
differences between the user-groups on single parts of questions Cl and
C2, whilst on other parts of the question there have been no differ-
ences. This tests looks across the whole range of the question and
determines how similar the answers are between two groups.
5.5.3a. For the combined sample, in questions Cl and C2, there is a
high correlation between the three user-groups. This is not unexpected
as the aim of this test is to seek for any differences between user-
groups at the company level and the aggregation problems would be likely
to preclude any significant differences in the combined sample.
5.5.3b. In the results for question Cl it is hard to see any pattern or
trend although there are some features of interest. There is a high
correlation between the responses of the three user-groups in company 5,
5.31
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even though there are significant differences between the three groups
for six of the seven purposes according to the Kruskal-Wallis results.
This may be explained by the fact that for five of the seven purposes
ACtF have given the lowest score and FLM the highest. This can be seen
on the star plot in Figure 5.2. For company 13 the correlation coeffic-
ients are lower for all three pairs than is found in the other
companies. The star plot for this company shows that the user-groups
vary greatly in the ordering of importance that they have given to each
purpose.
5.5.3c. In the correlation coefficients for question C2 a possible
pattern does emerge. In five companies the FLM are the user-group who
are different from the other two and in one other company ACCT and FLN
are clearly different. Too much should not be read into this result,
but it may be an indicator that the first-line managers have a different
view of the budget role in general in these six companies. The
explanatory data which was collected during the company visit gives no
insight into this result. There are no other general features which
emerge form this test. This may indicate that differences between the
user-groups will only be found on specific issues or in particular
companies.
5.6 r'ROPcITIONS 3a AND 3b - BUDCEF PRESSURE
In Chapter 4 these two propositions were examined and the basic
conclusions were:
Proposition 3a. The budget was used as a control device and there
was evidence of pressure to meet the budget.
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Proposition 3b. It was predicted that budget pressure would be
resented and be the cause of .
 dysfunctional behaviour, but this was
not substantiated by the results.
5.6.1 The Null Hypothesis for Propositions 3a and 3b
The literature reviewed in Chapter 2 is clear that using the budget
as a control device will produce pressure and that pressure beyond a
certain degree will produce resentment and dysfunctional behaviour. In
this study the two aspects will be examined separately. The results from
Chapter 4 support proposition 3a and there is nothing in the literature
reviewed in section 5.1 which suggests that the user-groups will have
different attitudes towards a control-oriented budget producing
pressure. Thus the following null hypothesis is advanced.
Hypothesis for Proposition 3a : the three user-groups mitt agree
that use of the budget as a controL device mitt produce pressure on
entptoyees.
However, the position is more complicated for proposition 3b. Firstly,
proposition 3b was not supported by the results in Chapter 4. The
literature reviewed in section 2.5.1 strongly supported the view that
budget pressure would cause dysfunctional behaviour. The difference
between the literature and the results of this study may be caused by
having three distinct user-groups in the samples. There is little in
the literature about accountants as budget-holders. Further, a general
knowledge of business practice suggests that accountants are not likely
to be controlled by the budget in the same manner as managers. Thus,
they may not experience budget pressure in the same way as other
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user-groups and have different attitudes towards dysfunctional
behaviour. As a result, the hypothesis for proposition 3b to be
examined is as below.
Hypothesis for Proposition 3b : the user-groups will, have different
attitudes towards the existence of dysfunctional behaviour caused
by budget pressure; tn particular, accountants will experience Less
resentment and Less dysfunctional behaviour.
5.6.2 Question Cl - Budget Pressure
The questions in section C are set out in Figure 4.14 and Appendix
1. Question Gi asks "do you feel any pressure on you to meet the
budget". The response to this question is shown below in Figure 5.12.
FIGURE 5.12




Yes	 34	 60	 59	 153	 (75%)
No	 31	 8	 12	 51	 (25%)
65	 I	 68	 71	 I	 204
The null hypothesis that the three user-groups come from the same
population can be calculated in the manner described above. This
produces a result of x 2 = 26.67 which, with 2 d.f., is highly signifi-
cant (i.e. at greater than 0.5% significance) and the null hypothesis is
rejected. It is clear from Figure 5.12 that accountants are the primary
cause of this difference and when the probability test is repeated on




groups come from the same population cannot be rejected.
The responses to this question for each company can be seen in
Figure 5.13 and the general picture from the combined sample is repli-
cated in nny of the individual companies. In eight companies the SNFM
and FLM state that there is pressure to meet the budget while AcXl' state
that there is not or they give a split response. Company 5 gives a per-
verse response again and in three companies all the user-groups state
that there is pressure to meet the budget.
FIGURE 5.13
Responses to Question Cl by Company and User-Group
5.6.3 Conclusions for Hypothesis for Proposition 3a
The senior and first-line managers give strong support for proposi-
tion 3a. This is found in the combined sample and all but one company.
However, the response of the accountants is significantly different,
only half of them feel budget pressure although this response is not
found uniformly within the companies. In five companies accountants
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clearly state that they feel no pressure and in three they state the
reverse.
Thus, it is concluded that this hypothesis is not supported by the
evidence as accountants do not clearly affirm proposition 3a.
5.6.4 Proposition 3b - The Consequences of Budget Pressure
For the SNFM and FLM there is clear evidence that they experience
pressure to meet the budget and thus it is appropriate to examine the
consequences of this pressure. The accountants have given a varied
response to question Cl and thus care must be taken with the analysis of
this proposition. However, only those who responded E Yes' to question
Cl have completed questions G3 and C4.
56. I#a. Budget Resentinertt. A similar approach is adopted here to that
in section 4.5. The issues of resentment and dysfunctional behaviour
are addressed indirectly. Question G3 asks respondents for the source
of budget pressure. A Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted on the combined
sample and the results of this are given in Figure 5.14. No statistical
tests have been conducted at the individual company level because the
sample sizes of some user-groups are too small for meaningful results.
In section 4.5.1 it was noted that self-created pressure was ranked as
the greatest source and that this was not in line with the prediction
based on a review of the literature. It is of interest here that this
same source of pressure is the cause of one of the two differences
between the user-groups. The medians (and more strongly the means) mdi-
cate that accountants have given self-generated pressure less importance
than the other groups.
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FIGURE 5.14
Kruskal-Wallis Results for Question C3 - The Source of Budget Pressure
Kruskal -
AcCI'	 SNFM	 FLM	 Wallis
Result E
Number in sample	 34	 59	 58
Medians for each user-group
for each source of pressure
TCM	 14.0	 13.0	 6.0	 .005
TDM	 11.0	 16.0	 14.0	 NS
AcCT	 10.0	 6.0	 6.0	 NS
IMSEJP	 15.0	 15.0	 16.0	 NS
YOUSF	 14.5	 17.0	 16.0	 .005
.005 = The three groups were significantly different at 0.5% level.
NS = There was no significant difference between the groups at less
than 10% level.
The other significant difference between the user-groups occurs in
their perception of pressure from TCM. Not surprisingly the FLM, who
are organisationally more distant from 1CM, have indicated that they
experience less pressure from senior central management than the other
two user-groups.
In Chapter 4 the major finding was that accountants were the least
source of pressure to meet the budget and self-generated pressure was
the greatest. From this it was concluded that there was not any great
resentment towards the budget (see section 4.5.1). The Kruskal-Wallis
results indicate that the view concerning pressure from accountants is
not significantly different between the user-groups but that accountants
feel that self-generated pressure is less important to them than to the
5.38
other user-groups. These results can be interpreted as implying that
accountants may have a different attitude towards budget pressure as
they consider other sources of pressure at least as strong as self-
generated pressure. It is only external pressure that can be the source
of resentment, thus accountants may develop resentment towards budget
pressure while the other groups do not. The results here do not justify
stating this conclusion with great confidence, but it is certainly a
possible interpretation of the results.
5.6.'#b. Thjsfunctionat Behautour. This part of hypothesis 3b is examined
primarily by using questions G4 and F3. Question G4 asks whether more or
less pressure to meet the budget would help in attaining the company's
major objectives. The results for the combined sample are given in
Figure 5.15.
FIGURE 5.15
Responses to Question G4 by User Group




























The null hypothesis that the three user-groups come from the same popu-
lation has again been tested. The result is N 2 = 3.915 which is not
significant at 10% and thus the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.
The question can also be examined at the company level and these
results are shown in Figure 5.16.
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FIGURE 5.16
Responses to Question 04 by User-Group and Company
Ce.pør3
The combined sample and nine companies give a clear result showing
agreement between the user-groups. Although a general desire for greater
pressure was contrary to the result predicted by the literature, here it
is clear that this result is found in all user-groups and most compan-
ies. The result must be seen in the light of the answers to question CS
where virtually all respondents stated they had experienced constant or
increased pressure in the preceding year.
Dysfunctional behaviour was also examined by question F3 which asks
whether the budget hinders the improvement of performance (the questions
from Section F are set out in Figure 4.20). The results for question F3
are set out in Figure 5.17.
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FIGURE 5.17
Responses to Question F3 by User-Group






























The null hypothesis that the data for the three user-groups in
Figure 5.17 caine from the same population was tested in the same manner
as before. This produced x2 = 6.21 which is significant at the 5% level
and so the null hypothesis is rejected. The accountants are the source
of this difference as only 14% of this user-group state that the budget
hinders their performance whereas for senior managers this figure is one
third and for first-line managers it is one quarter.
The results for this question at the company level are shown in
Figure 5.18.
FIGURE 5.18
Responses to Question F3 by User-Group and Company
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The results for the combined sample, i.e. that all user-groups do not
see the budget as a hindrance to performance, are generally repeated at
the company level. Adopting the same classification method as before
for this figure, the combined sample and five companies show the three
user-groups agreed that the budget does not hinder performance. In only
two of thirty-nine instances is a user-group classified as Yes', while
nine have a split response.
Thus the results for question F3 indicate that in general the three
user-groups are not experiencing any hindrance from the budget. However,
there is a difference between the user-groups in that the minority
within each user-group who do feel that the budget hinders performance
is significantly smaller among accountants.
5.6.5 Conclusions for Hypothesis for Proposition 3b
Proposition 3b was in two parts relating to resentment of the
budget and dysfunctional behaviour, both consequent upon excess budget
pressure. The hypothesis advanced was that accountants would have a
different reaction to the other user-groups and that this might be an
explanation of the unusual results found in Chapter 4.
The results from question C3 indicate that accountants feel self-
generated pressure to be less important than the other user groups and
thus may be more likely to experience resentment as pressure is being
exerted by external elements. In question C4 there was almost no differ-
ence in the responses of the three user-groups. Finally, question F3
shows that in general the user-groups are giving a similar response but
there is evidence that accountants are answering No to the question in
significantly greater numbers.
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This hypothesis does not have a straightforward conclusion. In
general the evidence does not support any major difference between the
user-groups and the hypothesis is not supported. However, there are some
aspects where accountants are giving a different response, certainly
enough to add a qualification to this rejection of the hypothesis. It
appears that the accountants, more than the managers, are responsible
for this unusual result in which budget pressure is neither resented nor
the cause of dysfunctional behaviour. But it should also be noted that
the self-generated source of budget pressure is found most strongly in
the managers who are typically described in the literature as most
likely to resent budget pressure.
5.7 PROPOSITIO( 4 - PARTICIPATION IN TIlE BTJDCEF PROCESS
Proposition 4 stated that the level of participation in the budget-
setting process was not great and that employees desire a greater degree
of participation. The findings from Chapter 4 supported this proposi-
t ion.
5.7.1 The Null H'crpothesis for Proposition 4
There is little in the literature which directly discusses the
different user-groups of interest in this study. The literature is
generally framed in terms of managers participating at the discretion of
senior management and accountants. The literature reviewed in section
5.1 does not give any further indication of different reactions to
participation by the user-groups. There is a general organisational
principle put forward by many (including Nintzberg (1979) and Brims and
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Waterhouse (1975)) that a company will be as centralised as possible.
If this is applied in the context of budgeting, one would expect low
levels of participation and little desire from accountants for greater
participation. A similar conclusion would result from an analysis of
organisational power. If accountants have a major role in setting the
budget, they will probably consider that this gives them a certain
amount of organisational power and influence and thus they may not wish
to share this with other groups.
From the above comments the following null hypothesis is advanced. It
is not considered that the literature fully supports this hypothesis.
Rather, that it is a satisfactory working hypothesis for this investiga-
tion which has some basis within the literature.
Hypothesis for Proposttton 4	 the user-groups mitt have similar
attitudes towards the amount of participation currently experienced
but will have different attitudes towards greater participation in
the budget-setting process; in parttcular, accountants wilt desire
less participation and greater influence in the budget-setting
process for themselves.
5.7.2 Question Dl - The Amount of Participation
Question Dl, set out fully in Figure 4.22, investigates the degree
of participation by asking how much influence various groups have in the
setting of the budget. The Kruskal-Wallis test results are shown in
Figure 5.19 and give a very clear answer for the first part of the
hypothesis. For the combined sample there are no significant differ-
ences between the user-groups and at the level of the individual company
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than is likely as a result of random fluctuations). The mean responses
for each user-group for each part of the question are shown in Figure
5.20 and confirm the high level of agreement.
FIGURE 5.20





Group	 Combined	 A(1T	 SNFM	 FLM
1CM	 13.15	 12.94	 13.11	 13.38
TDM	 14.16	 14.39	 14.72	 14.70
OTHP	 7.67	 6.86	 8.08	 8.00
AcXI,
	11.80	 11.73	 11.45	 12.21
TCM	 13.01	 13.18	 12.76	 13.10
TDM	 15.49	 15.45	 15.38	 15.63
OTHP	 10.30	 9.91	 10.30	 10.66
AcET	 11.79	 12.39	 10.85	 12.16
The star plots in Figure 5.21 show the similarity in the combined
sample very clearly. There is generally a much higher degree of agree-
ment among the user-groups than was evident on the star plots for
questions Cl and C2. Companies 1, 4, 7 and 13 show slightly less agree-
ment than the others but there is neither sufficient information nor
differences to enable any worthwhile further investigations.
The results of the pair-wise correlation over the whole of question
Dl are shown in Figure 5.11. The major feature is the high level of
these correlation coefficients which adds further to the evidence above.
At the level of the individual companies, only company 4 has distinctly
different results and this can be seen in the star plot.
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Figure 5.21
Star Plots For Question Dl
WHOSETSTHEBUOGETIN', 0	 'WHOSETrSTHEBUDGETIN, 02	 WHOSErSTHEBUDGETIW 03	 -WHO SETS THE BUDGET IN	 Li..	
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5.7.3 Question D2 - The Desired Amount of Participation
Question D2 asks how much influence each of the potential budget
setting groups ought to have. This gives an indication of the desired
degree of participation and enables the second part of the hypothesis to
be considered. The lower part of Figure 5.19 shows the Kruskal-Wallis
result for question D2 and as for question Dl there is a considerable
degree of agreement. For the combined sample the only significant
difference between the user-groups arises over how much influence A'XT
ought to have. The table of mean scores in Figure 5.20 shows that the
probable cause of this difference is the senior managers group, who
believe accountants should have less influence in drawing up the budget.
This is also the cause of the significant difference in company 5 but
not for company 6, where the FLM desire a much greater influence for the
accountants than the other user-groups.
The major feature of these results for question D2 is the similar-
ity between the user-groups. The star plots in Figure 5.22 show the
features already mentioned and there are only a few companies for which
there are noticeable differences; particularly companies 2, 6, 7 and 11.
The correlation coefficients in Figure 5.11 show very high levels
for the combined sample. There is a little more diversity among the
individual companies for D2 than was evident for Dl, but the overall






























5.7.4 Conclusion for Hypothesis for Proposition 4
The hypothesis stated firstly that the three user-groups will have
a similar view on the amount of participation currently experienced. The
results above substantiate this hypothesis clearly.
The second part of the hypothesis states that there will be differ-
ences between the user-groups as to increased participation, particu-
larly that accountants will desire less. The major conclusion is again
that the user-groups are not significantly different in this respect.
Section 4.6.4 showed that there is a general desire in these companies
for increased participation. The accountants are not significantly
different from the other user-groups and in fact they appear to be
slightly more in favour of increased participation. There is evidence
for this in the table of mean responses, where the increase in scores
between Dl and D2 for OTHP is 44% for accountants whereas the other
user-groups are 28% and 33%.
In conclusion, the major part of the hypothesis for proposition 4
which states that accountants will want less participation than the
other groups is contradicted by these results.
5.8 (DNCLUS IONS FOR UTAFFER S
At the outset of this Chapter it was stated that the investigation
was, at least partially, of an exploratory nature. The conclusions would
probably be tentative and may often indicate areas for further research
rather than provide definitive answers to the issues being investigated.
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This has been the case, although there are also some results which are
clear and may be of interest to practitioners as much as to researchers.
The major conclusions from this Chapter, with some brief comments,
are summarised below.
5.8.1 Specific conclusions
Proposttion 1. There is general agreement among the user-groups that
the budget is primarily intended as a forecast of future expected per-
formance. The senior managers would prefer this forecast role to have
less importance. There is general agreement that the budget does not
have a target or motivational element, but this is not as clearly
expressed as for the forecast rOle. A minority of senior managers
indicated that there were budget-related incentives, particularly via
promotion prospects, which did add a target or motivational element to
the budget.
Pro-postttort 2. The general conclusion was that the three user-groups
agree that the budget in their company is used as a control device
through the calculation and investigation of budget variances. The
senior managers gave more importance to this rOle and accountants less.
The academic and text-book literature often portrays accountants as
taking the lead in this area of budgetary control, but the results here
show the reverse. It is possible that accountants have a better
understanding of the weaknesses of budgetary control systems and thus
put less emphasis on their importance.
Ceneral.. rOI.e of the budget. Accountants give less importance to the
general business oriented rOles for the budget of uMAX and (X)MM. This
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is perhaps a result which could be predicted following a reading of
popular management accounting text-books which pay little attention to
business oriented issues.
From the comments above there is a picture of the SNFM group who
want the budget to have a decreased forecasting role, an increased
control rOle, and to maintain the high level of importance given to the
business oriented purposes of the budget. This group also sees a greater
motivational role for the budget. These differences are not great but
amount to a difference in emphasis which can be seen in the responses of
the senior non-financial managers.
The first-line managers in six of the companies also have a differ-
ent view of how the budget should be used. It is not possible to
determine the differences that this group is seeking and they could well
be company specific.
Proposttton 3a. The two groups of managers give strong support to the
proposition that pressure will result from use of the budget as a
control device. Only half the accountants have this view.
Propostttort 3b. The general result from Chapter 4 showed that the
greatest source of pressure was self-generated and thus there was little
evidence of resentment of the budget. This result was found for the two
groups of managers, but accountants felt this self-generated pressure
had only the same importance as some of the external sources of
pressure. This may result in accountants who feel pressure to meet the
budget (only half in this study) may also feel the resentment predicted
by the literature.
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In general the user-groups agree that budget pressure does not
produce dysfunctional behaviour. It was predicted that only accountants
would produce this result, and that this might be the cause of the
unexpected result in Chapter 4, but this is not the case and none of the
user-groups report a relationship between budget pressure and dysfunc-
tional behaviour.
Proposition Ii The existence of only limited participation and a general
desire for greater participation were found in all user-groups. Again
it was hypothesised that accountants, for reasons of control and power,
would want less participation, but the results show them as the most
keen for greater participation.
5.8.2 General Conclusions
The results and conclusions from this chapter have been presented
above in detail, and from these a general conclusion can be drawn. In a
number of important aspects these results do not conform with the
general textbook picture of budgeting procedures and attitudes.
This overall picture can be seen in the following specific results:
senior management gave more importance to control than forecasting
and planning;
accountants were more keen on increased participation than
managers;
budget pressure was not perceived as a major problem, in fact
increased pressure would be considered beneficial;
pressure was internally generated rather than externally imposed,
particularly for the managers.
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GIAYER SIX
TIlE ROLES OF THE BUDGEI - WIDER PERSPFCFIVES
6.1 flffROtUCFI
Chapter two of this thesis comprised a review of the ttritiona].t
literature on budgeting. This included the main issues that have been
discussed in accounting journals and textbooks in the last twenty-five
years or so. This literature usually views the budget as an accounting
phenomenon; it has a multi-purpose role concerned with matters such as
planning, communication, motivation and control. It is unusual to find
specific organisational matters discussed, although there are exceptions
to this generalisation.
To a limited extent in chapter two and more so in chapters four and
five, some aspects of the organisation's context have been discussed.
In particular, in the search for explanatory variables, a simple
contingency approach was adopted. The primary objective of this chapter
is to take a wider view of budgeting than has been possible in the
preceding chapters. This wider perspective will be gained by standing
back from the ttraditionall view of budgeting and examining the
literature that pertains to organisations to see what implications for
the rOle of the budget can be found.
In chapter four it has been concluded that there are differences in
the role of the budget between companies. Chapter five has shown that
there are also differences in the perceptions of the rOle of the budget
between three of the user-groups. The data available from the study
were not adequate for uny of these differences to be fully explained.
It is the view of the researcher that one of the possible explanations
for these differences is to be found in the roles that the budget plays
in different organisations. Some,of these rOles have not been mentioned
in the the review of the literature to this point while others have only
been briefly discussed.
In this chapter a number of paradigms will be briefly reviewed.
The review will have the specific objective of seeking the implications
of these paradigms for the rOle and purpose of the budget in an
organisation. It is not intended that this review should be exhaustive.
Rather, four paradigms have been selected which have been influential in
the literature on organisations and from which some accounting
implications have already been elucidated.
Following the review of these paradigms a comparison will be made
of the implications that can be drawn from each. One of the main
objectives of the comparison will be to determine whether these
different paradigms produce similar or complementary conclusions.
The four paradigms to be examined are:
1. Contingency Theory
2. Organisational Power
3. Markets and Hierarchies
4. Agency Theory
A review of.any of these could easily fill a complete chapter, if
not a whole thesis. It is not the intended that this chapter should
include a comprehensive review of these four paradigms. Rather, that
the main features of each approach should be outlined and analysed by
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considering a small number of important contributions to the literature.
These books or papers are well-known and often contain a review of the
paradigm in question.
Occasional reference will be made to the literature reviewed in
chapter 2 and to the results from chapters 4 and 5. Further comments
relating the reviews in this chapter to the earlier results will be made
in the concluding sections of this chapter and in chapter 7
6.2 (D1'TINGENCY THEORY APPROAGI
The contingency theory paradigm (hereafter referred to as 'CT')
will be considered by using two well-known and influential works; first,
the paper by Bruns and Waterhouse (1975), 'Budgetary Control and
Organisation Structure', and second, Henry Mintzberg's book 'The
Structuring of Organisations'.
CT is often quite narrowly defined; for example Waterhouse and
Tiessen (1978) gave the following definition:
"Contingency Theory essentially states that efficient organisation
structures vary with organisational contextual factors such as
technology and environment." p.66
In this section, and particularly in the review of }Iintzberg, a broader
view will be taken in which a wider range of contextual factors will be
considered.
6.2.1 Bruns and Waterhouse
The paper by Bruns and Waterhouse (hereafter B&W) nkes a natural
bridge between the 'traditional' approach to budgeting and Cf under
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consideration in this section. This is because budgeting is directly
considered in the paper and publication was in a leading accounting
journal. B&W also claim to be among the first to focus "specifically on
the relationship between formal properties of organisational structure
and budgetary control". Near the beginning of the paper a summary of
their conclusions is given:
"These findings lead to the conclusion that there must be
alternative organisational control strategies in different kinds of
organisations, and that prescriptions about how budgets should be
used in organisational control should be written with care." p 178
This quotation indicates one the most important conclusions which can be
drawn from CT for the purposes of this chapter, i.e. that a full
understanding of the function of the budget for organisational control
cannot be obtained without some reference to the organisation t s context.
B&W distinguish two forms of organisation structure: centralised
and decentralised but structured. Although budgetary control may be
used in either of these structures, B&W suggest that the decentralised
and structured organisations operating in a stable and predictable
environment are particularly "amenable to the use of budgets, and
budgets further the structure activities". In centralised organisations
"interpersonal relationships replace structured activities as primary
means for maintaining control", so the budget and other administrative
controls will have a secondary role.
The results of their study indicated that technologically
sophisticated organisations were larger and more structured. Perhaps
surprisingly, in large, structured organisations managers felt they had
more control, that they had more discretion on how to achieve financial
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results, that a greater degree of participation was perceived and they
were satisfied with budget-related activities. B&W state that this is
consistent with the idea that highly structured organisations are
associated with routine, standardised activities.
Different effects were seen in centralised organisations, where
managers experienced superior-initiated pressure, they saw budgets as
being generally less useful, but they appeared to be satisfied by the
use of budgets by their superiors.
The conclusion that can be drawn from the B&W study is that the
results show a relationship between contextual variables (size and
technology) and the role of the budget. This result is indirect as the
contextual variables influence the organisation's structure, and the
structure in turn affects the manner in which the budget is used and
perceived. From this study it is apparent that the Cf framework may
have a good deal to offer in the understanding of the use of budgetary
control and the rOle of the budget. A more extensive examination of the
Cl' approach to organisations is presented in the following section.
6.2.2 Henry Mintzberg - "The Structuring of Organisations"
Mintzberg(1979) states in the preface that he is attempting to
produce a synthesis from a large amount of published material on
orgariisation structure. Mintzberg takes a broad view of Ct,
incorporating some variables that many other writers overlook and
developing a more detailed analysis of organisation structures.
6.2.2a Parts of the Orgunisation
Mintzberg defines five basic parts of an organisation, namely:
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Operating Core - where the basic work of the organisation
takes place, where inputs are turned into outputs.
Strategic Apex - consists of senior management and their own
personal staff who are charged with ensuring that the organisation
serves its mission in an effective manner
Middle Line - who are the chain of command or organisation
hierarchy that join the strategic apex to the operating core.
Technostructure - comprises the analysts who serve the
organisation by affecting the work of others. These control analysts
primarily attempt to effect standardisation in the orgariisation, and
include: work study analysts, budget accountants, strategic planners.
Support Staff - includes a large number of specialised units
that exist to provide support for the organisation outside the operating
work flow. Units within this part of the organisation include: legal
department, industrial relations, research and development, cafeteria.
These parts of the organisation are represented in the diagram
shown in figure 6.1.
FIGU1E 6.1
The Five Basic Parts of an Organisation - Mlntzberg (1979) p . 20
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As will be seen later, these different parts of the organisation
have differing degrees of importance and different relative sizes
depending the circumstances in which the organisation is found.
6.2.2b Destgn Parameters
Mintzberg then considers a number of 'design parameters', some of
which will now be defined in Mintzberg's terms.
Horizontal Job Specification - is the predominant form of
division of labour and involves separating work into its component parts
and usually allocating different parts to different groups of workers.
Vertical Job Specialisation - separates the performance of
work from its administration. The worker only performs the activity and
has no influence over how or why it is done.
Bureaucratic structure - one where behaviour is predetermined
or predictable, in effect, standardised.
Organic structure - one where there is an absence of standard-
isation.
Behaviour Formalisation - is the design parameter by which the
work processes of the organisation are standardised. This may done in
three ways: formalisation by job, formalisation by work flow, and form-
alisation by rules.
Vertical Decentralisation - is concerned with the delegation
of power down the chain of authority, from the strategic apex to the
middle line. The focus is on formal power rather than the informal
power that arises from advising and executing
Horizontal Decentralisation - This is the transfer of power
from managers to non-managers, from line managers to staff managers,
analysts, specialists etc.
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6.2.2c The Contingency Factors
Mintzberg states in part III of the book that:
Contemporary research. . .has uncovered a set of what are called
situational or contingency factors, organisational states or
conditions that are associated with the use of certain design
parameters" p 215
These contingency factors will now be stated and the main hypotheses
that Mintzberg advanced from the literature will be outlined.
Age and Size. The older and larger the organisation, the more
formalised its behaviour; structure reflects the age of founding of the
industry; the larger the organisation the more elaborate and specialised
its structure and the larger the organisation the larger the size of its
average unit.
The Technical System. The more regulating the technical
system, the more formalised the operating work and the more bureaucratic
the structure of the operating core. The more sophisticated the
technical system, the more elaborate the administrative structure.
Thirdly , the automation of the operating core transforms a bureaucratic
administrative structure into an organic one.
Environment. The more dynamic the environment, the more
organic the structure; the more complex the environment, the more
decentralised the structure. The more diversified the organisation's
markets, the greater the propensity to split into market based units,
and finally, extreme hostility in its environment drives any
organisation to centralise its structure temporarily.
Power. The greater the external control of the organisation,
the more centralised and formalised its structure. The power needs of




Key part of organisation
Main design parameters
ised. Fashion favours the structure of the day, sometimes even when
inappropriate.
6.2.2d Structural Conftgurattons
It is Mintzberg's contention that the various features that have
been outlined above (and discussed in detail in his book) fall into
natural groupings or configurations. His five structural configura-
tions, each representing a commonly found organisation structure, are
presented and these will now be briefly discussed. After presenting the
essential features of each configuration, the role of the budget will be
considered. Having viewed the five structures separately, it will then
be possible to consider the differences and similarities in the rOles
that the budget is playing.
At the beginning of each section the key features of that
structural configuration will be summarised.









hostility or strong power needs
of top manager, Not fashionable
In the simple structure control is by direct supervision in an
organisation which is either very young or experiencing a dynamic or
very hostile environment. A similar organisation can result from highly
autocratic or charismatic leadership.
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Key part of organisation:
Main design parameters:
Comment	 Planning is extremely difficult, and communication is
direct and informal. 	 It can be concluded that in this structural
configuration there is almost no role for the budget as a control
device, and only a limited rOle for the other uses of the budget.
2. Machine Bureaucracy




and horizontal job specialisation
Usually functional grouping,




Old, large, regulating, non-
technical system, Simple, stable
environment, External control
Not fashionable
The machine bureaucracy is characterised by operating work which is
simple, routine and standardised. It will usually be large and the
operating core will be cut off from its environment. The key part of
the organisation is the technostructure as it is the technological
process which is the heart of the organisation, The middle line will be
large and communication will be formal. Formal power lies in the
strategic apex but a good deal of informal power is within the techno-
structure as their expertise is vital. These organisations are usually
large, inflexible and the best are very efficient within a narrow band
of activities.
Comment It is possible to conclude from this description that the
budget will have a number of potential rOles in a machine bureaucracy.
Planning is both necessary and feasible, although it is likely to be
kept at a high level within the hierarchy. Communication from the
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strategic apex to the first line umagers through the large middle line
is formal and the budget is known to be an effective communication
device in these circumstances. Thus the budget may have a planning and
communication role.
Control is the other major rOle which will be considered. It would
be possible to use the budget as a major control device in principle.
Accurate budgets could be drawn up as the operating core is sealed off
from most outside influences and the environment is relatively stable
and predictable. However, the budget is unlikely to be a major
instrument of control as there is another mechanism which is more
effective, viz the operating process itself. The process is stable and
predictable thus control is likely to be exercised by means of physical
quantities and tests for quality. It is quite probable that budgets
will have a control rOle outside the operating core, for example in the
support areas.
To summarise the above comments, it is likely that in a machine
bureaucracy the budget will have a high level planning rOle, it may have
a communication role and also a rOle in the control of areas outside the
operating core. Thus individuals from different parts of the organ-
isation could have very different perceptions of the rOle and importance
of the budget. For example, a middle manager in the operating core may
have little or no meaningful contact with the budget while a depart-
mental head in a support area may feel the budget is the major means by
which his performance is controlled.
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Prime coordinating mechanism
Key part of the organisation
Main design parameters










Examples of a professional bureaucracy include, universities,
hospitals, accounting firms, solicitors and craft production. The key
part of the firm is the operating core where professionally qualified or
skilled individuals carry out their work with little direct supervision.
The individual has considerable control over his own work, works
independently of his colleagues and closely with the clients he serves.
In these circumstances, and with a complex but stable environment,
control and coordination is by standardisation of skills. This
standardisation is achieved by means of training and indoctrination.
Skills may take many years to learn and the organisation may expend
considerable resources on its indoctrination programme with the
intention of building a strong organisation culture. Often there are
external standards which must be met but the organisation will have to
ensure that they are complied with. An example of this is the internal
manuals produced by accounting firms for their staff which comply with
the external requirements of the profession and also provide a framework
of control for the individual actions of their members.
Comment The implications for the role of the budget can now be
examined. As work is not programmable, is not directly repetetive, and
is carried out independently by professionals, control of performance by
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means of the budget does not seem to be a likely or efficient practice.
The actual work undertaken cannot be easily encapsulated in financial
terms; at best a budget of inputs could be prepared for certain
activities. Professional bureaucracies will usually have a small
technocracy (all the operating staff have considerable technical
training) but there may be a large support staff, for example in a
hospital, the staff for cleaning, catering, portering etc is a large
proportion of the total staff.In the support areas a control budget may
be effective.
The budget may have a role in long-term planning and in the shorter
term management of resources for large units i.e. at a high level in the
organisation and thus not in any great detail. There is also a rOle for
the budget in the support staff areas where the work is simpler and more
programmable, but there are other control techniques which may be more
appropriate, for example direct supervision. In the public sector, in
particular, the budget may be a constraint or a maximum amount of inputs
which are available for a given time period.
It could be argued that any attempt to impose a control budget on
the operating staff of a professional bureaucracy would be likely to
have serious detrimental consequences for the quality of work. The
nature of the work, its diversity and the need to exercise professional
judgement, indicates that control and communication by means of an
operating budget are not likely to be features of this form of organ-
isation, except in areas outside the operating core.
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Prime coordinating mechanism
Key part of organisation
Main design parameters




Market grouping, Performance control
system, Limited vertical decentral-
isation
Diversified markets ( particularly
products or services ), Old, Large,
Power needs of middle line
Fashionable
Mintzberg does not see the divisionalised form as a pure structure,
but as one structure superimposed upon others. The essence is a central
headquarters with quasi-autonomous, probably market-based units. A
large range of products may be produced. The middle line is the key to
this structure as these managers have considerable responsibility to rim
their own divisions. The production process and environment allow
standardisation of output which in turn allows for a performance control
system to be one of the main design parameters.
There is also considerable emphasis on training of divisional
management to produce standardisation of skills and there is an
important element of direct supervision of the senior divisional
management by central management. Theoretically, central management is
concerned with strategic decisions while the divisional management is
given the responsibility for operational matters; there will be a
tendency for each to attempt to become involved in the areas of the
other.
The needs of central management to keep control over autonomous
divisional management, in a reasonably stable environment where
standardisation of output is possible, has led to the use of performance
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control systems.
Comment One of the most common performance control systems is the
budgeting system. Thus in the divisionalised form it is common to find
the budget occupying an important position. Agreement between central
and divisional management at the outset of the budget is a vital form of
ex ante control and comparison between actual results and budget forms
the basis of ax post control.
This form of budget based control is only possible in the relat-
ively stable and predictable environment which is necessary for the
basic divisionalised form to exist. Where this environment is not
found, either some hybrid version of the divisionalised form will
develop or one of the other structural forms will be appropriate. It is
also important to note that budgetary control is not necessarily used
within the divisions. There will be a tendency to use within the
divisions the same performance appraisal system as is being used for
the division as a whole; the aim would be to produce a 'nesting' of
objectives and performance measures. However, there will be
circumstances where this is not appropriate due to the nature of the
production process, the market or the environment generally. Thus it is
not possible to state that divisionalised organisations will necessarily
use budgets as a major control device in all divisions.
Other roles for the budget are implicit. Forecasting and planning
are viable in this environment and it is highly likely that central
management would require this from divisions as an input to their own
planning procedures. Communication is possible via the budgeting
process and likely to be used. For example, including activities in









Support staff (in the administra-
tive adhocracy ) plus the operating
core in the operating adhocracy
Liaison devices, Organic structure,
Selective decentralisation,
Horizontal job specialisation,
Training, Functional and market
grouping concurrently
Complex and dynamic (sometimes
disparate) environment ,Young
(especially operating adhocracy),
Sophisticated and often automated
technical system (in the administ-
rative adhocracy), Fashionable
Adhocracies are highly organic organisations where there is usually
a sophisticated technical system and a high degree of innovation results
in little or no standardisation. Examples of such include: newspapers,
research laboratories, N.A.S.A., integrated oil companies. These organ-
isations show a large amount of horizontal job specialisation, there are
often project groups or teams, matrix structures are sometimes seen and
managers abound.
There are two basic forms in which this structure can exist:
a) Operating adhocracy. This form of the organisation is
highly innovative; it exists to solve problems directly on behalf of
clients. The administrative and operating work blend into a single
effort. There is a tendency for this structure to develop into another,
usually a professional bureaucracy, and thus most of these organisations
are young.
b) Administrative adhocraqj. This organisation structure
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exists to solve problems for its own benefit. The administrative and
operating aspects of work are kept separate. The operating core may be
truncated; in some organisations this nay be as a result of automation,
whereas in others sub-contracting may have a similar effect.
Adhocracies are considered by Mintzberg to be much in fashion at
the present and possibly to be the structural form of the future because
of their ability to adapt and cope with rapid technological change.
However it is clear that adhocracies are not efficient at performing
repetitive tasks, and with their complex and informal structures may not
be able to grow large without considerable problems of coordination and
integration.
Comment It can be concluded that there is almost no role for the
budget as a control device in this form of organisation. The
environment is too dynamic and unpredictable, the structure is informal
and overlapping, and the work is not programmable. There may be a
limited rOle for high level budgets to assist in the planning process.
In the short term, budgets may be used as a means to allocate resources
and thus, they would be a form of constraint.
6.2.3 Conclusions
CT, particularly in the broader form advocated by Mintzberg, states
that the structure of an organisation will be dependent on a number of
contingent or contextual variables. Mintzberg analyses these variables
and their inter-relationship with the parts of the organisation and
various design parameters. The five structural forms that he
establishes are not exhaustive and he discusses at some length the way
in which these five forms are tendencies and organisations are often
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being pulled in the direction of more than one of them by conflicting
features of their environment, technology etc.
The conclusion drawn from the researcherts comments above is that
these different organisational forms will produce different roles for
the budget to play. The control aspect will be examined first. In some
organisational forms (e.g. the simple structure and the adhocracy) there
is almost no control role for the budget. Whereas in the divisional
form, where performance control systems play a vital rOle, the budget
may be an important control device. However, even in the divisionalised
form there will be many instances where the budget does not play a vital
rOle wtthtn the division even if it does have considerable importance in
the relationship between the central and divisional management.
The planning and forecasting rOle for the budget has more general
importance as this will be relevant, to some degree, even when control
is not in appropriate objective. In the adhocracy and professional
bureaucracy in particular, the budget may have a rOle in resource
allocation. This is especially common when outputs are difficult to
measure but inputs can be quantified in financial terms.
A very large proportion of medium and large companies in the U.K.
are of the divisionalised form and the general conclusions from T lead
to the prediction that budgets would be in use and that they would have
considerable importance. However, a more careful examination of the
theory and the companies reveals many situations where this might not be
the case. Such situations would include:
a) Where extreme environmental hostility has forced the
organisation towards the simple structure.
b) Where rapid technological change has resulted in the
6.18
organisation or some divisions moving towards the adhocracy.
c) Where the degree of automation in the production process
has reduced the numbers of workers in the operating core to such an
extent that the organisation is moving towards the machine bureacracy.
Thus a sample of medium or large companies, such as the one used in
this thesis, may all appear to be divisionalised on paper, but there may
be large differences in the role that the budget plays because not all
the companies are of the classic divisionalised form. Further, within
one company which does have the divisiorialised form, the individual
divisions may not have similar organisational structures and so the rOle
of the budget would be dependent on what part of the organisation was
examined or who was questioned. This adds further theoretical evidence
to the proposition that an empirical investigation is likely to find
differences in the rOle of the budget in different companies.
6.3 ORCANISATIOAL POWER
6.3.1 Introduction
The existence of organisational power and its implications for the
organisation have been considered by many writers, although only a few
have sought to examine the effect on the rOle of the budget. This
section discusses a small selection of the literature but with the
intention of covering many of the important issues. Other issues
related to organisational power and found in the literature are also
discussed.
Before embarking on any discussion of organisational power, some
definition of the terms must be given. There are numerous definitions
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of power and most are in terms of the individual, often seeing power in
terms of coercion or determination of behaviour. However there are also
writers who see power as a feature of relations within an organisation.
Hickson et at (1971) state,
• .power as a property of the social relationship, not the actor.
.power is explained by variables that are elements of the
subunit's task, its functioning, and its links with the activities
of other subunits.
.dependency in a social relation is the reverse of power." p 217
All definitions of power are incomplete; they are difficult to
operationalise, harder still to measure. Yet it would appear from
empirical work that most organisation members know what power is and who
wields it! A working definition for the purposes of this chapter is one
which Hickson et at quote, with an impressive array of writers who have
also used it; "power is defined as the determination of the behaviour of
one social unit by another".
There is an immediate link with the previous section, in that
Mintzberg considers power as one of his contingent variables but not one
which he elaborates greatly. A further link can be found in the paper
by Hickson et at already quoted. Their paper presents a structural
contingencies approach to power which uses ideas similar to those found
in CT. The most important factor in their theory appears to be the
units ability to cope wtth uncertatnty. This point is stated formally
in their hypothesis 1, "The more a subunit copes with uncertainty, the
greater its power within the organisation". The subject of uncertainty
and power will be discussed later.
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6.3.2 Organisational Power and the Budgetary Process
The framework for this section is based on the paper by Covaleski
and Dirsmith (1986) (hereafter referred to as 'czD') entitled, 'The
Budgetary Process of Power and Politics'. D begin by considering the
traditional view of budgeting where a rational and efficient allocation
of resources is attempted to enable the achievement of the
organisatiofl's objective. They note that as far back as 1963 "Cyert and
March . . . saw budgets as the results of political bargaining within
organisations, subsequently fit for legitimising and maintaining systems
of power and control". The basic theme of their paper is "that
budgeting systems are complicit in representing vested interests in
political bargaining processes and maintaining existing power
relationships".
This is a theme that has been developed considerably by Wildavsky
although his work has been mainly in the public sector. Wildavsky
(1975) states.
"The bonds between budgeting arid 'politiking' are intimate.
Realistic budgets are an expression of practical politics. The
allocation of resources necessarily reflects the distribution of
power." p xii
"If organisations are seen as political coalitions, budgets are
mechanisms through which subunits bargain over conflicting goals,
make side-payments, and try to motivate one another to accomplish
their objectives." p 4
Permanent organisatiorial interests dominate temporary policy
objectives." pg
Whereas the above comments were made in relation to national
budgeting, they apply also to the private sector and other writers have
taken up the same themes.
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The political nature of the budgetary process and the connection
between power and politics are themes dealt with by Burchell et at
(1980). They concentrate on roles that accounting may play in
organisations and society and emphasise economic rationality has not
been a driving force in the development of these rOles:
". . . there is little in the development of accounting as practised
that would lead one to describe its essential rationale in terms of
the furtherance of economic efficiency or rationlity." p 10
Burchell et at develop a model, based on the Thompson and Tuden
(1959) model, which relates the rOles that accounting may play in an
organisation to two forms of uncertainty, viz uncertainty about
objectives and uncertainty about cause and effect. This model is
reproduced in figure 6.2.
Figure 6.2















Burchell et at discuss the rOle of accounting in general, from
which it is possible to draw out the implications for the budget. Where
there is agreement over objectives (low uncertainty) and there is a good
understanding of "the patterns of causation which determine the conse-
quences of action" (ie low uncertainty), then the budget may be used to
provide answers to problems facing the organisation. If there is high
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uncertainty over objectives the budget may be used as ammunition in
arguments between individuals or subunits. The implication is that the
budget is not being used to further economic efficiency but to promote
the interests of one part of the organisation.
At the position with maximum uncetainty, where Thompson and Tuden
say that decisions are made by inspiration, the budget will be used to
rationalise the decisions that have already been taken. Finally where
there are clear objectives but uncertain causation the situation is more
complex. The budget may still be used to answer problems, however the
uncertainty may produce more questioning actions. The organisation
participants may feel the need to explore problems, question
assumptions, ascertain whatever is possible about the cause and effect
relationships that they are dealing with, before making any judgement.
In these circumstances the budget has become a device for organisational
learning.
It can be concluded from this paper by Burchell that the
traditional role of the budget for control purposes is only seen in one
of the quadrants of their model. Organisations which are in a situation
characterised by any of the other quadrants may have very different
roles for their budgets. The other rOles for the budget gain much of
their significance from the budget setting process and the ex post use
of the budget is less important. It is particularly in the setting of
the budget that learning and rationalisation takes place; similarly it
is during the budget setting process that the budget is used as
ammunition to gain resources.
Cooper et at (1981) also question the rationality, objectivity and
economic efficiency of organisational budgeting. They suggest three
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possible models which can be used to explain the budgeting process, viz,
a rational model, a bounded rationality model or a 'garbage-can' model.
The first of these is the traditional accounting model of rational
choice and economic efficiency, where the budget is used for planning,
communication and perforrrnce appraisal. The second is the model uses
the concept of bounded rationality advanced initially by Simon (1957)
and defined as
The capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving
complex problems is very small compared with the size of the
problems whose solution is required for objectively rational
behaviour in the real world." p 198
Cyert and March (1963) develop a similar model (although called
t the adaptively rational model'),in which the emphasis shifts from a
concern with the outputs of the system to a concern with the processes
and uses of these systems. Thus bounded rationality models emphasise
procedural rationality, consistent behaviour and do not assume
omniscience.
The implications for budgeting from the bounded rationality model,
are that the budgeting process is of more importance than the actual
budget itself. Cooper at at state that various studies suggest
budgeting is intended as a rational process but nny factors prevent
this occurring. The budget may be the product of a rational process
without denying the implications of the bounded rationality model.
The garbage-can model discussed by Cooper et at is one developed by
Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) and is one of a class of models described
by Pfeffer (1981) as 'decision process' models. In this class of models
it is posited that there are no overall organisational goals being maxi-
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mised and no powerful actors with defined preferences and the resources
to obtain their preferences. Thus these models would be found in the
fourth quadrant of the Burchell et at model described above, where there
is a high degree of uncertainty.
In the garbage-can model, decisions are the outcome of several
relatively independent streams within the organisation. There are
streams of:
problems - the concerns of people, all require attention;
solutions - someone t s product, looking for a problem;
participants - they come and go at various times in a
particular choice situation;
choice opportunities - when a decision is expected to be made.
In this model goals are discovered through action and actions are under-
stood retrospectively. The budget process may then be viewed as a means
of justifying past actions and making them appear sensible (rational) to
the actor and others.
Cooper et at give further interpretations of the garbage-can model
regarding the role of the budget, including the following.
Budgets are a reflection of organisational power and a tool for
settling disputes.
The budgeting process may have the rOle of ritual, which provides a
sense of identity and reinforces what is valued within the
organi sat ion.
The budget may be seen as myth, which helps to determine what is
acceptable or not by anchoring actions to the past and to explan-
ations of the past; "myths justify and sustain specific values in
organisations".
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From the comments in Cooper et at, particularly those which relate
to the garbage-can model, it may be concluded that there is a range of
roles which the budget may play in an organisation. Some of these seem
far removed from the textbook descriptions of the budget and other
formulations of the budget which emphasise their rationality and
economic efficiency.
6.3.3 Concluding comments
It is not possible to draw a simple conclusion from this brief
analysis of the organisational power and related literature as it
relates to budgeting. zD used this perspective to examine the way that
budgets and the budgeting process were being used and perceived by a
particular group of users. Their conclusion was that this view of
budgeting "definitely appears to be useful to an understanding of the
budgeting process in the six hospitals". Further, they do not see the
traditional rational view of the budget and other perspectives, which
emphasise power, myth, political processes etc, as necessarily being in
conflict. In fact, "the traditional perspective (on the budgeting
process) and its acceptance by organisatiorial actors serves to enhance
its potency in political processes...
The range of rOles which is apparent in this approach to budgeting
is such that it is highly likely that individual members of an organi-
sation will have differing perceptions of the rOle and importance of the
budget. Similarly, different organisations may have developed different
rOles from this wide range of possibilities, depending on their own
circumstances.
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6.4 MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES APPROACH
6.4.1 The General Approach Stated
The Markets and Hierarchies approach (hereafter called M&H) has
been primarily the work of O.E.Williainson, particularly in Williamson
(1975). The basic approach is from microeconomics although the dist-
inctive features of his work concern issues which Williamson believes
have been overlooked in economic theory. Williamson describes his
approach as the 'organisational failures framework' and it relies
heavily on the importance of transactions (Williamson also describes his
approach as the 'transactional paradigm t ). At the simplest level M&H
states that markets and firms (hierarchies) are alternative instruments
for completing a related set of transactions, and an organisation will
use whichever instrument is most efficient. The costs of using the two
instruments will vary depending on the characteristics of the human
decision makers and the objective properties of the market.
In the M&H approach where a transaction is being conducted in a
market, there is a presumption of organisational failure; the reverse is
also true. The first part of the framework is an examination of a set
of environmental and human factors that lead to prospective market
failure and thus to transactions being conducted within the firm.
Bounded ratiorwiit!J. This is the same concept as used by Simon and
Cyert and March (indeed Williamson wrote one of the chapters in Cyert
and March (1963)). It refers to behaviour which is "intendedLy
rational, but only LimitedLy so" and refers to the limited language and
computational abilities of individuals. This feature is particularly
relevant when there is a high degree of uncertainty and/or complexity.
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Opportunism and small ruiinbers. Opportunism is 'self-interest
seeking with guile' In conventional economics this feature is not of
critical importance because the usual assumption of a large number of
agents prevents an individual's self-interest from being realised.
Williamson asserts that in reality there are many instances where small
numbers exist, and even if there are large numbers at the time that the
original contract is made at the stage of renewal small numbers will
often appertain.
Irtformat tort impactedness This "is a derivative condition that
arises mainly because of uncertainty and opportunism, though bounded
rationality is involved as well". The condition arises when the full
information relating to a transaction or set of transactions cannot be
costlessly revealed to all the parties involved. Williamson argues that
within the organisation it is easier to control for information
impactedness as conditions can be devised where the parties will find it
in their best interest to fully reveal the information in their
possession. In particular, parties may be more keen to reveal inf or-
mation internally than they would be to a third party and performance
assessment and audit are easier to conduct within the organisation.
Atmosphere. "Reference to atmosphere is intended to make allowance
for attitudinal interactions and the system consequences that are
associated therewith". Williamson appears to use this term to include
many of the behavioural aspects not usually dealt with in economics.
These features are summarised in a diagram from Williamson which is
shown in figure 6.3
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Figure 6.3





















One aspect of the M&H framework that is particularly important and
which has implications for budgeting is analysis of internal labour
markets. Williamson argues that there are features of the internal
labour market which encourage individuals to forego opportunistic
behaviour and willingly work for organisational objectives. These
include the nature of the wage bargain, which typically ties the wage
rate to a job rather than to an individual; well documented arbitration
procedures; limited ports of entry; and internal promotion procedures.
All of these features may persuade an individual that commitment to an
organisation and its objectives would be a better course of action than
an attempt to gain the best possible contract available in the short run
on an open labour market.
6.4.2 Implications from M&H for Organisation Structure
Williamson broadly supports the analysis presented in Chandler
(1966) and sees the multidivisional structure ( M-form ) as the best
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response to failures in the market. The large divisionalised organ-
isation, with a substantial internal labour market and the resources to
produce a miniature capital market, is seen by Williamson as more
efficient than a unitary organisation attempting to manage a similar
scale of operations. The assumption of frictionless capital markets is
one which Williamson finds particularly inappropriate and he argues that
the internal capital market is a major feature of M-form organisations.
A range of organisational forms, based around the multidivisional form
are presented, as shown below:
H-form	 Holding company




6.4.3 The Implications for Budgeting
The form of divisionalisation envisaged by Williamson is similar to
that described by Chandler. There there is a small central part to the
organisation (the general office) which is responsible for long run
strategy and monitoring the performance of the operating divisions.
These divisions have full authority to run their affairs as long as they
achieve the objectives set by the central management. It is important
in this structure that the separate roles of the central and divisional
management are maintained. The budget has a number of potential rOles
in the M&H framework, although these are not discussed by Williamson.
N-form organisations are more complex than unitary organisations
and they need more complex internal control systems. Because of the
separation of strategic and operational decision making, the central
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management need a control system to ensure that the organisation's
strategy is implemented. Williamson suggests that an important aspect
of this is the use of incentives. Budget-based incentives are feasible
(discussed further in section 6.5) and thus, this may provide a role for
the budget that would be perceived by senior divisional and central
management.
If the internal labour market is to be efficient it requires
rewards that are given on the basis of good performance (performance in
line with objectives). Financial rewards and promotion will both
generate a demand f or performance measures and what Williamson describes
as histories'. Performance measured in terms of the budget
clearly fits this requirement and produces another well known rOle for
the budget. It is not clear in the M&H framework whether budget based
performance measures are envisaged as means of controlling senior divis-
ional management or whether it is only appropriate within the divisions;
central management may not wish to be involved in the level of detail
necessary to control divisional management by budget based performance
measures.
Even though the perspectives of central and divisional management
are different, they may both find a forecasting and planning rOle for
the budget. The time horizons and objectives may be different, but this
rOle would be similar. Overall the M&H approach does not say a great
deal directly about the rOle of the budget, although there is
considerable importance given to performance appraisal and there are
many implications concerning the use of budgets. Comparison between





Agency theory (hereafter referred to as AT) has its roots in
information economics and institutional economics.	 It is usually
presented in rigorous terms, often to allow the use of mathematical
techniques. This literature is large and covers a broad range of
subjects. In this section a very brief review will be undertaken; it
will be non-mathematical and will only consider issues that have direct
relevance to the role of the budget This section draws on two papers
which review the AT literature from the perspective of management accou-
nting, namely Tiessen and Waterhouse (1983) and Walker and Choudhury
(1987).
6.5.2 A Brief Outline of Agency Theory
AT deals with a world where there is a principal, who in the case,
of a large business organisation could be, for example, the share-
holders, board of directors, or central management; and an agent, or
agents, who is engaged by the principal to perform some form of service
on his behalf. Both principal and agent are wealth maximisers, and the
agent's utility function also includes disutility for effort. The AT
world is one of competitive markets where contracts can be made to cover
most eventualities. Much of the discussion revolves around the contr-
acts that the principal makes with the agent and of ways to enforce
conditions in the contract.
Two forms of uncertainty are frequently distinguished: ex ante
uncertainty covers the difficulty in predicting the state of the world
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that will exist during the period that the contract will run; ex post
uncertainty arises because there is not full information available to
the parties concerning effort levels and skill types.
Two problems are of particular interest in AT, viz, the moraL
hazard problem and the adverse setectton problem. The moral hazard
problem occurs because outcomes are jointly determined by the state
variable and the effort level of the agent. The principal in many
circumstances is not able to distinguish between the effects of these
two variables. The adverse selection problem arises if skills are not
directly observable and agents claim to have skills which they do not
possess, as the outcomes cannot be used to infer skill levels.
Within AT uncertainty is a form of contingency variable.
	 For
example, where an organisation has highly structured operations, as a
result of a predictable environment or routine technology, it may be
possible to make a contract for effort levels. Under these circum-
stances effort is virtually the only variable and thus output is an
accurate proxy for effort. Circumstances where this is likely to occur
are uncommon and the more usual position is that output cannot be used
as the basis of a contract without incurring moral hazard problems. In
the search for contracts which will share uncertainty between the
parties, provide motivation for the agent to give a high level of effort
and be a pareto improvement on a simple wage contract, the budget has
been examined. The resulting use of the budget is dealt with in the
next section.
6.5.3 Roles for the Budget in Agency Theory
In the basic AT model the principal is seeking a contract which
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will simultaneously provide the optimum effort level arid the optimum
reward function. The principal is seeking the u.ximum effort at least
cost whilst the agent is seeking the converse. Budget based contracts
have been advanced as a solution to this problem. A simple represent-
ation of this class of contracts is given by Walker and Choudhury:
w(x) = f(x) If x ^ x and
w(x) = g(x) if x x
where x represents the budget level and w(x) is
mono tonically increasing.
There are two particular forms of budget based contract which are
considered by Demski and Felthain (1978) and others who have reviewed
this literature.
The first is called the 'bangjjg 1
 contract. Using the formu-
lation above, this contract is of the form:
f(x)=a and g(x)=b
where a and b are constants, and a ^ b
The second is the dichotomous contract, which is of the form:
i) f(x) = c and g(x) = dx + k or
ii) f(x) = cx + k and g(x) = d
where c,d and k are constants
These contracts are shown in figure 6.4
Figure 6.4



















In the bang-bang contract, if the outcome is above budget the agent
receives a high reward, whereas if the outcome is below the budget
level, a much lower reward is paid. In the dichotomous contract, the
agent is paid a fixed wage if the outcome is above budget and If the
outcome is below this level, he would receive what he would have
received had a linear compensation contract been in operation. Demski
and Feitham demonstrate that for both of these budget based contracts
there exist sets of acceptable circumstances which produce a pareto
improvement over the linear contract with which they are being compared.
An important necessary condition for budget based contracts to be
superior to other contracts where there are moral hazard or adverse
selection problems, is that it should be costly to observe both the
worker t s effort and the state. This does not appear to be an unduly
harsh condition. Further, Feithain and Demski found it much easier to
find acceptable sets of circumstances in which the bang-bang contract
could be shown to be pareto superior than it was to find similar circum-
stances for the dichotomous contract. This again provides few problems
as the bang-bang contract would be easy to implement and is of a form
that has been used in practice
Demski and Feitham also demonstrate that there are circumstances
where budget based variance investigation contracts are pareto superior
to skill differentiating contracts. There are various conditions
attached to this result and it has not been demonstrated in the general
case.
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6.5.4 Conmient and Conclusions
This small aspect of the AT literature does reveal a role for the
budget which has not been emphasised in the other approaches discussed
in this chapter. The motivation of employees by means of the budget was
discussed in chapter 2 and there is a large literature from other disci-
plines in the social sciences which has been brought to bear on this
accounting issue. AT, from its roots in economics, brings a different
perspective. It says little about how budgets may be used to motivate.
Rather it concentrates on demonstrating that the use of the budget to
bring about increased effort is a rational objective for senior
management (the principal) as such a practice is superior to other
strategies available.
This rOle for the budget is clearly demonstrated within the
framework of AT, however, there are some serious issues which arise if
normative conclusions are drawn from this theory. AT is clearly an
abstraction from the real world; it does not include all the features
which a face a business organisation. Its defence would be that it
includes the essential aspects and no model is comprehensive. At the
heart of AT is the agent's utility function which has two elements:
wealth maximisation and the disutility of work. If this is compared to
other literature in the social sciences it appears to be a poor repre-
sentation of what motivates individuals (and says nothing about any
motivation that may arise through belonging to groups of individuals).
Two aspects of this weakness are particularly important. First, what is
not included, i.e. individuals may gain utility from many items other
than wealth. Second, there is evidence that work does not always cause
disutility; satisfaction from work is not unknown!
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There are also major problems concerning the empirical testing of
AT. Walker and Choudhury comment on this concluding that there are many
aspects of AT where there is currently no prospect of tests being
developed. The area of budget based contracts, where some testing has
been done, is one where more work may be able to give weight to the
conclusions that have been drawn from the theory. In the light of these
comments, one must be more than usually careful in drawing normative
comments from AT.
6.6 COMPARISONS AN) THE ROLE OF UNCERTAINTY
In the preceding sections, four organisational paradigms have been
examined. The objective has been to draw out implications concerning
the role of budgets in organisations. The purpose of this section is to
draw together these approaches and make some concluding remarks.
Organisations and budgets have been in focus throughout this
dicussion. One of the important issues is whether these four paradigms
are equivalent to four different perspectives on the same subject, or
whether different subjects are being viewed. It would be usual to
expect that different views of the same subject would produce different
pictures; if a house were viewed in close-up only the house itself would
be seen, whereas if it were viewed from a distance then it would be seen
in its context. Similarly, these four paradigms might produce different
pictures but each one adding insight as they were all viewing the same
subject. Such a position would be desirable, as it would enrich our
understanding of the rOle of the budget. On the other hand, it is also
possible that the terms used may be referring to different subjects and
thus any comparison would be fruitless.
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Tiessen and Waterhouse (1983) have made a comparison of M&H, AT and
Cr. Their starting point was CF and referring to the other two they
state
"The fundamental ideas advanced in these literatures are comple-
mentary to contingency theory and may serve to enrich it."
p 262
The comparisons in this section are made from a similar perspective i.e.
that these approaches reveal different aspects of the role that the
budget may play in an organisation. None of the approaches is complete,
and what is lacking in one may be found in another.
6.6.1 Comparisons
This section will commence by briefly noting some of the differ-
ences between the approaches that have been reviewed. Cl' and M&H draw
conclusions about the structure of the organisation, whereas AT and the
organisational power approach says little or nothing about this.
Structure is an important variable in the first two approaches but the
conclusions of the organisational power approach are independent of the
organisation t s structure and AT usually ignores this detail. In M&H the
Mt Form is advocated as a universally superior form of structure for
t large t
 organisations. In Cl', structure is conditional or contingent on
a number of variables.
The organisational power literature adopts a more social approach
than the others. It is particularly concerned with the social rOle that
the budget plays. At times it may appear remote from reality; it is
unlikely that anyone working in a large organisation would consider the
budget as myth or ritual, or recognise the concepts that lie behind
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these terms. However, these analogies may be helpful in understanding
why certain behaviour occurs or attitudes are held.
AT may also appear remote from reality but at the other end of the
spectrum. The assumptions that are needed to enable the problems to be
analysed in mathematical terms result in the problems being an abstr-
action. The assumptions in AT concerning near perfect markets are
clearly different from those in M&H where market failures are of the
essence. The normative conclusions that are drawn from AT have to be
treated with considerable caution, and empirical testing is particularly
difficult.
Having discussed some of the differences between these approaches
there are also some important similarities. All these approaches cons-
ider the context to some degree. This is the essential
feature of the CT approach as the conclusions depend upon the contextual
variables. AT gives the least role to organisation context as it
adopts a set of assumptions which include this aspect but context is not
a variable.
These approaches all incorporate the power relations within the
organisation, again in varying ways. The organisatiorial power
literature deals with this most thoroughly; power is a contingent
variable in Mintzberg's analysis; and in M&H and AT the power relations
between senior and divisional management are important features. There
are two other areas that will be dealt with separately below, viz, the
rOle of uncertainty and the general conclusions.
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6.6.2 The Role of Uncertainty
Tiessen and Waterhouse (1983) recognised the important rOle that
uncertainty played in the three theories that they reviewed (Cl', AT and
M&H) and this is equally true of the organisational power approach. The
crucial place of uncertainty in these approaches will now be considered
and compared. There are various forms of uncertainty, therefore, unless
specifically stated otherwise, uncertainty in this section refers to
environmental uncertainty.
In CT, as explicated by Mintzberg, uncertainty is one of the most
powerful contextual variables. Two aspects of uncertainty are cons-
idered: the environment can be measured on a scale from stable to
dynamic, arid on a scale from simple to complex. Some writers view this
in one variable on a scale from predictable to unpredictable where
uncertainty is the lack of predictability. The implication drawn from
this by Mintzberg is that where the environment is dynamic, the organi-
sation structure will tend to be organic; where the environment is
complex, the structure will become decentralised. These variables,
along with others, determine the type of structure and the budget will
play different rOles depending on the structure.
In this indirect manner, uncertainty has a clear impact on the rOle
of the budget. It is in the divisiorialised form that the budget has its
largest rOle and this form is only likely to occur under certain condi-
tions. One of the important conditions is that there should be a relat-
ively stable and simple environment. Under more complex and dynamic
environments other organisational structures will develop, which have a
smaller rOle for the budget.
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Bruns and Waterhouse (1975) discuss an organisation which Is
decentralised and structured, and which faces a stable environment.
Such an organisation Is not one of Mintzberg's typical forms as his
analysis suggests that a technologically complex environment will result
in decentralisation but riot the high degree of structuring that is
proposed and empirically found by Bruns and Waterhouse. However the
conclusion that decentralised and structured organisations will have a
major role for the budget in control is critically dependent on the
stable environment, i.e. where there is little uncertainty.
In the organisational power and related literature that has been
reviewed, uncertainty was a key feature. Burchell at at presented the
adaption of the Thompson and Tuden model which, in simple form, shows
the effect on accounting of two forms of uncertainty. One is internal
and relates to objectives, whereas the other is a form of environmental
uncertainty which is revealed in the lack of knowledge of the cause and
effect relationships. A high degree of uncertainty in both dimensions
of their model produces a rOle for the budget which is a rationalisation
of actions and decisions already taken. This is a very similar result
to that found in Cooper et at and their examination of the implications
of the model which is a description of actions under high
degrees of uncertainty.
The M&H approach incorporates an important rOle for uncetainty.
The concept of bounded rationality, which is probably the crucial
element in the organisational failures framework (really a market
failures framework), becomes critical because of uncertainty. It is
market failures that gives rise to the divisionalised form in which
budgets have a major rOle. Some critics of the N&H approach argue that
the treatment of uncertainty is a serious weakness in Williamson's
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analysis. In particular that treating uncertainty as ubiquitous, and
effectively as a constant, is inadequate and uncertainty needs to be
treated as a causal variable. It is this treatment of uncertainty that
leads to the result that the 14-Form organisation is universally
appropriate.
In AT the concept of ex ante uncertainty is a form of environmental
uncertainty. Ex ante uncertainty can be viewed as a contingent variable
in that where uncertainty is minimal, accurate predictions are possible
arid contracts based on output can be used as measures of effort. This
leads to a conclusion that budget based contracts will be important in
situations where there is uncertainty and output contracts would result
in an unacceptably high moral hazard problem.
6.6.3 Ceneral Conclusions from the four paradigms
6.6.3a Uncertainty and the rote of the budget
The relationship between uncertainty and the role of the budget is
complex and so any general conclusions must be treated with care, in the
knowledge that not all specific cases will follow the general
conclusions. The relationship is summarised in the following table.
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The Relationship between Uncertainty and the Rile of the Budget
UNGERTAINTY INTERVENING EFFECFS
	 ROLE OF THE BUDGET
Mintzberg	 low	 Bureaucratic or
	 Traditional
Divisionalised Structure control
B&W	 low	 Decentralised but
	 Traditional
structured	 control
Organstn.	 low	 Answer machines	 Traditional
Power	 control
M&H	 ubiquitous	 Bounded rationality —>
	 Traditional
M-Form structure	 control
AT	 low	 Effort observed in	 No control role
output	 for budget
	
high	 Acute moral hazard
	 Budget based
problems	 contracts
From the above summary it is possible to conclude that the Cl' and
organisational power literature suggest that under conditions of low
environmental uncertainty the traditional control rOle for the budget
will be important. The M&H literature does not contradict this, but
different levels of uncertainty are not considered. Therefore it is
possible within this approach that high levels of uncertainty would
still produce the M-Form structure in which the budget has a control
rOle.
The AT approach does not produce a conclusion that is consistent
with the others. Where there is low uncertainty, there is no need for
control by a budget based system as control can be maintained by
observation of physical output and by ensuring that specified procedures
are followed (Tiessen and Waterhouse (1983) p 256). Under high levels
of uncertainty there is a rOle for the budget in motivating high levels
of effort through the use of budget based contracts. The assumptions
upon which AT is based and its roots in information economics cause it
to be noticeably different from the other paradigms that have been
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adopted in this chapter.
The general conclusions from Cl', M&H, and organisational power are
compatible under conditions of low uncertainty. However, where condi-
tions of high uncertainty prevail there is greater diversity in the
conclusions. The cr literature concludes that uncertainty is one of the
major contingent variables which determine organisation structure and it
has been concluded in this chapter, that in different organisatiorial
forms there will be different roles for the budget. In the review of
the organisatiorial power literature, it was noted that under conditions
of high uncertainty, the budget took on rOles that were quite different
from the traditional control aspects. Under such conditions the budget
plays a more direct role in the determining of the balance of power in
an organisation; it is used in the political process; the budget setting
process may be of vital importance; and the rOle of the budget may not
be obvious within the organisation (rOles of myth and ritual, for
example, may only be clear to outside observers).
Thus it may be concluded that these paradigms do not produce
similar conclusions under conditions of high uncertainty. However, it
is not clear that these more diverse rOles are incompatible. When there
is high uncertainty, the picture becomes more complex and a greater
number of roles may coexist.
6.6.3b Other roles for the budget
The majority of the implications that have been drawn from the
review of these four paradigms have concerned the control or performance
appraisal aspects of the budget. Chapter 2 indicated that there are
other commonly discussed rOles and the results of the study in chapters
4 and 5 confirmed that these were perceived in the sample of
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companies investigated.
The planning and forecasting role have been mentioned and it is
likely that this is the most widespread of all rOles. Except under the
most extreme conditions of uncertainty a planning budget would be
feasible and highly likely. The related rOles of communication and
coordination have been given little importance in this chapter, yet they
figure clearly in the review in chapter 2 and they are not unimportant
in the findings of chapter 4.
There have been few comments regarding motivation in the CT, MRB
and organisational power literature. The discussion in AT is at a level
of abstraction which is almost divorced from the actual organisation and
bears little relation to the issues regarding motivation that have been
discussed in the rest of the accounting literature.
This rather limited view of the rOles of the budget, which
emphasises the control aspects, will be discussed further in chapter 7.
These four paradigms yield helpful insight into the rOles which the
budget ny play, in some important aspects their implications are




DNcLUS IONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FURThER RESEARCH
In this chapter the conclusions from the previous chapters will be
reviewed. A comparison will then be made between the empirical findings
and the conclusions regarding the role of the budget from the main
organisation paradigms, before proceeding to some overall concluding
comments. The research has revealed a number of areas where important
issues deserve further investigation. These areas, for future research
have been noted in the final part of this chapter.
7.1 PREVIOUS (X)NCLUSIONS REVIEWED
In chapter 2 the 'traditional' literature on budgeting was reviewed
to enable a number of working propositions to be advanced for empirical
examination in chapters 4 and 5. This literature is extensive and there
have been many important contributions in recent years. There is no
indication from this review that there is any waning of interest in the
general subject area of budgeting.
7.1.1 Conclusions from Chapter 4
In chapter 4 five general propositions were examined using the data
gained from thirteen U.K. companies. The propositions covered: the rOle
of the budget, the existence and consequences of budget pressure, the
attitudes towards participation, and the causes of the differences
between the companies. The conclusions from chapter 4 are set out below
Proposition 1. The company budget is most commonly viewed as a forecast
of future performance; however, there is a sizeable minority, spread
through all the companies, who perceive some target element in the
budget.
Proposition 2. The use of the budget as a control device through the
calculation and explanation of variances was considered one of the major
purposes of the budget, along with forecasting, assisting profit maximi-
sation and judging performance.
Proposition 3a. The pressure felt by most respondents in this study was
not perceived as emanating from accountants or senior management; the
greatest pressure experienced was internally generated and indicates
that the major motivation was personal.
Proposition 3b. There was no indication that pressure to meet the budget
caused dysfunctional behaviour; in fact, 86% of respondents considered
increased pressure would be beneficial, even though 97% of respondents
had experience increased or constant pressure in the preceding year.
Proposition 4. General participation in the setting of the budget was
not a feature found in these companies though, in all, there was a
desire to see increased participation. This desire was most strongly
expressed by accountants.
Proposition 5. The differences found between the companies could not be
explained by systematic differences in their organisation, structure and
environment. However, the particular unusual features of individual
companies could usually be understood in the light of their particular
circumstances. This may indicate that:
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(a) the relationships that could provide systematic explanations of the
differences between companies are more complex than this study was
able to elucidate, or
(b) the most important explanatory features are company specific and
are not likely to produce systematic explanatory relationships.
There was also a general conclusion which indicated that the
respondents in this sample believed that the budget should have
increased importance.
7.1.2 General Conclusions from Chapter 5
Chapter 5 examined the perceptions and attitudes of three important
user-groups, using similar propositions to those in chapter 4. The main
conclusions from chapter 5 were as follows.
Proposition 1. There is general agreement among the user-groups that
the budget is primarily intended as a forecast of future expected per-
formance. The senior managers would prefer this forecast role to have
less importance. There is general agreement that the budget does not
have a target or motivational element, but this is not as clearly
expressed as for the forecast rOle. A minority of senior managers
indicated that there were budget-related incentives, particularly via
promotion prospects, which did add a target or motivational element to
the budget.
Proposition 2. The general conclusion was that the three user-groups
agree that the budget in their company is used as a control device
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through the calculation and investigation of budget variance. The senior
managers gave more Importance to this role and accountants less.
Accountants give less importance to the general business oriented
rOles for the budget of uMAX and COMM. From the comments above there is
a picture of the SNFM group who want the budget to have a decreased
forecasting role, an increased control rOle, and to maintain the high
level of importance given to the business oriented purposes of the
budget. This group also sees a greater motivational role for the budget.
These differences are not great but amount to a difference in emphasis
which can be seen in the responses of the senior non-financial managers.
Proposttton. 3a. The two groups of managers give strong support to the
proposition that pressure will result from use of the budget as a
control device. Only half the accountants have this view.
Proposttton. 3b. The two groups of managers felt that the greatest
source of pressure was self-generated and thus there was little evidence
of resentment of the budget. However, accountants felt this
self-generated pressure had only the same importance as some of the
external sources of pressure. This may result in accountants who feel
pressure to meet the budget (only half in this study) may also feel the
resentment predicted by the literature. The user-groups agree that
budget pressure does not produce dysfunctional behaviour.
Proposttton l#. The existence of only limited participation and a general
desire for greater participation were found in all user-groups. It was
hypothesised that accountants, for reasons of control and power, would
want less participation, but the results show them as the most keen for
greater participation.
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7.1.3 General Conclusions from Chapter 6
Chapter 6 contains a review of four paradigms from the literature
on organisations and an examination of the implications for the role of
the budget. Under conditions of low uncertainty, CI', N&H and
organisational power produced similar conclusions, viz, that there is an
important rOle for the control aspects of the budget. The conclusions
from AT were not compatible.
Under conditions of high uncertainty there was a greater diversity
of conclusions. The traditional control or performance appraisal rOle
had a much smaller part and rOles which adopt a wider organisational
view were more important. These rOles often stressed the procedural
aspects of budgeting.
7.2 (DMPARISO{ OF THE MAIN (XJKi1JSIONS
There are some important comparisons that can be made between the
conclusions from chapter 6 and those from the empirical study. Three of
the organisation paradigms recognise that there is a major rOle for the
budget under conditions of low uncertainty. The rOle envisaged in this
literature appears to be that of traditional control or performance
appraisal. There is no definition of 'low uncertainty', however it is
the researcher's belief that the majority of medium and large companies
are operating in conditions which could be so described. There is
evidence for this in the study where there is a clear conclusion that
all but one of the companies investigated are using the budget as a
control device.
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The conclusions from chapter 4 also indicate that there are other
equally important roles that the budget is playing in these companies.
In particular, forecasting and planning, generally assisting profit
maximising behaviour, and to a slightly lesser extent communication, are
important. The literature reviewed in chapter 6 includes very little on
these issues. It would appear that these important rOles for the budget
have been overlooked by writers outside the accounting literature. This
may be because the writers see these other rOles as mundane or
unproblematic and thus they do not merit inclusion in their theories.
Alternatively, these issues may be deemed to be too detailed to find a
place in organisation paradigms which take a broader view.
The result of this is that the perception of the rOle of the budget
in the organisations which have been examined is not fully in accord
with the descriptions in the organisation paradigms that have been
reviewed. The empirical evidence has come from a broad cross-section
within the organisations and although it does not contradict the
theoretical position, it reveals that the paradigms reviewed may be
seriously inadequate in their treatment of the budget.
The literature reviewed in chapter 6 suggests that the budget may
take on much wider rOles in organisations which are faced with high
degrees of uncertainty. The companies that form the sample in this
study were not facing high levels of uncertainty, but some were in an
intermediate position where the markets they faced were undergoing
change and long term prediction was difficult. The questionnaires do
not give any indication of budget uses which would be in accord with the
predictions in conditions of high uncertainty. In fact the question
-
naires and the interviews with the senior financial official only
produced evidence of the 'accounting oriented' rOles for the budget.
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7.3 DNWJDING cII4ME1T1S
In the introduction the primary objectives of this thesis were
stated. The first was to seek a better understanding of the role of the
budget in U.K. medium and large sized companies. The sample of thirteen
companies, comprising 210 respondents, is not unrepresentative of this
class of companies and so the conclusions that have been drawn in
chapter 4 give a good indication of the role that the budget plays in
these companies. Similarly for the conclusions outlined below, this
study has been able to add some interesting new knowledge.
Interesting results have been found concerning the existence,
source and consequences of budget pressure, which cast fresh light on
the conventional understanding of this issue. Participation in the
budget setting process was not great and there was a general desire for
increased participation.
The perceptions of three important user-groups have been
investigated.	 There is a large degree of similarity in their
perceptions and attitudes, and some interesting differences,
particularly regarding the motivational use of budgets, the effects of
budget pressure and the desire for increased participation.
When these results are put in the context of the wider literature
review in chapter 6 it would appear that for the most common situation,
where there is not high uncertainty, it is the accounting literature and
the results of this empirical study which have the broader rOle for the
budget. This study was not able to make comparisons under conditions of
high uncertainty.
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7.4 AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCh
There are a number of areas,' most of which have been noted in the
preceding chapters, where further research would be beneficial to
confirm aspects where this study has found unconventional results or to
elucidate areas of uncertainty. These aspects for further research are
given below.
In section 2.6.3b it was noted that organisatiorial attitudes were
important features in the relationship between participation and
improved performance. However as it was also seen that participation
could be an important factor in improving organisatiorial attitudes,
there appeared to be a circularity that could fruitfully be explored.
The conclusions from chapter 4 indicate that the budget plays a
very small part in the motivation of employees, except indirectly for
some senior managers. Information concerning what motivates middle and
low level managers would be helpful generally and in the operation of
management accounting systems in particularly.
The results that budget pressure is primarily self-generated and
not resented is contrary to the prevailing view in the literature. The
majority of the literature on this subject has come from the U.S.A.
There is a need to confirm or refute the results found and to explore
further whether there are differences between the U.K. and U.S.A.,
particularly in the areas of budget pressure and budget based
motivation. Linked with the above is the need for further investigation
into what has produced the state where there is a high degree of self
generated pressure, as such pressure is likely to produce better long
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term results than high levels of external pressure.
Some of the results in chapter 5 imply that accountants have a less
business oriented view of the budget.	 With increased comment from
professional accounting bodies about the need for business aware
accountants, it would be helpful to know if the result found here was
general.
Finally, the effects of high levels of uncertainty on the roles
which the budget may play has not been examined in this study. The area
has received some attention, for example, studies into the effects of
advanced technology and rapidly changing markets on management
accounting, sponsored by C.I.M.A., but much more will be needed before a





QUESTIONNAIRE THE ROLE AND PERCEPTION OF BUDGETS
NOTES
1) This questionnaire is confidential and no individual's
reply will be communicated to any company taking part.
2) It is important to the success of the questionnaire
that each participant completes the questions without
consulting other employees of the company.















i) The questionnaire is being asked to gather much needed information
concerning budgeting practices in UK companies. Because of this, the
questionnaire is being answered by many different people and thus , some
of the questions may not appear particularly appropriate to your
situation. Nevertheless, it is vitally important that you answer all
the questions.
ii) In this questionnaire you are frequently asked to give your answer by
marking a scale in the appropriate place. Two examples are given here
to demonstrate how to use these. scales
(a) Suppose the question was "How often are you late for work?" and
the scale looked like this
I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I
never	 always
If you were late once a week on average, your answer would be
I	 II	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I
never	 a 7-ways
(b) Suppose the question was "How important is Kevin Keegan to the
success of the England foothall team?" and the scale was like this
If you thought that Kevin Keegan was very important but there were
other important matters also, your answer would be
I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I
not important	 extremely
important
iii) The scales are always labelled for each question so that you know what
each end means. You are required to mark on the scale the point which
best shows your answer to that question.
Please give the following information
Name of the company who employs you
Title of your job ---
Length of time that you have worked for the companyyears
Length of time that you have been in your present jobyears
A. Please indicate how important you think each of the following objectives is
in your company. Mark on the scale at the point whi(3h best describes your
company.
To maxiniise sales




To stay in business
To produce high quality
goods at competitive
prices
To do what is best for
Cu stone rs
To do what is best for
employees
To do what is best for
shareholders
I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I
I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I
I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I
I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I
I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I
I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I
To increase company's






Bi. Please indicate how much influence each of the following groups have in deter-
mining the objectives for your company. Briefl, look at que8tion°B2 before
you coniplete tin-B quest on.
Top central management I	 i	 I	 I	 I	 I
	
no influence	 total influence
I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I
I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I
I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 J	 I	 I	 I
Other people in the company	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I




I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 )	 I	 I
no influence	 total influence
I	 I	 I	 I-	 I	 I
1	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I
I	 I	 I	 I	 •I
Other people in the company 	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I
To judge performance
As a means of calculating
rewards
To motivate employees to
do better
To control performance by
calculating and
investigating variances
Any other purpose you think
is important (please state
below)
CL. Budgets may have a number of different purposes to fulfil within your company.
Indicate how important you think each of the following purposes is for your
company. Briefly look at questwn C2 before you complete this question.




To assist in profit
	 I	 Imaximising
As a means by which manage-
ment communicate to other	 I	 I	 I	 I
levels in the company
I	 t	 i	 i	 I.




I	 i	 i	 1	 I
1	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 •I
C2. Now indicate how important you think each of these purposes ought to be.







As a means by which manage-
ment communicate to other	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I
levels in the company
To judge performance
As a means of calculating
rewards
To motivate employees to
do better




I	 I	 I	 I	 II	 I
	
1111	 I	 Il
I	 I	 I	 I	 I
Any other purpose you think
is important (please state 	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I
below)
Top divisional management
People throughout the firm
Accountants
Any other group (please
state below)
C3. Which one of the following best describes the budget in your company (tick one
of the following) :
Average past performance
Realistically attainable performance but not too loose
A target to be aimed for
A forecast of expected performance
Performance under normal conditions
Such high performance that no-one can ever make it
Dl. Within your company various groups will have influence when the budget is being
drawn up. Indicate below how much influence each of the following groups have
in your company. Briefly look at queStion D2 before you w2swer thie queStion.
Top central management I	 I	 I	 I	 J	 I
no influence	 total influenoe
I	 I	 I	 I
I	 I	 I	 I	 I
I	 I	 I	 I	 J	 I	 I '	I
I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 .1
D2. Now indicate how much influence you think each group ought to have when the
budget is being drawn up.
Top central management
Top divisional management
People throughout the firm
Accountants
Any other group (please
state below)
I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 1
no influence	 total influence
I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I
I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I
I- .	 	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I
I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I
El. Do you receive any financial reward for achieving the budget you have been
given (e.g. bonus, commission etc.)?
Yes/No	 (delete as appropriate)
If you answer 'Yes', how important is this reward in relation to your salary?




E2. Do you suffer any financial penalty for not achieving the budget?
Yes/No
If you answer 'Yes', how important is this penalty in relation to your salary?




E3. Do you receive any financial reward for "good performance" in your jbb?
Yes/No
If you answer 'Yes', how important is this reward in relation to your salary?




E4. Do you suffer any financial penalty for "poor performance" in your job?
Yes/No
If you answer 'Yes', how important is this penalty in relation to your salary?
I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I
not import ant	 extremely
important
E5. Do you consider that your promotion prospects depend in part on your ability to
achieve the budget?
Yes/No
If you answer 'Yes', how important is achieving the budget to your promotion
prospects?




E6. Do you receive any non-financial rewards (e.g. 'perks' of some form) for
achieviig the budget or "good performance"?
Yes/No
If you answer 'Yes', how important are these rewards in relation to your salary?
....I	
i ' i	 I	 I	 I
not important	 extremely
important
E7. Please give brief details of any of these non-financial rewards or penalties.
Fl. How important is the budget in attaining the company's primary objectives?
I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I
not important	 extremely
important
F2. How much does the budget help to improve individual performance?
I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I
no help	 extremely
helpfi4l
F3. Does the budget ever hinder the improvement of your performance?
Yes/No	 (delete aa appropriate)
Gi. Do you feel any pressure put on you to meet the budget?
Yes/No	 (delete as appropriate)
If you have answered 'Yes', then complete the next two parts.
(32. How strong is this pressure to meet. the budget?











I	 I	 I	 •I	 - I	 I	 I	
-j
no pressure	 a7l the pressure
I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I
I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I




G4. Do you think more or less pressure to meet the btdget would help in attaining
the company's major objectives?
more pressure/less pressure
	 (delete as appropriate)
G5. During the last year or so has any pressure on you to meet the budget
increased/remained constant/decreased (delete as appropriate)
G6. If there has been any change, why do you think thLs has occurred?
Thank you for completing this questionnaire; your co-operation is appreciated and
without it this research could not take place.
A stamped-addressed envelope is provided for you to return the completed
questionnaire. It will be a great help if you could do this as soon as possible.
APPENDIX 2






Company Employees	 £m	 Group	 Products	 Markets	 Cycle
	2,170	 > 100	 Yes Chocolates	 Almost all UK
	 Long lead on
new products
2	 3,300	 80	 Yes	 Undercarriages,	 export	 2 year lead
hydraulics, etc. 	 governments	 time on new
products




4	 11,000	 500	 Yes	 Aircraft	 Worldwide	 Long
substantial
govt. share
5	 1,550	 40	 Yes Packaging	 10% UK market	 Short
share

































































B&W	 Bruns and Waterhouse (1975)
BS	 Budgetary Slack
COMM	 Budget purpose; As a means by which management communicate
with other levels in the company
CONVAR	 Budget purpose; To control performance by calculating and
investigating variances
Cl'	 Contingency Theory
FEP	 Forecast of Expected Performance
FLM	 First Line Management
FORECAST Budget purpose; To forecast the future
JUPERF	 Budget purpose; To judge performance
IMSUP	 Immediate superiors







Budget purpose; To motivate employees to do better
People throughout the firm
Performance Under Normal Conditions
Realistically Attainable But Not Too Loose
Reliance on Accounting Performance Measures
Budget Purpose; To assist profit maximising
REWARD	 Budget purpose; As a means of calculating rewards
SNFM	 Senior Non-Financial Managers
TARGET	 A target to be aimed f or
TCM	 Top Central Management
TDM	 Top Divisional Management
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